Rarity Abdullah v. Eathan WeinzeirlRarity Abdullah v. Eathan Weinzeirl
Jill Clark, Golden Valley, MN, for Appellant.
Toni Ann Bunker Beitz, Hennepin County Attorney‘s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellee.
Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Rarity Abdullah appeals the district court‘s1 dismissal of his
On appeal, Abdullah argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim because Heck only applies to criminal matters and a petty misdemeanor is a civil action under Minnesota law; because his claim should have been stayed in light of Wallace v. Kato, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1098, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (indicating that if plaintiff files civil action alleging false arrest and claim necessarily requires invalidation of anticipated future conviction, federal court should stay civil action until criminal case is terminated); because the court improperly considered matters outside the complaint and imposed a heightened pleading requirement on him; and because he has no other means to obtain federal review given his ineligibility for habeas relief. He also challenges the
This court reviews de novo a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), assuming all factual allegations in the complaint as true. See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007). Heck provides that in order to recover damages for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court‘s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. If a plaintiff cannot make the requisite showing, dismissal is appropriate. See id. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (district court must consider whether judgment in favor of plaintiff would necessarily imply invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would the complaint must be dismissed unless plaintiff can demonstrate that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated).
We conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Abdullah‘s section 1983 claim under Heck, because success on his claim would necessarily render invalid the “sentence” of a fine imposed for his possession of marijuana, and because he did not allege or show that the fine had been invalidated or that his criminal petty-misdemeanor case had otherwise been resolved in his favor. See
We also conclude that Abdullah is not entitled to a stay under Wallace, because Abdullah admitted in the district court that there was no pending matter in state court. See Andrews v. St. Louis Joint Stock Land Bank, 127 F.2d 799, 804 (8th Cir.1942) (judicial admission is conclusive upon party by whom it was made); see also LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir.2006) (court may affirm district court‘s dismissal on any basis supported by record).
Finally, Abdullah‘s inability to obtain habeas relief does not preclude application of Heck. Cf. Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.2007) (holding Heck‘s favorable-termination rule barred claim of habeas-ineligible former prisoner). His policy disagreements with Heck are unavailing, and his reliance on Jones v. Bock is misplaced because that case addressed the unrelated issue of the exhaustion requirement regarding prison grievances under the PLRA. See Jones, 127 S.Ct. at 918-22.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.