DGANIT RAVIV, Respondent, v LIOR RAVIV, Appellant.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
884 N.Y.S.2d 81
Ordered that the order and supplemental order are modified, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provisions thereof directing that the defendant pay 100% of the fees charged by the parenting coordinator, and substituting therefor provisions directing that the parties each pay 50% of the fees charged by the parenting coordinator and that the plaintiff reimburse the defendant 50% of the fees previously paid by him to the parenting coordinator; as so modified, the order and supplemental order are affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The parties were divorced by judgment entered December 8, 2005. Pursuant to the terms of their separation agreement, which was incorporated into, but did not merge with, the judgment of divorce, the parties shared legal custody of their three children. Additionally, the agreement provided that any party who unsuccessfully challenged or sought to modify or enforce its terms would be required to reimburse and indemnify the other party for all legal fees and expenses incurred in the defense of such action. In June 2008 the plaintiff former wife, claiming that the parties were unable to effectively coparent, moved to modify the divorce judgment so as to award her sole legal custody of the children. The defendant former husband opposed the motion and cross-moved for an award of an attorney‘s fee and expenses incurred in defending against the motion. The Supreme Court declined to award sole custody of the children to the plaintiff, but it appointed a parenting coordinator to help the parties meet the cooperation obligation inherent in the award of joint custody. The court also directed the defendant to pay 100% of the parenting coordinator‘s fees, and it denied his cross motion for an award of an attorney‘s fee and expenses. The defendant appeals from the directive ordering him to pay 100% of the parenting coordinator‘s fees and the denial of his cross motion for an award of an attorney‘s fee. We modify.
Moreover, although the court did not award the plaintiff the specific relief she sought, it nonetheless granted her motion to the extent of appointing a parenting coordinator to assist the parties with their coparenting responsibilities. Consequently, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant‘s cross motion for an award of an attorney‘s fee and expenses.
The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Fisher, Eng and Hall, JJ., concur.
