66 How. Pr. 368 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1884
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants are now and were at the- time named in the complaint a domestic corporation; that she now-is; and has been since the 12th of February, 1876, the owner and. possessor in fee of certain lapds and premises in- the- complaint particularly described; that by an act of the legislature, passed in' 1873, and' amended in 1874,. the defendants, by the name ánd
To the" complaint the defendants demur, on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. If the allegation in -the complaint that the defendants are now, and were at the times "in the complaint named, a domestic corporation, is an allegation of a matter of fact, it is clear that the demurrer cannot be sustained upon the ground principally argued by the defendants’ counsel, to wit, that the defendants are not a corporation and that actions cannot be maintained against them, for the reason that the demurrer, according to old established principles, admits such facts as are- properly pleaded. (See United States agt. Ames, 99 U. S., 45, and cases cited.)
It is equally well settled, however, that the demurrer only
How in this case,- independently of the reference to the statute referred to in the complaint, which prescribes a portion of the duties of the defendants, this court must, I think judicially take notice of the fact that the defendants constitute a part of the municipal government of this city, and that their powers are defined and limited by the charter of the city and other public statutes in relation to that subject (See Swinnerton agt. Columbian Ins. Co., 37 N. Y., 174-189).
If I am right in this assumption then it follows that the demurrer is well taken, for the reason that the admission of the allegation that the defendants are a domestic corporation is an admission only of the legal conclusion which the pleader who framed the complaint drew from the various statutes under which the defendants have their existence. In other words, I am of the opinion that as the defendants- derived their powers from public statutes, of which the court can take judicial cognizance, the complaint is to be read in construing the allegation that the defendants are a domestic corporation in the same manner as if those statutes had been annexed thereto. If such statutes had been annexed the conclusion of the pleader as to their force and effect could have no greater efficacy than would an averment in the complaint as to the meaning or contents of a paper set forth therein, or annexed to or made a part thereof; and in such cases, as has already been seen, the courts have uniformly held that such averments are not admitted by a demurrer. Under the charter the park department is a mere subdivision of the city government and is not itself a body corporate (See Swift agt. The Mayor of New York, 83 N. Y., 533).
Ho statute has been cited which gives to the board of commissioners of the department of public parks any greater corporate powers than those conferred upon the other departments of the city government. All the departments are but parts of the city corporation, which alone possesses corporate capacity (See charter, chap. 335 of the Laws of 1873, and the acts amendatory thereof). Entertaining these views I am of the opinion that the board of commissioners of the department of public parks are not liable to be sued as a corporate entity, and that therefore it is unnecessary to discus's any of.' the other questions presented in the case.
The defendants are entitled to judgment upon the demurrer,, with costs.