Rausch v. McVeighRausch v. McVeigh
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Kahn
OPINION OF THE COURT
Lawrence E. Kahn, J.This is a motion for an order pursuant to
The action which was commenced by service of a sum
Counsel for defendants, urge that this action was commenced more than one year after the date of the alleged occurrence and is therefore barred by the one-year Statute of Limitations set forth in
New York Jurisprudence succinctly sets forth the general provisions of law regarding assaults by persons who are alleged to be under a disability such as the case at bar. “[Pjublic policy places upon one with impaired mental powers the same liability for assault and battery as it places upon those of normal mentality. There is no sound reason, it is said, why the victim of the violence of an
In determining whether the one-year Statute of Limitations set forth for the tort of assault and battery, or the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth for a recovery of damages for all other personal injuries applies, the key element to be discerned is that of intent. “Negligence is distingiushed from assault and battery by the absence of that intent which is a necessary ingredient of the latter” (Jones v Kent, 35 AD2d 622). It is alleged herein that defendant, William McVeigh, Jr., is incapable of forming an intent to commit a tort of assault. While common law has long held such a person liable for his actions, such a holding has been based upon public policy and without regard to the ability to form the requisite intent to commit the tort. “There can be no distinction as to the liability of infants and lunatics, between torts of nonfeasance and of misfeasance — between acts of pure negligence and acts of trespass. The ground of the liability is the damage caused by the tort. That is just as great whether caused by negligence or trespass; the injured party is just as much entitled to compensation in the one case as in the other, and the incompetent person must, upon principles of right and justice and of public policy, be just as much bound to make good the loss in the one case as the other” (Williams v Hays, 143 NY 442, 451).
The plaintiff has alleged a cause of action to recover for damages for a personal injury through an occurrence on July 16, 1976. No allegation of an intentional act by defendant, William McVeigh, Jr., is alleged. Accordingly, this court finds that the alleged cause of action is governed by CPLR (subd 5), and accordingly, a three-year Statute of Limitations is applicable.
Accordingly, the motion for an order pursuant to