Facts
- Juan Cristobal Calderon, a California prisoner, alleged that Correctional Officer C. Vue raped him and inflicted physical violence on March 25, 2018 [lines="13-21"].
- Calderon claims that he was attacked while sleeping and has physical injuries as a result [lines="21"].
- Defendant Vue asserts that he had no interaction with Calderon on the date in question, citing evidence that he was logged into a computer during the alleged attack [lines="111-121"].
- Medical records indicate that Calderon reported being assaulted shortly after the incident, but no physical injuries were documented by medical staff upon examination [lines="210-222"].
- Calderon has a history of mental health issues, including schizophrenia, and has previously made multiple unsubstantiated claims of being attacked by staff [lines="225-234"].
Issues
- Whether Officer Vue's motion for summary judgment should be granted based on Calderon's allegations of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment [lines="12-14"].
- Whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding the alleged attack and the resulting injuries [lines="90-91"].
Holdings
- The court recommended granting Officer Vue's motion for summary judgment, finding that Calderon's claims were self-serving and uncorroborated [lines="336-337"].
- The evidence did not support the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the alleged assault, as documented injuries were absent and Calderon's mental health history compromised his credibility [lines="330-335"].
OPINION
RAVIN CROSSBOWS, LLC, v. HUNTER‘S MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. d/b/а TENPOINT CROSSBOW TECHNOLOGIES
CASE NO. 5:23-cv-598
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
July 1, 2024
CHIEF JUDGE SARA LIOI
Case: 5:23-cv-00598-SL Doc #: 192 Filed: 07/01/24 PageID #: 3866
Before the Court is the motion (Doc. No. 156 (Motion for Reconsideration)) of the defendant, Hunter‘s Manufacturing Company, Inc. d/b/a/ TenPoint Crossbow Technologies (“TenPoint“), for reconsideration of the Court‘s order (Doc. No. 149 (Memorandum Opinion and Order on Motion to Strike)) striking portions of TenPoint‘s supplemental invalidity contentions and inequitable conduct claims. Plaintiff Ravin Crossbows, LLC (“Ravin“) filed a brief in opposition. (Doc. No. 175 (Brief in Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration).) For the reasons set forth herein, TenPoint‘s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court discussed the facts of this case at length, both in its Markman order (Doc. No. 148 (Markman Order)) and in its memorandum opinion and order (Doc. No. 149) grаnting in part Ravin‘s motion to strike TenPoint‘s supplemental invalidity contentions (the “first opinion“). In summary, this case was originally brought in the District of Nevada on December 17, 2021. (Doc. No. 1 (Complaint).) From the outset, the parties disputed the scheduling order and disclosure requirements. (See generally Doc. No. 34 (Disputed Discovery Plan); see also Doc. No. 139-2
Ravin served its initial infringement contentions on May 23, 2022. (Doc. No. 89-6 (Infringement Contentions).) On July 7, 2022, TenPoint served initial contentions that challenged only six of the one-hundred and three claims at issue, arguing that they were anticipated by US Patent No. 20120125302 (“Stanziale I“). (See generally Doc. No. 139-1 (LPR 1-8 Contentions).) Fifteen months later, after the case was transferred to this Court and in the midst of claim construction briefing, TenPoint served Ravin with supplemental contentions introducing thirty-three new invalidity claims under anticipation or obviоusness theories, and new allegations of inequitable conduct. (Doc. No. 141-1 (Supplemental Contentions).) The Court discussed TenPoint‘s supplemental contentions, and Ravin‘s opposition to the same, during a telephonic status conference on November 8, 2023. (Minutes of Proceedings [non-document], Nov. 8, 2023.) The parties briefed the issue at the Court‘s direction. (Id.; Doc. No. 139 (Brief in Support of Motion to Strike); Doc. No. 141 (Brief Regarding Supplemental Invalidity Contentions).)
On March 6, 2024, the Court granted Ravin‘s motion to strike as to claims based on newly referenced prior art, denied the motion as to claims based on Stanziale I, and struck TenPoint‘s new allegations of inequitable conduct claims as improperly pled. (Doс. No. 149, at 18–21.) TenPoint filed a motion for reconsideration on March 28, 2024 (Doc. No. 156.), which Ravin opposed. (Doc. No. 175.) The motion is now ripe for review.
Although a motion for reconsideration is not mentioned in the
The purpose of a motion to alter or amend judgment is to request “reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.” See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989) (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dep‘t of Emp. Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982)). “It is not the function of a motion to reconsider either to renew arguments already considered and rejected by a court or ‘to proffer a new legal theory or new evidence to support a prior argument when the legal theory or argument could, with due diligence, have been discovered and offered during the initial consideration of the issue.‘” McConocha v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 930 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (quoting In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F. Supp. 1403, 1408 (S.D. Ind. 1994)). In other words,
“In this circuit, a district court may alter a judgment under
III. DISCUSSION
A. TenPoint was Required to Supplement its Contentions in a Timely Manner.
TenPoint first argues that the Court improperly applied the
At the outset, L.P.R. 2.3(c) provides that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)‘s requirements concerning the supplementation of disclosure and discovery responses apply to all disclosures required under the Local Patent Rules.” Nevertheless, TenPoint contends that the Court, through L.P.R. 3.10(a), eliminated
This analogy relies on a misunderstanding of the Court‘s standing order. In Joseph v. Advanced Transp., Inc., this Court exрlained that its initial standing order requires only a timely answer under
TenPoint‘s argument that the Court incorrectly imposed a good cause requirement to amend initial contentions fares no better. “Good cause” appears nowhere in the first opinion.
Finally, any reliance TenPoint placed in its analysis of other districts’ patent rules was misplaced. The Court did not apply a novel interpretation of the Local Patent Rules. Indeed, numerous other courts have applied the
B. TenPoint‘s Supplement was Untimely.
TenPoint next argues that, even if
Even if this argument were properly before the Court, it fails to change the analysis. TenPoint‘s submissions show that three attorneys spent 734 hours between May 2022 and October 2023 preparing invalidity contentions. (Doc. No. 156, at 13.) By the Court‘s calculation, this means that TenPoint spent approximately 3.4 hours per attorney per week preparing invalidity contentions. This expenditure of rеsources stands in contrast to the nearly 500 hours that TenPoint dedicated to inter partes review over the course of just three months. (See Doc. No. 156-5.) It was not, as TenPoint argues (Doc. No. 156, at 8), impossible to supplement its disclosures in a timely manner. Rather, as Ravin explains, TenPoint‘s failure to supplement its contentions in a timely manner was the result of strategic decisions to pursue other activities. (Doc. No. 175, at 7.) Such
More importantly, these arguments do not challenge the Court‘s conclusion that TenPoint knew that its contentions were incomplete for over fifteen months and did nothing to notify Ravin or the Court of this deficiency. (Doc. No. 149, at 9.) In the interim, the parties briefed for claim construction based on the six claims TenPoint asserted in its first set of contentions. (See Doc. No. 175, at 15.) When TenPoint did elect to serve its supplemental contentions, it sought to change the fundamental nature of the case by introducing thirty-three new claims and ten pieces of prior art.
In the first opinion, the Court noted that TenPoint engaged in gamesmanship by “wait[ing] to finalize its contentions until claim construction was fully briefed and it received a covenant not to sue from Ravin[.]” (Doc. No. 149, at 9.) The evidence that TenPoint engaged in gamesmanship has only gotten stronger since the first opinion. In its brief, Ravin attached documents which show that TenPoint was aware of seven of the ten prior art references it disclosed in its supplemental contentions not only since before claim construction began, but since before the onset of this litigation. (See generally Doc. No. 175-1 (TenPoint Document).) Permitting TenPoint to introduce thirty-three new claims and ten prior art references in the midst of claim construction, when it knew of that prior art since the outset of this litigatiоn, would only “promote principles of
As this Court explained, the purpose of permitting amendments to initial contentions is to allow parties to refine their infringement theories as litigation progresses. Fast Felt Corp. v. Owens Corning Roofing & Asphalt, LLC, No. 3:14-cv-803, 2017 WL 4876789, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July 26, 2017). The Local Patent Rules do not grant parties license to “spring entirely new theories that potentially disrupt the case schedule” by “withholding information until the last possible moment.” Id. That is exactly what happened in this instance. TenPoint‘s late disclosure deprived both Ravin and the Court of the opportunity to meaningfully engage in claim construction. Its strategic choices to alloсate its resources to inter partes review and additional motion practice do not persuade the Court to ignore TenPoint‘s lack of diligence in supplementing its contentions.
Finally, as the Court explained, any notice Ravin received from TenPoint‘s petition for inter partes review fell well short of a proper disclosure under L.P.R. 3.5 because it did not provide a сhart identifying limitations or the precise grounds for invalidity as applied to the patents at issue in this case. (See generally Doc. No. 86-1 (Petition for Inter Partes Review).) Because Ravin was left without information that would have been included in a proper disclosure under L.P.R. 3.5, it is incorrect to say that Ravin had knowledge of TenPoint‘s invalidity positions relative to thе prior art provided in TenPoint‘s supplemental contentions. See Sjostrand v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:11-cv-462, 2014 WL 4417767, at *2 (finding that the “made known” exception applies where the non-disclosing party received the “functional equivalent” of a proper disclosure).
Finally, TenPoint contends that the Court erred in finding that its late supplеments were not harmless or substantially justified under
i. Disruption to Trial
In its first opinion, the Court explained that the potential disruption to trial weighed against finding that the supplement was harmless or substantially justified because the case was already behind schedule, and because adding additional contentions would likely require another round of claim construction, potentially delaying the October 28, 2024, trial. (Id. at 13–14.)
TenPoint argues that the Court did not weigh this factor properly because the claim construction briefing schedule, coupled with the large amount of claims initially asserted, made it impossible for TenPoint to supplement its contentions in a timely manner. (Doc. No. 156, at 14–15.) The Court has already explained why it was not impossible for TenPoint to supplеment its contentions in a timely manner, pointing to its strategic deployment of resources and dilatory tactics throughout the case. TenPoint does not dispute that its late supplement would likely entail further delay in this case, threatening to delay the trial. Instead, it argues that the Court could engage in a rolling claim construction, issuing multiple rulings as needed. (Id. at 16.) While the Court acknowledges that other courts sometimes conduct multiple claim constructions, it also
TenPoint also argues that the Court improperly weighed potential prejudice to Ravin. But Ravin has repeatedly urged this Court to pursue a more expedient timetable, citing prejudice. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 89 (Opposition to Motion to Stay), at 5–9.) The Court did not simply credit Ravin‘s bare assertion of prejudice, but rather found merit to Ravin‘s persistent urging of this Court that further delays would be prejudicial. Notwithstanding any prejudice to Ravin, TenPoint‘s argument still does not challenge the Court‘s determination that its late supplement threatened to disrupt the trial schedule in a case that had already seen a substantial delay and generous case management schedule. The Court finds no error in its analysis of this factor.
ii. Importance of Evidence
In the first opinion, the Court noted that this factor can often cut both ways. (Doc. No. 149, at 14.) Accordingly, the Court found that the importance of the evidence in this case was neutral. (Id.) The evidence was important to TenPoint but allowing the late supplement would prejudice Ravin. (Id.) Ample case law exists to support the proposition that the importance of the evidence can, and often does, cut both ways. See, e.g., Bisig v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 940 F.3d 205, 220 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing EQT Prod. Co. v. Magnum Hunter Prod., Inc., No. 5:16-cv-150, 2017 WL 2295906, at *5 (E.D. Ky. May 25, 2017), objections overruled sub nom. EQT Prod. Co. v. Magnum Hunter Prod. Co., No. 5:16-cv-150, 2017 WL 4974782 (E.D. Ky. July 19, 2017)). The Court weighed the evidence in this case and determined the same was true here. But even if this factor
iii. Explanation for Delay
Finally, TenPoint takes issue with the Court‘s analysis of its explanation for its untimely disclosure. Here, TenPoint offers three explanations for its untimely disclosure, two of which the Court evaluated in the first opinion. (Doc. No. 156, at 16.) First, TenPoint reiterates its argument that Ravin could not unilaterally withdraw from the parties’ agreement to allow amendments. (Id.) The Court did not find that Ravin had withdrawn from such an agreement; instead, the Court saw no evidence that such an agreement ever existed. (Doc. No. 149, at 14–15.) The District of Nevada did not adopt this agreement, Ravin denied the existence оf such an agreement from the outset, and Ravin moved to amend its own contentions. (Id.)
As to TenPoint‘s additional explanations—namely, the alleged impossibility of complying with the timeliness standard, and its reliance on L.P.R. 3.10—the Court has already addressed these contentions elsewhere in this opinion. In short, the Court does not credit the argument that TenPoint was unable tо comply with the timeliness standard of
For all the reasons set forth herein, TenPoint’s motion to reconsider (Doc. No. 156) the Court’s memorandum opinion and order granting in part Ravin’s motion to strike (Doc. No. 149) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 1, 2024
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT