delivered the opinion of the court.
In this case the Raven Red Ash Coal Corporation was the employer, The Maryland Casualty Company was the insurance carrier, and Henry Absher, an employee of the coal company, was claimant before the Industrial Commission.
On March 18, 1922, this claimant, while in the course of employment, was injured and for the time being totally disabled. Thereupon he entered into a compensation agreement with the employer, subsequently approved by the Commission, under which he was to receive from the coal company, during thе period of total disability, $10.00 a week.
In accordance therewith, he was so paid from March 18, 1922, up to and including February 6, 1923, or for a period of forty-six and four-seventh weeks. On February 7, 1923, he appeared to have recovered and resumed work, and this was the situation up to and including January 23, 1925, or for a period of 102 and three-seventh weeks. On January 24, 1925, thеre was a recurrence of total disability and compensation theretofore agreed upon was paid up to and including April 5, 1925, or for ten and two-seventh weeks. On April 6, 1925, he resumed work and continued work up to and including May 11, 1925, or for a period of five and one-seventh weeks. On May 12, 1925, he again became totally disabled and so remained until Decеmber 4, 1926, or for a period of eighty-one and five-
He was still рartially disabled, and applied to the Commission for additional relief. From the date of his injuries to that on which payments ceased, there were 107 and four-seventh weeks in the aggregate during which he had been paid nothing, as is shown by the statement which we have made, the reason therefor being that he, during those periods, appeared to have rеcovered, although this in fact was not true.
If he was entitled to be paid for three hundred weeks, the award of the Commission is correct. If the right to rec ., er expired by limitation three hundred weeks from the date of the injury, it was erroneous. Therefore, it becomes necessary to determine what is a proper construction of said section 31 of the wоrkmen’s compensation law, which provides:
“Except as otherwise provided in the next section hereafter, where the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, thе employer shall pay, or cause to be paid, as hereinafter provided, to the injured employee during such incapacity a weekly compensation equal to fifty per centum of the difference between- .his average weekly wages before the
This statute is highly remedial and should be liberally construed, and the judgment of our painstaking and able Commission is entitled to the utmost consideration; but the employer and the insurance carrier are entitled to fair consideration also.
Of course, it is competent for the legislature to say that in such circumstances compensation should be paid for three hundred weeks, but that was not done. The statute states that “in no case shall the period covered by such compensation be greatеr than three hundred weeks from the date of the injury.” If this be construed to give to the employee unconditional compensation for three hundred weeks, then the phrase “from thе date of the injury” is meaningless. This violates a fundamental rule of construction. Every part of an act is presumed to be of some effect and is not to be treated as meаningless unless absolutely necessary.
Uncertainty and confusion would follow if the judgment were upheld. Indeed, it would be difficult to say when liability would end. If a man was totally disabled temporarily аnd on account thereof was paid compensation for a year, and then apparently made a complete recovery, he might forty years afterwards, if рartial disability developed from his original injury, again successfully apply for relief. Such a liability, so
In Johnson v. Iverson,
“Plaintiff was injured, as stated, on November 20, 1920. His compensation commenced November 27, 1920 Under the compensation law, his injury resulting finally in permanent partial disability, he was entitled to wеekly compensation to continue during disability, not, however, ‘beyond 300 weeks.’ This provision is a limitation as to the time beyond which
The Minnesota statute (Gen. St. 1923), under which this case was decided, reads in part as follows:
“Section 4274 (a). “This compensation shall be paid during the period of such disability (referring to temporary totаl disability), not, however, beyond three hundred weeks payment to be made in intervals when wage was payable, as nearly as may be.”
Section 4274 (b). “This compensation shall be paid during the period of such disability (referring to temporary partial disability), not, however, beyond three hundred weeks, payment to be made at the intervals
Section 31 of our statute is certainly not less favorable to appellants than this Minnesota lаw.
We hold that no payment can be demanded after 300 weeks from the date of the injury.
The judgment and award of the Industrial Commission will be reversed, and final judgment entered here for the appellants.
Reversed.