189 P. 572 | Utah | 1920
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff, hereinafter called appellant, brought this action against the defendants, hereinafter styled respondents, to quiet title to certain water hereinafter more particularly referred to and to enjoin them from interfering with his use thereof for irrigation purposes. Appellant’s claims to the water in question are fully and explicitly stated in the complaint.
After alleging that he is the owner of ten acres of land and the lessee of perhaps more than that amount in Sanpete county, describing the same, it is in substance alleged that the said lands in their natural state were arid, and, without water to irrigate them, were nonproductive; that since the year 1906 said lands “by reason of extensive irrigation of lands situated north, east, and south and above said lands causing water to filtrate and percolate through the same under the surface of the said lands in undefined and unknown channels,” said lands “have become wet, boggy, and marshy and unfit for cultivation or production of agricultural crops.” Appellant then alleges that in order to reclaim said lands from the condition just stated, and for the purpose of collecting the waters therein and to apply the same to a useful and beneficial purpose, namely, to irrigate other arid land, he constructed a certain drain ditch and placed earthen pipes therein to facilitate the drainage of said lands and by means thereof to collect .the water aforesaid; that by means of said ditch and pipes appellant collected “one cubic foot of water per second from seepage and under
Some of the defendants answered the complaint, while others defaulted. The respondents here answered in two separate answers in which, after making certain admissions and denials, they set forth their claims to the water in question in detail and affirmatively alleged that they are the owners of the right to the use of the water by reason of prior appropriation and use for beneficial purposes and by virtue of a certain decree which is fully set forth. They prayed for affirmative relief. In view that the claims of respondents are' sufficiently reflected in the findings of the court, we shall refrain from stating them further. ■
After a trial to the district court of Sanpete county, said court found the issues in favor of the respondents, and adjudicated and decreed that they aré the owners of the water , here in question and enjoined plaintiff from interfering therewith. In view of the great length of the findings of fact, we are compelled to abridge them.
Omitting all matters of inducement, such as the findings relating to the incorporation of the several cities and irrigation companies and the appropriation of the waters of Sanpitch river, none of which matters are in dispute, the court in substance found: That the Sanpitch river is a natural stream having its source in the mountains north of the city of Fairview, and that it flows southwesterly through Sanpete county for a distance of over fifty miles; that the waters of said river are diverted therefrom for irrigation purposes at divers points along the
Upon substantially the foregoing findings, the court found as conclusions of law: (1) That the appellant is not entitled to any relief; (2) that respondents are entitled to the use of all the water intercepted and collected by and flowing through and from appellant’s drain ditch; (3) that respondents are entitled to a permanent injunction against the appellant, etc.
Pursuant to the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court entered a decree quieting the right to the use of said water in respondents and enjoined appellant from interfering with the same after it flows through his drain ditch into Spring creek as before stated, etc.
The appeal is from the decree.
While the assignments of error assail the findings of fact in some particulars, yet, in counsel’s brief, the findings of
In order to assist the reader to a better understanding of the questions herein decided, we append á rough sketch of the country surrounding appellant’s land, together with the streams, including Sanpitch river, which are the sources of the water supply for both the appellant and the respondents. While the sketch does not correctly reflect either courses or distances, yet they are sufficiently accurate to afford a full understanding of the question which is to be determined by us.
The controlling features of this case, as we view them, are: (1) That appellant’s land lies wholly within the water shed of the Sanpitch river; (2) that before appellant’s land and the lands lying adjacent thereto and higher than his were irrigated they were arid and nonproductive; (3) that all the water used to irrigate appellant’s land and the lands lying adjacent thereto and higher in elevation was taken from the streams that are tributaries of Sanpitch river, and if the water in said stream and the drainage, percolating, and seepage water from lands adjacent thereto be permitted to flow uninterruptedly, it all will reach said river before it is diverted by the respondents into their irrigating canal, and all of said water constitutes a source of supply of said Sanpitch river; (4) that the respondents, prior to the time that appellant commenced to intercept and collect the seepage and percolating water by means of his drain ditch, had appropriated and used for beneficial 'purposes all of the water from Sanpitch river flowing therein at a point some distance below appellant’s land and lands lying adjacent thereto, and that all of the water that was used and is used to irrigate appellant’s and said adjacent
In making the foregoing statement we have designedly excluded the water that is collected in the reservoir for the reasons: (1) That the evidence shows that the drainage toward appellant’s land is mainly from the east and southeast; (2) that his lands always were irrigated, so long as irrigation was necessary, with water taken from Birch creek and that the lands lying immediately to the east, southeast, and south of appellant’s lands are irrigated with water coming from said creek; (3) that there is little, if any, evidence tending to prove that any of the water coming from said reservoir reaches or has reached appellant’s land. Be that as it may, however, if appellant contends that any of the water which he claims in this action comes from said reservoir and not from streams or seepage which is naturally and directly tributary to Sanpitch
Notwithstanding the foregoing facts, appellant’s counsel vigorously contend that the waters intercepted and collected by their client were mere seepage and percolating waters which he has a lawful right to collect and use as he may see fit. They further contend that the waters collected by appellant by means of his drain ditch clearly come within the decisions of this court. So that there may be no misconception regarding counsel’s claims, we give them in their own language as found in their brief. In referring to the con
“Prior to the diversion of these waters on these highlands, there was no seepage or percolating water of any kind upon any part or portion of plaintiff’s land. This fact is overwhelmingly established by the testimony offered. But after irrigation commenced on these uplands percolating and seepage waters appeared near the west end of plaintiff’s lands and gradually extended in an easterly direction until the entire tract owned by plaintiff, as well as those leased by him, was rendered wholly unfit for the production of agricultural crops.’’
Counsel’s theory seems to be that, in view that the title to appellant’s lands passed from the government before the decree under which respondent’s claim was entered, therefore appellant has the right to intercept and collect the seepage and percolating waters underneath the surface of his lands, regardless of the source of such waters. Upon that point they say:
“It will thus be observed that plaintiff’s lands were reduced to private ownership as early as 1864; that a government patent issued therefor in 1881 (twenty years before defendants’rights to the waters of Sanpitch river were settled by decree of court); that twenty-five-years elapsed after patent was issued before the seepage and percolating waters appeared upon the land in question and before they were sought to be collected by plaintiff from these privately owned lands.”
In concluding the statement of facts they state their claim in the following words:
“We insist that plaintiff has the right to all the water he can collect in his drainage system, which is constructed wholly upon his own lands; that he has the right to use the water for beneficial purposes as he chooses, and to change the place of use, subject only to such limitations as may be imposed by law.”
In support of their contention, they cite and rely upon the following cases emanating from this court, namely: Sullivan v. Mining Co., 11 Utah 438, 40 Pac. 709, 30 L. R. A. 186; Crescent M. Co. v. Silver King M. Co., 17 Utah 444, 54 Pac. 244, 70 Am. St. Rep. 810; Herriman Irr. Co. v. Butterfield M. Co., 19 Utah 453, 57 Pac. 537, 51 L. R. A. 930; Herriman Irr. Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 Pac. 719; Willow Creek Irr. Co. v. Michaelson, 21 Utah 248, 60 Pac. 943,
So that tbe controlling facts of this case may be thoroughly grasped, we will briefly restate them. ' This case is one where the water in question comes from a river system from which, at a certain point, the respondents had diverted and put to a beneficial use all of the -water flowing in the stream at the point of diversion for many years prior to the time' when appellant commenced to intercept and collect the water in question. Appellant and others owned land lying on this stream but higher úp the stream. All of these lands without irrigation were arid and nonproductive. In order to make the lands productive, water was diverted by appellant and others who owned lands adjacent to and above his from the streams that formed a part of what we have termed the river system. Water after being used on said lands caused some of them, and especially such as are somewhat depressed, which is the condition of appellant’s lands, to become saturated with the irrigation water and thus, in the language of the findings of fact, made them wet and boggy and unfit to produce the usual farm crops. The water, however, which caused appellant’s land to become saturated, wet, and boggy all seeps and percolates through the earth from the irrigated lands lying higher in elevation than do his lands and which water was originally diverted from the river system above respondents’ point of diversion; and all of the water which was used on appellant’s land, as well as that used upon the lands lying above his, would naturally flow into and become a part of the river system before it reaches respondents’ canal by means of which the water is diverted on to their lands, all of which lie lower down on the river system than where it is diverted by the canal
In view of all those facts and the concessions made in appellant’s brief, how can it successfully be contended that he can legally acquire any right to the waters which seep and percolate through and underneath the surface of his land as against the respondents’ prior rights? The principle involved here is precisely the same as though the appellant were seeking to appropriate a cubic foot of water from either Cottonwood creek or Birch creek, both of which, it is conceded, are tributaries of Sanpitch river and empty into it at points above respondents’ diverting dam. If he attempted to do that, every one, we think, would pronounce his act as unjustified by.the laws of this state. In principle what he is attempting to do, however, in no way differs from an attempt to divert water from those streams directly. The water which he claims in this action necessarily comes from the tributaries of Sanpitch river and hence in contemplation of law comes from that river. All the water which comes from streams which empty into Sanpitch river is as much a part of that river as though that river had no tributaries and as though its source of supply flowed directly into that stream from surface and underground sources. It must be remembered that in this mountainous country all streams are necessarily, to some extent at _ least, fed from underground sources as well as from surface sources. Indeed, the water which flows in the middle and lower reaches of our mountain streams from which the water is diverted for irrigation and domestic uses after the high-water season is passed, and when we have arrived at what is called the low-water
This case affords a most striking illustration of the injury that might thus be inflicted upon the prior appropriators of water whose lands lie lower down the stream. No case has been called to our attention, and we think none can be found, where it is held that under facts and conditions like those
“It was not until tlie more recent scientific investigations, before mentioned, as to the movements of underground waters through the soil, that these percolating waters tributary to surface waters were recognized as belonging to any particular class, or that any rights*155 could he acquired in them other than the rights which could he acquired to the soil itself, through which they found their way, of which soil, under the prevailing common law rule, they were considered component parts. But, by these geological and topographical investigations made hy the government and others, it has been proven in many instances that waters percolating through the soil of watersheds were not only the sources of supply, hut the only source of supply of certain streams and other surface bodies of water. It being proven absolutely that these percolating waters physically are directly tributary to these streams, the law has kept pace with these scientific investigations proving this fact; and therefore it follows that in law they should be, and in many jurisdictions are, dealt with and treated as tributary waters. And, where rights to the waters of the stream itself have been once acquired, by appropriation or otherwise, it is unlawful for persons owning land bordering on the stream to intercept the waters percolating through them on their way to the stream, and apply it to any use other than its reasonable use upon the land upon which it is taken, if he thereby diminishes the flow of the stream to the damage of those having rights therein. Therefore this rule modifies the common-law rule that the owner of the land is also the owner of all the water found percolating as a part of the soil itself, and that he may use and dispose of it as he sees fit, to the extent that he may only use these waters so percolating through his land, subject: First, to the rights of others to the water flowing in the stream which this water augments, upon the same principle as though this water was a part of the stream itself. * * *”
By wbat we have said we do not wish to be understood as holding that the appellant may not drain his lands and by that means reclaim them. In doing that he must, however, • permit the water he drains therefrom to flow into the San-pitch river for the use of respondents, precisely as that water flowed into the river before he commenced his drainage system.
Neither do we wish to be understood that under no circumstances may seepage and percolating waters be intercepted and collected, appropriated and put to a beneficial use by the one who intercepts and collects them. See Stookey v. Green, supra.
Nor do we hold that the appellant would not be entitled to use an amount of water equal to the amount of his original appropriation when used upon lands other than those for
To avoid, if possible, any misconception respecting the scope and meaning of this decision, we, in conclusion, feel constrained to remind the reader that this case belongs to a class which is readily distinguishable from all other classes known to the law covering the subject of irrigation. This case falls within what for convenience may be denominated “a river system case” which arises and can arise only in irrigating lands which lie along and within the watershed of a river, stream, or water course whether natural or artificial, from which the seepage and run-off water arising from irrigation if not' intercepted will eventually return to the stream or water course from which it was originally appropriated by prior appropriators and diverted by them at some point further down the stream. In such cases the rights of prior appropriators may not be interfered with, not even by the owners of lands from, through, or underneath the surface of Which the seepage and percolating water passes on its return to the stream or river system. The fact that the water in question may be percolating or seepage, as contradistinguished from water flowing in known and defined underground channels, does not alter the case. The controlling question always is: Was the water in question appropriated and put to a beneficial use by others before the interception and attempted appropriation thereof by the landowner? We feel certain that we venture nothing in saying that it is a matter of common knowledge that by far the greater portion of irrigated lands in this state are included within the area of river systems. Notwithstanding that fact, however, this case, so far as we are aware, is the
From what has been said it follows that the judgment should be, and it accordingly is, affirmed, with costs to respondents.
Rehearing
On Application for Rehearing
Appellant has filed a petition for rehearing, in which it is urged that this court erred in unconditionally affirming the judgment of the district court and in not modifying it in certain particulars. As usual, counsel, who have filed a brief in support of the petition, see, or think they see, a multiplicity of evils that will necessarily result if the opinion of this court be not modified in many respects, and especially as it affects the appellant. In making the present contention counsel no doubt have overlooked the fact that, although they assigned the district court’s ruling in restricting appellant so that he could use the water only upon the land from which it is drained, they nevertheless did not argue that question in their brief and hence hád waived it. The only contention made in their brief was that the water in
Counsel also lay much stress upon the fact that we used the word “precisely” in referring to the fact that, if water is used upon lands lying above the point of diversion of a prior appropriator by a subsequent appropriator, the latter must nevertheless so use it as to permit the water to find its way back into the stream above the prior appropriator’s point of diversion. By using the term “precisely” we did
In view therefore that appellant may have use for the water on lands other than those from which'it is drained and in using it may not interfere with respondents’ prior rights, the judgment or decree should be modified