*1 Ratony Estate. Before January 20, 1971. J., Jones, C. Bell,
Argued Pomeroy JJ. Roberts, Barbibri, O’Brien, Eagen, *2 L. and Ashton, Franklin him with Gordon Gordon, for appellant.
William R. him Milton Keen, Jr., Apfelbaum, with for appellee. by
Opinion June 1971: Chief Mr. Justice Bell, This appeal involves the of a validity postnuptial Separation Agreement.
Decedent, Alexander Ratony, Jr., appellant, Julia on Ratony, were married June 1940. On June the purchased Ratonys property Coatesville, as tenants Pennsylvania, the by entireties. Sixteen months later, then being separated, they conveyed for a net sum On property December 11, 1941, f620. executed a formal they Separation Agreement. The Agreement was drawn decedent’s who attorney, also witnessed its signing. After the Agreement was entered into, parties continued to live apart and made no appellant attempt to attack or set aside or the clear ignore language of this Agreement or the mutual promises they made therein, until after de- August death on cedent’s 26, 1968, twenty-seven years later. mu- contained which
In Separation Agreement, all divided they (1) releases, and mutual promises tual they home which their of the sale of proceeds the net $620; namely as tenants entireties, owned and personal furniture all to divide (2) agreed certain leased well as they articles which owned, mutually important (3) most all, articles; and, full settle- complete this shall be a that “... agreed parties of all between property ment [and] any shall have time neither party from this forward, the other.” owned property interests made this they case were (when his wife gave The husband extremely poor. Agreement) in the he had world. everything one-half separate in which lived they twenty-seven years made back appellant attempt go never apart, or to get any support and live with the husband, *3 of subsequently acquired or to claim any prop- him, attempt to set aside or or made attack erty, any Agreement. Separation provides
The Separation Agreement as follows: “Separation Agreement made 11th “This of day December, Alexander and between and Ratony, Jr., Julia, witnesseth: wife, differences have arisen “Whereas between the par of which are they ties on account now separated and apart and living separate now and are intending live and each other apart separate during the remain natural their and Uves,* der of the home formerly
“Whereas occupied by the parties and the sold various been debts has connection with estate have been real and paid, the said there has resulted a fund of “Whereas six hundred and dollars twenty ($620.00), and ours, throughout unless otherwise * Italics noted. a upon agreed mutually have
“Whereas parties of all the retention upon and division of the furniture, and have other to each belonging articles personal leased or take certain to either return over agreed articles. and com- therefore in settlement, adjustment
“Now, the par- and promise questions rights, all property, ties hereto the division mutually agreed upon have that ($620.00) of the said hundred dollars twenty six and dollars hundred and ten upon the three payment this shall be ($310.00) thereof Julia, wife, all be- complete settlement property full tween the neither parties. forward, par- From this time ty shall have interests any any property owned by any the other. language clearer?] [Could
“The said Julia hereby expressly agrees said division the said shall be lieu payment all claims for and she support expressly agrees hereby that she will not further claim assert against said husband.
“This does not or in prevent way militate either party ask obtain a nor divorce, does it admit or deny any such right.
“In witness whereof the do hereto set their hands and seals this 11th day December 1941.
(s) Julia Ratony
(s) Alexander Jr. Ratony, “(s) Walter A. Herley, Witness to both “Received full. $310.00 Dec. 14, 1941.
(s) Julia Ratony” filed an Appellant election to take against deced- pursuant ent’s will and, Section 11 of the Estates P. L. an Act of election to take against cer- of his inter vivos conveyances. tain Since the estate is relevant insolvent, only election is her claim 11. Section She under therefore filed objections to the based executrix, of decedent’s final and account first were assets which include certain on her failure to The lower lifetime. his during decedent transferred and valid to be Separation Agreement found the Court decedent and e‘the the date thereof, that, wife proceeds other than the no assets possessed items with certain together home their sale of former in the agree- referred to items personal of furniture important finding very that date.” This ment was cer- which the completely ignore, minority fact, evidence tainly unquestionably supported and the together above-quoted Agreement with and, is therein de- promises contained, mutual releases of this case! the Court confirmed Accordingly, cisive and dismissed objections. the account appellant’s This followed. appeal contention that appellant’s Separation
It its Agreement, notwithstanding crystal-clear language and its mutual promises and mutual releases property interests then “from time owned other, discloses want or forward” failure of consideration, and, does not consequently, bar take will or his (so-called) inter vivos conveyances.
findWe no absolutely merit any of appellant’s contentions. we are of
Preliminarily, opinion princi- antenuptial ples applicable even agreements, though and the the consideration circumstances may sometimes differ are slightly, equally applicable to postnuptial See Slagle’s agreements. Appeal, Pa. 442, 144 Atl. 426.
It is a
general principle
law which has existed for
promises
that mutual
centuries
are binding upon the
thereto and furnish
valid consideration. Section
on
Williston
Contracts
(3d Ed. 1957); §75, Re
of the Law,
statement
Contracts; 8 P.L.E., Contracts,
*5
Co.,
Paper
Moore Paper
Bryant
&
Co. v.
§45; Jessup
Pa. Estate,
129 Atl.
Gredler
559;
In Rosciolo parties en Pa., supra, tered into a mutually-executed antenuptial agreement. was drawn
This an for the hus attorney present band the wife did not and, case, have an attorney. provided: pertinently that all the agreed properties name or “[I]t wherever nature, real, personal mixed, they may belonging party found, first part before shall be and remain marriage, his personal forever, ...” There then estate. followed a disclosure of their respective but properties, there was no to an respect with provision abandonment of the right to take against of a wife husband’s will.* her husband’s the wife death, elected to Upon take presented her husband’s will. She against several con- she limited to finally which one, tentions namely, she and her right her claim to an election “based to take on the fact that his will Antenuptial against Agree- similarly provision no abandonment * And a husband against right his wife’s will. take and less specific language contained less ment [which in the than does the Agreement clear releases waiver did not an express contain present case] of the fact take spite will].” [to understood Italian) that Mrs. Rosciolo (an spoke *6 of a unanimous Su- little the very English language, our “In 466-467): judgment, stated preme (pages Court of ei- this Antenuptial Agreement precludes to other, ther take the will of the even party is no there waiver” though express We believe the of the following portion present “in and all compromise settlement . . . Agreement, of questions and hereto property, rights, the have parties that and . . . this shall be com- mutally agreed a full plete settlement all the between property rights par- of ties. From this time neither halve forward, shall party any property interests owned the any property clearly and other,” that the unequivocally provides wife all gave rights to and all up rights and all property interests of any property decedent then or time forward owned by the husband. of Because the different and very intimate relation ship of husband and (and wife of prospective spouses), one two additional factors has been required vali of date and postnuptial ante- agreements. An antenuptial or postnuptial agreement is presumed valid and parties the thereto binding upon and the party seeking to avoid or or nullify circumvent the agreement has, without the any doubt, burden of the proving invalidity of the clear and convincing evidence. That burden can be met either by proving one of the two fol a (1) lowing reasonable provision the factors — was not made at spouse the claiming time the agree of ment or absence (2) a a provision, full disclosure the other’s fair worth was not made. the reasonableness must be Moreover, determined as of the not in date the light of hind
461 mockery a test would make a sight “hindsight” —such Estate, the rule and the of life. realities Hillegass 431 244 A. 425 Pa. 117, Pa. 2d Gelb 144, 672; Estate, A. 2d In (page 228 we said Hillegass Estate, 367. : 150) An
“(1) Antenuptial Agreement presumptively valid thereto. binding upon or “(2) person avoid seeking nullify* circumvent has burden of Agreement proving clear and convinc invalidity Agreement by ing spouse evidence deceased at the time neither made a reasonable Agreement (a) provision the intended nor disclo spouse, (b) full fair sure (or her) worth. Gelb Estate, Pa., supra, 123; Kaufmann page Estate, Pa., supra, page Justice [per ; McClellan Estate, Pa., supra, Jones] page 407; Emery Estate, Pa., pages supra, 146; Snyder A. 2d 67.
“(3) the of evaluating reasonableness the pro- vision for the survivor, reasonableness must the determined as time the Agreement and not by of of Gelb hindsight. Estate, Pa., supra, page 123; Kauf- mann Pa., supra, page [per Justice Reasonableness will depend upon the totality Jones]. of all the facts and at the circumstances time the of Agreement, including the (a) financial worth of the husband; (b) intended the financial status of the in- wife; tended . . .”
Even if nullify we and the ignore clear and unam- of this language Agreement with biguous all its mutual escape we cannot the promises, conclusion that a gift division) the husband to (or proper his separated (and years thoroughly satisfied) wife of one- of he had all the world everything half was not only but provision undoubtedly reasonable a fair one. * Htttegasa qnote in this are Bitate. Italics this when at least impliedly, recognized
Appellant, had additional that her husband attempted prove she the witness was only and undisclosed assets. Appellant which to offer evidence of the additional property time the she contends decedent at now was owned ashed When the executed.* Separation Agreement was aside whether she decedent owned any property or from in the that mentioned in she answered the Agreement, to the extent At a later she recanted negative. hearing “prop the word that she then testified she thought that, estate she referred to real only thought erty” ac of had a bank at the time the decedent Agreement stated she Specifically, count and stocks bonds. National bank accounts were that the decedent’s S. and that the bonds were U. Bank Chester Valley at paid place War Bonds deduction his by payroll stipulation parties, of employment. However, to and at the time prior later revealed that it was he had no account The Na Separation Agreement no Bank of Chester deduction Valley payroll tional job. at the decedent’s With to the regard was in force un appellant owned was by decedent, stocks allegedly names of the stocks to recall the companies able broker. evidence short, only or the name had additional assets at the time of decedent was statements appellant’s conflicting Agreement beliefs. The lower Court justi unproved fully a matter of fact that “... as De in finding fied decedent and possessed no cember 11,1941, wife proceeds sale other than their assets certain items with together home of furniture former *8 * objected appellant’s testimony to estate for the on Counsel Rule, Act of P. L. Dead Man’s P.S. the basis initially overruled, objection but at a sustained §322. However, thereupon (unwisely) hearing. counsel for the estate later objection. withdrew in the that and items personal agreement referred of date.” dissenting Opinion
Mr. Justice Roberts states support that this is a “consensual settlement.” This only and contention obliterates completely ignores, nullifies all the and mutual and settle- express agreements ments “of . from questions all and . . rights neither time forward shall have party any prop- other.” erty interests owned the any property This far of separation is more than an far, support. and Justice Roberts contends Furthermore, the waiver the or claim support right of wife’s for her part husband a clear intent on the “evinces $620 the the to be parties to the divided between them was to serve lieu of further de- support This payments.” obviously completely her void merit —it wife gives the only the amount which would have resulted in tiny $310, on ridiculous amount a based year, $13.28 lived after length time she the Separation Agree- ment was executed. Justice Roberts further contends there was a want of consideration for Agreement. promises He not overlooks aforesaid only mutual and mutual and property agreements he settlements, both (1) also overlooks facts that were (2) and the wife iix extremely acquired, addi- poor; aforesaid sum of money tion to the and a division of and other personal their a furnishings property, right existence her life (a) any without separate her without husband, (b) any interference or house; such as cook duties, duty marital keep secured her absolute she she (3) liberty; (4) to receive and keep, secured without important or thereto from husband claim she any money might inherit, therein, (a) her husband from her win. work, (c) make (b) reverse the Jones would Court Mr. Justice below received no he believes wife consideration, because *9 464 then advo Justice provision.
or no reasonable
Jones
of consideration
the determination
new
for
cates a
test
tbe fact
first
He
overlooks
in a postnuptial agreement.
time
from this
that
agreed
mutually
the parties
in
or interest
have no
each would
forward
furnish
These mutual promises
the other.
property
our
(see
many
this agreement
consideration
legal
reasons exist
and no sound or
supra)
justifiable
cases,
our
decisions
change
to
us to invalidate or
prior
induce
In addi
promises meaningless.
and render these mutual
tion
our
further
prior
supported by
we are
decisions,
2d
Kaplan
recent case of
v.
25 Ill.
182
Kaplan,
In
N.E. 2d
discuss
Kaplan,
Court,
such mutual
releases were
valid consid
whether
a
ing
eration for a
a husband
between
property settlement
and tvife,
said
: “.
. without
pertinently
708)
.
(page
considering other elements of consideration
flowing
could
plaintiff which
be mentioned
mutual
such
covenants
were
themselves
sufficient
Kroell v.
agreement.
219 Ill.
76 N.E.
Kroell,
105, 112,
v.
63; Seuss
N.E.
Schukat,
Ill.
27, 34,
1461.”
A.L.R.
See also, Rockwell v. Est.
Rockwell,
24 Mich. App.
180 N.W. 2d
24 Am. Jur.
498;
2d,
and
Divorce
No
Separation,
matter how named,
§887.
Justice Jones
seems to hold that whether
prom
mutual
ises
mutual
releases
are
valid consideration
depends upon
whether
surviving spouse or the de
spouse
ceased
the one
“is
who relinquished his or her
intestate
share in exchange for certain property.”
Whether or not
this is called a “hindsight”
test —as
we
it
believe
is—its nomenclature is immaterial. What
important
is
inescapable
is the
fact that such a waiting
or test
period
directly
the teeth of the test which
flies
our prior cases have established and
we
which,
repeat,
Justice
himself has aided in establishing.
Jones
Pa. 131, 137,
For these find no merit in reasons, we the contentions made or by in appellant erron- eous and novel interpretations enunciated in the dis- senting which Opinions, make realistically nullity prior our decisions the clear and express mutual promises agreements which the parties themselves made and kept twenty-seven years.
Decree affirmed; appellant to pay costs. Eagen Mr. Justice and Mr. Justice Pomeroy concur in the result. Concurring by Opinion Mr. Justice Barbieri:
I concur in the conclusion reached Opinion the Court and disagree with the dissenters two I reasons. First, believe that the separation agreement in this case encompassed all property rights between the two and not spouses just the matter of support. sufficient legally was I believe that there
Secondly, agreement, Under to the widow. consideration as of the sale net proceeds received one-half she tenants by had owned which as they their house, she to which not receive that did entireties. she Thus, widow Levine did the as legally entitled, already where, prior A. 2d 741 (1955), Pa. was owned separation agreement, to the has uncovered in common. research My a tenancy tenant the entireties has by no that a indicating case limited circum except very right power, divorce.* The prior separation partition stances, case the widow the gave present thus she could not have ob to an interest otherwise predeceased from or tained divorced except by being her husband. Dissenting Opinion Mb. Justice Jones: I must dissent from the reluctantly expressed view majority opinion. *11 reiterating It to me the that appears majority, or full and fair provision the “reasonable disclosure” lost consideration sight necessity has test, for postnuptial agreement. this so-called cases turn- * argument proceeds is that the of There no the sale of the See, e.g., not also owned the entireties. 41 house were C.J.S. par §§481, has 485. Our Court not allowed Husband Wife spouse except when “one an entireties estate has been tition of appropriating the or own use so that there exclusion,” Linett, 142, wrongful 138, Linett v. 437 Pa. has been a ; (1970) Lindenfelser, v. see also 396 A. 2d 849 262 Lindenfelser incompetent, spouses (1959) ; when one of 530, the is A. 2d 901 153 Pa. Appeal, & Trust Co. Bank rboro Pa. 59 A. Inte explicit implied (1948); court finds an the or when 2d 101 partition, spouses Berhalter, agreement Berhalter v. the between any (1934). There is no indication Atl. that Pa. postnuptial prior present to the conditions these in this case. is there standard, provision” “reasonable on the
ing is whether there question occasion to no generally a sufficient whether the is consideration; inquiry usual implied an On the other hand, been given. amount has test is fair “full and disclosure” to the corollary to support be consideration there requirement below the court I would affirm agreement. Although “full fair disclo- if latter alternative —the only necessary question I it to first sure” test —is find met, of Alexander Ratony’s provision the reasonableness his wife. prior
While decisions realizing many Court indicated that crucial examination date for provision” test the date of “reasonable execution, I, articulated the statement “such initially, rea- that, must be determined sonableness the date of the not by hindsight”. Kaufmann 2d 171 A. I 131, 137, have never any displeasure intimated with this principle con- and, to the I do trary majority’s not assertion, now advocate adoption hindsight test. the crux of Perhaps my dispute with the majority’s provision” “reasonable examination merely represents a different perspective. it is no Nonetheless, coinci- dence that the majority states at places two opin- its ion, different slightly “the words, gave husband wife one-half Tie everything had the world.” (Em- added.) To phasis my way thinking, more correct statement of this would thought substitute pronoun “the “they”: gave husband his wife one-half of every- had in the thing world.” they I Indeed, as shall demon- I strate would state shortly, that, “the husband gave his wife she had in everything the world.”
Reviewing Julia agreement, Ratony received: *12 proceeds one-half (1) the sale of the former fund was residence —a she entitled to as a matter of personal her (2) law; property which she effects — 468 certain all and (3)
owned and controlled at
times;
her
to
belonged
of which
of furniture —one-half
pieces
Returning test, position is that even if there had been my a full and fair disclosure (a dubious assumption my opinion), there is no consideration this agreement. Besides the this Commonwealth cited precedents Justice dissenting the over- opinion, Roberts whelming weight authority recognizes that a post- nuptial separation like agreement, any other con- valid tract, supported must consideration. 41 Am. Jur. Husband 26A Wife, (1968); C.J.S. Des- §262 cent and Distribution, (1956). Although the ma- §58b jority legal *13 for a consideration does not furnish existing
already
for an
it does
as
settlement
postnuptial
2d Husband
41 Am. Jur.
agreement.”
antenuptial
necessary
it becomes
Wife,
Accordingly,
§263
consideration.
to search for Alexander
elusive
Ratony’s
I
that Julia
Insofar as
have
demonstrated
already
received no
con
tangible
only arguable
benefits,
cor
sideration
Alexander
was his
supplied
Ratony
in
release
his intestate
share
Julia’s
responding
so
the mu
estate;
sole
is whether
framed,
question
in
tual
release
each
of his or her interest
spouse
the estate
the other
the valid considera
constitutes
tion
postnuptial
a
necessary
separation
research
a conflict of
agreement.
authority
discloses
My
on
v.
37 Ind.
point.
Unger
Compare,
Mellinger,
For I these reasons dissent. *14 by
Dissenting Opinion Mr. Justice Roberts: In I am compelled dissent three reasons. I am unable first view place, accept majority’s that Julia and Alexander Ratony mutually intended document on December to be a signed 11, 1941, and a of Mrs. Ratony’s waiver release interest statutory I her husband’s estate. think the Secondly, agreement should be held void and unenforceable for reasons of policy. public Finally, agreement is invalid for want consideration.
The majority opinion ignores some the most fundamental principles our underlying domestic rela tions law. it Primarily, ignores the distinction between settlements marriage (postnuptial antenuptial agreements) concerning disposition of the spouses’ respective interests the estate other, sep aration agreements concerning spouses to and the of a live apart wife to support, mainte and the nance, property presently owned jointly between by them as tenants the entireties. This distinction is crucial in many circumstances. For example, a separa tion may agreement abrogated a reconciliation, whereas a postnuptial property settlement will not be annulled merely by reconciliation, it is the intention parties and surrounding facts which deter type mine what of agreement has been created in each See Zlotziver v. case. 355 Zlotziver, Pa. 49 299, A. 2d
471
v. DiVale
ex rel. DiValerio
Commonwealth
(1946);
779
A. 2d 687 (1951);
82
Pa.
Ct. 477,
rio,
Superior
v. Makowski,
rel. Makowski
ex
Commonwealth
see
(1948);
generally,
A. 2d 71
Ct.
Superior
103; Note,
and Wife, §§24,
Husband
P.L.E.,
Dick. L.
(1935).
Rev.
separation
I
that the
document was
Ratony
believe
settlement.
marriage
rather
than a
no
I
think Mrs. Ra-
it
do not
matter what
case,
was,
in Alex
intended
interest
tony
statutory
to waive her
ander
We have a tradition
Ratony’s
closely
estate.
and the
nuptial
scrutinizing
agreements
surrounding
circumstances.
Ann
Mary
Slagle’s Appeal,
E.g.,
Pa.
There is no in evidence the record that Mrs. Ratony even knew of the existence her intestate rights or her right take her against husband’s will. It is well established that where a husband and wife separate be- 1 Hillegass Estate, portion In the relevant of read as foUows: '“Whereas it is the intention of the intended wife to waive, relinquish and bar all her inchoate intestate and other interests, or either as wife or widow Party, of the First any property acquired and to now owned or hereafter the First Party, including right of election to take the Will of Party.’” 147, (emphasis Id. at 244 the First A. 2d at 674 omitted).
472 is the wife together,
cause cannot live happily they on his to her his estate entitled interest statutory of those death absent a clear waiver expression Atl. 699 109 Lawton’s 266 Pa. rights. Estate, 558, the sur- as long This holds true (1920). principle to the estate, not forfeited her viving spouse has mali- if willfully as. she she would example, to his prior deserted her for one year husband ciously P.S. death. Act 20 §6, Intestate P. L. 80, 1947, §1.6. (1962); Watt A. 2d 781 See 409 Pa. 185 Estate, 44, Hudak No 118 2d 383 Pa. A. 577 Estate, 278, forfeiture in the case. present occurred
Confronted with at best an ambiguous agreement,
should
we
the traditional
of con
guided by
rules
attempt
struction
this area.
do not
Courts
generally
a
read
broad waiver
unclear
rights into
intestacy
documents.
Estate
Dick, 102 Pa.
Ct.
Superior
589,
157
(1931)
Atl. 349
it was stated: “Without
the agree
governed
law
ment,
relations of husband and
and within well
wife,
understood
limits,
possible
disposition
devolution of the
of either.
property
By
their
they
agreement,
prescribed
themselves certain
changes
the law
their
governing
marital
status dif
ferent
what
prescribed.
law
But
there
no
on the death of
that,
the devolution
either,
prescribed
intestate law shall not
So
take
place.
radical
change in the legal rights of
must
be stated
or at
expressly,
least appear
by inevitable implication: Talbot v. Calvert, 24 Pa.
Rice v.
327;
Rice, W.N.C. 672; Scott’s Estate
(2),
A. 214;
102,
Kaiser’s Estate,
I accept cannot the conclusion that Julia Ratony *16 here did the Dick what opinion requires to surrender in her her interest husband’s estate. There also is evi finan with unfamiliar completely dence that she was not advised and that she or legal cial agreements be con of the wife should counsel. The intelligence the provi the reasonableness sidered evaluating See for her in a agreement. sion postnuptial Kaufmann Warn (1961); 2d 404 Pa. 171 A. Estate, 48, 131, 137, er’s 57 Atl. (1904). 207 Pa. Estate, 580, this
Aside from the
of mutual
question
intention,
unforceable for
public
should be
reasons
While a
remains
a husband
policy.
couple
married,
owes a
support
even where
duty
wife,
David
separation
consensual. Commonwealth ex rel.
v.
549,
178 Pa.
port during
income
property,
into consideration her husband’s
or station
condition
and the
earning capacity,
family’s
Zehring,
ex rel.
v.
Zehring
in life.
Commonwealth
See
(1958).
Finally,
for
unenforceable
want of
consideration. Almost a century ago it was established
that a court of
would
equity
not enforce a postnuptial
if the wife has received no benefit under it,
and a wife’s rights under the intestate laws would be
preserved for her. Campbell and Others’ Appeal, 80 Pa.
298,
(1876)
(report of the
Chief
master,
Justice
adopted by the Court).
Thompson,
This principle was applied in a more modern con
in
text
Levine Estate, 383 Pa.
A.
354, 118
2d 741 (1955).
husband and
There,
wife executed a postnuptial
agree
ment that one-half of a certain checking account would
belong
the wife
exchange
her release of all
his estate. After the husband died, she elected
to take
the will on
the theory that here had been
2 See, e.g.,
Duncan,
149,
Estate
87 Colo.
(1930) ;
tors to one-half of the fund to Mrs. would pay Levine, not constitute to refrain consideration her promise *18 part estate. claiming any Acknowledge- his ment of what to another clearly belongs by law cannot be advanced as consideration. equity ... It is true that the of 1949 also under was seal, but as to that there was a failure of consid- eration Mr. for, Levine what indicated, specified it to upon was he intended confer in wife exchange for her all claims to abandoning part of his estate. her what But he could not he give promised, for that it not cogent reason his to It give. was im- him to to possible pass what was already for wife hers.” Id. at 118 A. 2d 358-59, at 743. (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, Julia and Alexander Ratony owned and sold the in Coatesville as tenants Appellant by entireties. was entitled to one-half of a as matter of law. I proceeds fail to com- Hence, prehend “agreeing” how to waive her rights in his for one-half of estate those proceeds can be viewed as being supported any meaningful consideration. urges that majority promises “mutual”
Mr. and Mrs. to waive Ratony any interest they each in have the other’s estate might serves as sufficient con I this agreement. sideration have already indicated accept I not the proposition that do the Ratonys promises. such mutually exchanged Nor do I believe sus to legally is alone sufficient an exchange that such Camp agreement. antenuptial an postnuptial tain “ ‘Equity it was stated: supra, Others’ Appeal, bell and con equitable unless in this particular, follows the law rule. modify to cause given appear siderations altogether settlement For where a postnuptial instance, the gift has been executed fair and equitable, settlements, post-nuptial to her passed (for wife has husband and mere between gifts are strictly speaking, case Rel. she might wife: Schoul. Dom. 276), other perform it; words, equity required re her to her rights chancellor would refuse to restore linquished in the after the death the hus settlement, band. It will the nature depend upon much, therefore, and value of the interest has been with parted which as a wife consideration what she has received whether or way not she to be settlement, ought entitled to Cord relief; on Married et sec. Women, seq. The as also the authorities, reason the thing, seem to teach that . . . the . . never . bound aby wife mere consideration.” promissory Id. at 306. (Emphasis added.)
The majority’s proposition that Mrs. Eatony’s ac- quisition as “her things absolute (she liberty” was still married), “a a separate existence *19 for her life without any interference from her husband, and (b) without any marital duties, as the duty cook or keep house” serves sufficient legal considera- tion for this ambiguous agreement is certainly novel and without precedent. decisional I, am one, unable it. accept
I dissent.
notes
principles
ante-
governing
nuptial
postnuptial agreements may
dif-
sometimes
fer due to the consideration
supporting
agreement,
equation
of these
general
two
types
contracts
rule
overlooks
that,
marriage,
since
“[t]he
it
*
Ratony
Since Alexander
was alive when the furniture was
divided,
no occasion to invoke
there is
the common
presumption
law
owned the
husband
furniture
contained
in the marital
King Estate,
of his death:
home at
time
2dA.
Matheny Estate,
(1956) ;
Superior
Pa.
Ct.