31 W. Va. 798 | W. Va. | 1888
Suit in equity instituted February 7,1888, in the Circuit Court of Wood county by John Y. Rathbone, Charles H. Turner and A. G. Clark suing on behalf of themselves and all other stockholders of the Parkersburg Gas Company, against said gas company, O. S. Despard, B. M. Despard, H. Goff and W. A. MacCosh.
The bill avers, that said gas company is a domestic corporation organized in 1865 for the purpose of supplying the city of Parkersburg and its inhabitants with gas; that it is
The bill finally avers that, by reason of a collusion of a majority of the stockholders with 0. 8. Despard, and the neglect of the majority of the directors, the plaintiffs are helpless, and have no way of protecting themselves against the fraud and wrongs of which they complain, except by the interposition of a court of equity; and therefore the plaintiffs pray that the gas company, the said 0. S. Despard, in his own right and as president, of said company, and each of the other defendants, their agents, etc., be enjoined from collecting any money due the company, or in any manner interfering with its funds or affairs; that a receiver be appointed to take charge of the property and assets of the company, collect the money due to it, and administer its affairs, carry on the business of the company, and take care of its property ; that said 0. S. Despard be required to account for the properly, money, and other things belonging to the company ; that an
The bill was answered by all the defendants except MacCosh, and the cause, having been set for hearing as to the plaintiifs’ motion for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver, came on to be heard on March 8,1888, by the Circuit Court, upon said motion, on the pleadings, which, being sworn to, were treated as affidavits, the depositions, and the several affidavits filed by the respective parties, and the argument of counsel; on consideration.of all of which the court decided that the plaintiffs had made out a proper case for the intervention of a court of equity; and therefore it awarded the injunction prayed for in the bill, and appointed a receiver to take charge of all the property and estate of the gas company, and to operate and manage its works in the manner prescribed in said decree, until the further order of the court.
From this decree all the defendants, except W. A. Mac-Cosh, obtained an appeal, with supersedeas.
I have stated fully all the material allegations of the bill, for the reason, that the important question presented for our determination is, whether or not the plaintiifs by their bill make a case which entitles them to relief in equity. It may be stated, as a general rule, that there is no wrong or fraud, which the directors or officers and agents of a corporation may commit, that can not be redressed by appropriate and adequate remedies. From the fiduciary relation, which the directors of a corporation hold to the corporation itself and to its shareholders and creditors, and from the fact, that they are held to strict good faith in the management of the corporate concerns, it follows, that they are liable either to the corporation, or in a proper case to the shareholders or creditors for a fraudulent breach of trust or misappropriation of corporate funds, whereby a loss or injury results to the corporate assets. Brinekerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52; Ang. & A. Corp. § 814.
It may be stated, however, as a rule equally well established, that redress for a wrong against the corporation should
The managing agents of an ordinary private corporation are invested with wide discretionary powers. It is often a matter involving the exercise of much judgment whether or not it is expedient in a given case, to begin litigation on account of an actionable injury. It. is not always the duty of the managing agents of a corporation to go to law immediately, whenever a wrong has been done to the corporation. The advisability of suing for redress, and the time and manner of proceeding, are largely intrusted to their judgment; and it. is their duty to give the corporation the benefit of their best j udgment in this respect. The refusal of the agents to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the corporation, even when requested by its shareholders, may possibly be a judicious exercise of the discretion conferred upon them. This discretion ary power confided to the agents can not be usurped by the shareholders, and therefore the courts will
In order to entitle a shareholder to sue he must show, either, that the managing agents are themselves the authors of the wrong, or, that their refusal to bring suit in the name of the corporation is an act of bad faith, or an abuse of the discretionary power vested in them. Even this rule is subject to this qualification: The directors and agents of the corporation are inferior to and under the control of, a majority of the shareholders. Consequently, when the directors refuse to discharge their duty, they may be removed or controlled by a majority of the shareholders. Thus, in order to confer upon a shareholder the right to sue, in a case in which the primary right is in the corporation, he must not only show, that the directors are in default or wrongfully refuse to sue, but he must show, that a majority of the shareholders have been appealed to, and, that they are also guilty of misconduct, or willfully and wrongfully refuse to act in the matter. 1 Mor. Priv. Corp. §§ 242-246; Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 493; Hodges v. Screw Co., 53 Amer. Dec. 624, note, 637; Cook Stocks, §§ 677, 678. In Stevens v. Davison, 18 Gratt. 819, the act complained of was done ultra vires, and had been repudiated by the stockholders in regular meeting, and the question of the right to institute that suit was not raised or considered by the court.
It was held by this Court in Crumlish v. Railroad Co., 28 W. Va. 623: “ If it be made to appear in any manner, that the corporation can not safely be left to obtain relief through the action of its officers, equity will interfere at the suit of a stockholder, without proof of a demand upon the managing-agents, and their wrongful refusal or neglect to proceed on its behalf.” This rule, as applied to cases such as that then before the Court, is well sustained by the authorities. That was a case, in which the corporation had ceased to exist both in law and in fact, and there were neither directors nor stockholders willing to act in its behalf.
It is very evident, that there is a wide difference between that case and one in which the corporation is solvent, and is in the full exercise of its corporate franchises. The rule ac
It is not alleged, that the corporation, the gas company, is either insolvent, or, that it has abandoned its corporate business. It is not pretended, that any of its officers or agents have done any act ultra vires, or violated any charter-rights. The burden of the complaint is, that O. S. Despard, the president and manager of the business of the company, has abused his trust, and, that a majority of the directors and stockholders are under his influence and refuse to remove him. This is simply a general charge.
The facts, by which it is attempted to prove, that a majority of the directors and stockholders are under the influence of and controlled by said Despard, are, that they are his near kinsmen; that some of them reside at a distance and permit him to select the proxy to vote their stock at the stockholders’ meetings; that they refused to permit a committee, appointed to investigate the books of the company, to employ an expert to aid in such investigation; that at a meeting for the election of directors some of them withdrew and broke up the meeting, and thus prevented the election of a full board of directors-; and, that they afterwards gave notice for a meeting to elect five directors, ignoring the fact, that three directors had been elected at the former meeting-
What we have already said is sufficient to show, that neither of these directors, nor any of the stockholders, except the said C. S. Despard, has done any such wrongful act in respect to the matters complained of in the bill, as would of itself disqualify or disable him or them to act; and there is no fact alleged or charged in the bill to show, that any director or stockholder, other than O. S. Despard, has done any wrongful act in respect to the property or management of the business affairs of the company.
In regard to calling upon the directors and stockholders to bring suit the bill contains the general charge, often repeated, that the plaintiffs have time and again protested to the directors and stockholders and sought by every means in their power to secure an honest and faithful administra-tio'n of the affairs of the company without avail, and that they demanded an investigation of the books and accounts of the company and the removal of 0. 8. Despard as president and manager; but it is not even suggested anywhere in the bill, that the plaintiffs or either of them ever requested, much less demanded, that suit should be brought. It may be inferred, that the board of directors, as well as a majority of the stockholders, were informed of the complaints and dissatisfaction of the plaintiffs at the conduct of 0. S. Despard in the management of the business of the company; but the only facts charged in the bill are, that on one occasion the plaintiff-, Rathbone, in the presence of 0. S. Despard and N. Goff, stated the facts set out in the bill in regard to the mismanagement of the affairs of the company by said Despard and the misappropriation of its funds, and demanded a
These stockholders, united with the plaintiffs, would represent a majority of the stock, and could therefore control the election of the directors and thus change the management of the company. Simply because stockholders were near relatives of O. S. Despard, resided at a distance, and permitted him to appoint proxies to vote their stock, would not, in the absence of any information that Despard was abusing his trust, and that the affairs of the company were being mismanaged, warrant a court of equity in assuming that, they, if informed of the facts and requested to act, would refuse to aid in the removal of Despard, in compelling him to account to the company, and, if necessary, authorize suit against him. It was entirely practicable to inform these absent stockholders, and i-equest their co-operation, nor were the matters complained of such as required action at once. It had already been delayed for years by the acquiescence of the plaintiffs. It seems to me, therefore, according to the rules of law hereinbefore stated, that the plaintiffs have entirely failed to aver such facts in their bill as would authorize them to institute ov maintain this suit.
It is, however, contended, that our statute has modified the general rule of law so as to authorize a creditor or stockholder to institute such a suit as this, regardless of the wishes of a majority of the stockholders. The fifty seventh section of chapter 53 of the Code authorizes not less than one third in interest of the stockholders to apply by bill in equity to wind up the affairs of the corporation. The bill in this cause has no reference to this provision, for two reasons: first, it is not filed by one-third in interest of the stockholders; and, neo-
For the reasons stated, I am of opinion that this suit was improperly brought, and, that, therefore, the decree of the Circuit Court must be reversed, and the bill dismissed.
REVERSED.