107 Cal. 229 | Cal. | 1895
This action was brought by Rauer to recover an assessment for work performed in the construction of a sewer, and certain street work connected therewith, under a contract with the superintendent of streets, in the city and county of San Francisco. Written findings were filed and judgment entered for the plaintiff, and the appeal is from said judgment and an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial.
The said certificates of the city engineer, together with the assessment, warrant, and diagram, were then offered in evidence by the plaintiff, and were received over the objection of defendant. Of the numerous grounds of objection stated in the record two only need be noticed: 1. That said certificates are not shown to be the certificates of the city engineer; and 2. That the assessment, warrant, and diagram, together with the certificates of the city engineer were not recorded in the office of the superintendent of streets.
1. As already stated, these certificates were signed, “C. S. Tilton, City Engineer, H. D. G.” The addition of the letters, H. D. G., if they did not absolutely indicate that the certificates were not signed by the city engineer in person, were sufficient to call for an explanation before receiving them in evidence. There is no addition to his title known to the law that could be
The defendant, however, afterward called as a witness H. D. Grates, who testified that throughout the year 1892 he was employed by the city engineer as an ordinary employee, but never was his deputy. That Mr. Tilton did not make the examinations himself, but certain employees made the examinations of the work and left in the office notes thereof, and that he, the witness, prepared the certificates from said notes and signed the name of the city engineer thereto, adding his own initials to indicate that he had written that officer’s name; that when he was first employed, in the beginning of the year 1891, he was instructed by Mr. Tilton to make out the certificates and sign his name to them, and that Mr. Tilton had nothing to do with them except through him as his employee.
The Political Code, section 4112, provides: “ Every county and' township officer, except county judge, supervisor, and justice of the peace, may appoint as many deputies as may be necessary for the faithful and prompt discharge of the duties of his office.”
Section 865 of the Political Code provides: “In all cases, not otherwise provided for, each deputy possesses the powers and may perform the duties attached by law to the office of his principal.”
The general rule is that an officer has no authority to appoint a deputy unless it is specially conferred, especially where the duties of the office involve trust, skill, and confidence. (State v. City of Buffalo, 2 Hill, 434.) It would seem to follow that, if a deputy cannot be appointed unless authority to make the appointment has been conferred by law, that a mere clerk or employee could not be empowered by an officer to perform official acts, and that the making of a certificate which is essential under the statute to create a lien upon real estate is an official act is beyond question. That such certifi
Appellant also contends that the certificates are insufficient upon their face. It is not necessary to decide that question, but it should at least be said that they are unsatisfactory as evidence of the proper completion of the work.
2. The second ground of objection to the introduction in evidence of said papers, viz., that they were not properly recorded, should be noticed. Section 9 of the act of 1885, as amended in 1891 (Stats. 1891, p. 205), after prescribing the form of the warrant, provides as follows: “ Said warrant, assessment, and diagram, together with
In Buckman v. Cuneo, 103 Cal. 62, it was said: “ By the act approved March 18, 1885, it was only necessary to create a lien, such as is sought to be enforced in this action, to record the warrant, assessment, and diagram. But by the act of March 14, 1889, the recording of the engineer’s certificate was made an additional and necessary prerequisite to the creation of a lien thereunder. Ror does the creation of such a lien depend upon whether the owner of the lot had notice of any of these proceedings, but upon the recording of the warrant, assessment, diagram, and engineer’s certificate; and, if they were recorded as provided by the terms of the statute, then a valid lien was created upon the defendant’s lot, otherwise not.”
In that case the recorded certificate showed upon its face that the work was completed except as to a certain part which the certificate stated was shown by the diagram on the back thereof. It was held that the diagram thus referred to was a material part of the certificate, and should have been recorded with the certificate, and because it was not, no lien was created.
In the case at bar the testimony shows that the assessment, warrant, and diagram were duly recorded in a book kept for that purpose, and designated “ assessment records,” while the engineer’s certificates were recorded in a small book kept in the same office, but not with the assessment records, nor was it in any way referred to in the assessment record so as to make it even constructively a part of that record. The statute
Appellant further contends that the contract under which the sewer was constructed is void, because it “ guaranteed the street superintendent and his sureties and bondsmen immunity from liability.”
I think this provision can have no such effect. If the defendants are injured by any acts of the superintendent of streets for which that officer is liable personally, or upon his official bond, they are not affected by this clause of a contract to which they were not parties. That they may have such action against the superintendent of streets, see Goodsell v. Ashworth, 96 Cal. 397. This precise question was decided against appellant’s contention in Byrne v. Luning Co. (Cal., Dec. 3, 1894), 38 Pac. Rep. 454.
The case of Brown v. Jenks, 98 Cal. 10, cited by appellant, is not in point.
It is further contended that the contract did not fix the time for the commencement of the work, and for that reason the contract is void, citing Libbey v. Elsworth, 97 Cal. 316.
The provision in the contract now under consideration is: “ The work to be commenced within fourteen days from the date of the contract.”
In Fletcher v. Prather, 102 Cal. 413, the same words were used to fix the time of commencing the work, and it was held sufficient; and in White v. Harris, 103 Cal.
The judgment and order appealed from should be reversed.
Vanclief, C., and Belcher, C., concurred.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment and order appealed from are reversed.
Temple, J., McFarland, J., Henshaw, J.
Hearing in Bank denied.