3 Utah 315 | Utah | 1883
Lead Opinion
The only question raised on this appeal is, Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action ?
It then alleges a deed of one half the land and one half the cause of action to the plaintiff Brown; that plaintiff Rasmussen, previous to the discovery of the fraud, commenced an action against James McKnight alone to foreclose the mortgage ; that afterwards a decree was obtained, and the property sold to plaintiff Rasmussen for less than the face of the mortgage debt, and he obtained a deed therefor conveying all the interest of James McKnight; “ that the said Mary Ann McKnight received the said conveyance without any consideration moving from her; that she is a party to and cognizant of the said frauds herein alleged.” And then the prayer for relief.
The defendants demurred upon various grounds, but none, except the one mentioned, viz., “ that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,” was argued or called to our attention. We shall therefore treat the others as abandoned.
On the ground of demurrer stated, the complaint is assailed principally because the facts constituting the fraud are not more specifically stated.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, with costs, and the cause is remanded to the third district court, with directions to that court to overrule the demurrer.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
This is a suit in which the plaintiffs pray that a deed mentioned in the complaint be decreed to be a fraud upon the rights of the plaintiff Rasmussen, and for certain other relief, special and general.
The complaint is as follows: “ Plaintiffs, by amended complaint, complain of defendants, and allege that the said Hyrum
“ Plaintiffs pray judgment that the said deed to Mary Ann McKnight may be decreed to be a fraud upon the rights of the said plaintiff Basmussen, and that the said mortgage from the said James McKnight be so corrected as to include all the interests conveyed in said deed to Mary Ann McKnight or any other person, and that said plaintiffs may be decreed to be the owners of said property, and for such other relief as may be proper in the premises, and for costs of suit.
“ ARthub, 'Brown,
“ B. B. Tripp,
“Attorneys-for plaintiffs.”
This complaint was duly verified. To this complaint the defendants filed a demurrer as follows:
“Come now the defendants and demur to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, and for causes of demurrer allege:
“ 1. That there is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff and defendant in this: 1. That said plaintiff Brown is not a proper party to the action, because no profert has been made of his interest except the recital in said complaint; which shows that his interest, if any, was for the mere purpose of litigation and without consideration, and that he was not a party
“2. That the complaint does not show that plaintiff Rasmussen’s claim was fully paid by former suit in foreclosure and sale, nor that plaintiffs have been refused possession of said land by either of the defendants, nor that said plaintiffs have made any effort to obtain possession of said land by writ of possession or otherwise, nor that plaintiffs have ever demanded possession of the same.
“ 3. That said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
“ James McKnight,
“Attorney for defendant.”
The complaint sets forth that the plaintiff Rasmussen was at the time therein alleged the owner of and in possession of certain real estate and right of way therein described, and a contract between Rasmussen and James McKnight of sale, but whether of the described land and right of way or for the right of way alone is quite uncertain, but I will assume it was for both. The complaint also alleges that James McKnight wrote a deed and mortgage, and read them “as in pursuance of the contract” — a deed to McKnight and a mortgage back to Rasmussen for the unpaid balance of the purchase money.” Down to this time in the history of the transaction, as set forth in the complaint, there is no allegation that either the deed and mortgage was not in all respects written in strict compliance with the agreement between Rasmussen and James McKnight. The allegation that since the time the papers were read by James McKnight to Rasmussen, the plaintiff “ Rasmussen has discovered that the said deed, as it appears upon the record, runs in the name of the wife of the said James McKnight as grantee, to wit, the said Mary Ann McKnight,” is no allegation that the deed was either frauduently written or read by James McKnight; or of any fraud whatever imputable to either James McKnight or to his wife : Pomeroy’s Remedial Rights, 1st ed., 563.
If the plaintiffs claim that the deed contained a name as
The allegation “ that the plaintiff Rasmussen does not know whether the said McKnight obtained the said deed in his wife’s name by misreading the same to plaintiff Rasmussen or by obliterating the name and putting in hers,” is not an allegation that it was done in either way, or that there was any fraud on the part of either of the defendants, and is not an allegation of ignorance, or want of full and complete knowledge of the facts on the part of his co-plaintiff Brown ; and the further allegation "that by whatever means it was done, it was done fradulently, and for the purpose of robbing and wronging the said plaintiff Rasmussen,” does not cure or help the defect.
Although it is a general rule of pleading that the plaintiff is not required to allege in detail all the minute facts constituting the alleged fraud, yet a general certainty is required in these matters, and the facts constituting the fraud complained of must appear on the face of the complaint. Fraud is a conclusion of' law derived from facts, and is not to be presumed: it is found only when the facts make it apparent. A general allegation of fraud in a pleading is not good when demurred to: The Railroad Company v. The Supervisors of Plumas County, 37 Cal. 354; Bliss on Code Pl. 211; Capuro v. Builders’ Ins. Co., 39 Cal. 123; Triscony v. Orr et al., 49 Id. 612.
The foregoing being in my opinion conclusive as to the sufficiency of the complaint, it is not necessary to consider the other questions raised by the demurrer, and ably presented by the brief of the counsel for the respondents.
In my opinion, the ruling of the district court in sustaining the demurrer ¿should be sustained.