Raulerson v. StateRaulerson v. State
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- McMurray
Defendant was charged in two Uniform Traffic Citations with driving with a suspended license and driving with a prohibited bodily alcohol concentration in violation of
While on early morning patrol on August 6, 1994, Trooper G. W. Rogers of the Georgia State Patrol passed an oncoming Mercedes Benz automobile traveling at a low rate of
1. The trial court erred in admitting the results of defendant’s breath test because the State failed to establish that its Intoximeter 3000 machine had all of its electronic and operating componénts attached and in working order as required by
2. Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because Trooper Rogers stopped her without specific, articulable facts giving rise to á reasonable suspicion that she was engaged in criminal conduct. We agree.
Although we construe the evidence most favorably to upholding the trial court’s findings and judgment, “[t]his court’s responsibility in reviewing the trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress is to ensure that there was a substantial basis for the decision. Brown v. State, 190 Ga. App. 324, 326 (378 SE2d 908).” Chastain v. State, 196 Ga. App. 50 (1) (395 SE2d 570). To this end, we observe that “ ‘an officer may conduct a brief investigative stop of a vehicle [only when] such a stop [is] justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. . . . This suspicion need not meet the standard of probable cause, but must be more than mere caprice or a hunch or an inclination.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jorgensen v. State, 207 Ga. App. 545, 546 (428 SE2d 440) (1993).” State v. Jones, 214 Ga. App. 593 (448 SE2d 496).
In the case sub judice, Trooper Rogers testified that he stopped defendant because, at 1:20 in the morning, defendant was driving “between 25 and 30 miles an hour . . .” in a 55-mph speed zone, defendant turned onto a dirt road when he first began following her, and defendant returned to the highway — driving at a relatively slow rate of speed — after the trooper drove his patrol car out of defendant’s sight. These reasons alone, however, do not support Trooper Rogers’ conclusion that defendant was “an impaired driver or a burglar. . . .” See
State v. Goodman,
220 Ga. App. 169, 170 (2) (469 SE2d 327). Trooper Rogers did not observe defendant weave in the highway, react slowly to oncoming traffic, endanger life or property, operate her car improperly, or otherwise demonstrate that she was intoxicated. The trooper’s testimony shows only that defendant was driving an automobile, early in the morning, at a lawful rate of speed. Nonetheless, the State argues that Trooper Rogers was justified in stopping defendant because defendant’s slow speed impeded the flow of traffic in violation of
First, defendant could not have been impeding the flow of traffic in violation of
3. We do not reach defendant’s final enumeration of error in light of our holding in Division 2 of this opinion.
Judgment reversed.
Johnson and Ruffin, JJ, concur.