No. 1973. | Tex. App. | Jan 26, 1940
Rose Rappmund filed her original petition herein against Frank Zaiontz September 26, 1938. She alleged that on November 1, 1926 Zaiontz executed and delivered unto Fritz Rappmund a promissory note in the sum of $2,000 bearing 5 per cent interest and 10 per cent attorney's fees in the event of suit and that the note was payable November 1, 1928. That the note was not paid at maturity but was "orally" extended from time to time. That the payee in said note transferred same to plaintiff prior to February 1, 1937 as a part of her separate estate.
That at the time of suit plaintiff was the owner and holder of said note and the obligation sued upon. That said note was made the basis and grounds of a subsequent written agreement whereby defendant expressly acknowledged the debt and impliedly promised to pay the same. That the new promise constituted the cause of action sued on in the petition. The new promise was alleged in words and figures as follows:
"October 30, 1937.
"Mr. Walter F. Schwartz
"Attorney-at-Law,
"516 Hicks Building,
"San Antonio, Texas.
"Dear Mr. Schwartz:
"With reference to your letter of October 28th, addressed to Mr. Frank Zaiontz, Route 2, Poth, Texas, I wish to advise that Mr. Zaiontz, is in my office and says that he has paid all interest due on the Two Thousand Dollar note, together with approximately One Thousand and No/100 ($1000.00) Dollars, or more, and that he also paid the funeral expenses of Mr. Rappmund amount to about Two Hundred and no/100 ($200.00) Dollars, all of which he has a record of at home and therefore the amount shown by the note is not correct.
"Very truly yours,
"D. Richard Voges, (Signed)."
The defendant filed his original answer, consisting of a general demurrer, special exception, etc. In his answer he pleaded the following letter in response to which Zaiontz made the above communication.
"October 28, 1937.
"Mr. Frank Zaiontz,
"Route 2, Box 34,
"Poth, Texas.
"Dear Sir:
"This is to advise you that I have been retained by Mrs. Rose Rappmund of this city to handle some legal matters appertaining to the estate of her deceased husband, and among the papers in my possession is one certain promissory note in the principal sum of $2,000.00. The amount due on said note at the present time including all interest is $3266.50, exclusive of the usual 10% attorney's fees.
"It is the purpose of this letter to ascertain from you as to whether or not you have, at any time in the past made any payments on said note; I am asking this by reason of the fact that there are no credits or payments shown on the reverse side of note.
"You will therefore acknowledge receipt of this letter and make immediate reply to the writer by mail and state fully whether or not the above is true and correct. *872
"Thanking you for your promptness in this matter, I beg to remain,
"Very truly yours,
"Walter F. Schwartz, (Signed)
"516 Hicks Building
"San Antonio, Texas."
The question of four year limitation was raised by exceptions which the trial court sustained. Upon failure of the plaintiff to amend, the petition was dismissed and this appeal follows.
In her brief the appellant, Mrs. Rappmund, says that "The sole and only question presented on this appeal is whether or not the written letter of attorney Voges (for Zaiontz) of October 30, 1937, was sufficient to take the plaintiff's cause of action out of the four years' statute of limitation."
Two propositions, one predicated upon the court's ruling in response to the general demurrer, and the other in response to the ruling on the special exception, are presented.
In the appellee's brief he states: "Appellee agrees with appellant that the two propositions present only one question, and appellee is therefore following appellant's form of submitting both the first and second counter propositions together without a restatement of the same, for the purpose of brevity."
In answering the question propounded by this appeal we shall do so in the light of the rule of law expressed in York v. Hughes, Tex.Com.App., 286 S.W. 165" court="Tex. Comm'n App." date_filed="1926-06-23" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/york-v-hughes-4999702?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="4999702">286 S.W. 165, 167, and other authorities as well, wherein it is held: "In order to remove the bar of limitation from a barred indebtedness, there must be a new promise to pay same, evidenced by writing on the part of the debtor. The liability of the debtor, in such a case, depends, not upon the old obligation, but upon the new promise. This new promise need not be expressed in the writing, but may be implied from what is written. An unqualified and unequivocal acknowledgment in writing on the part of the debtor, of the existence of the indebtedness, unaccompanied by expressions indicating an unwillingness to pay same, will raise the implication of a new promise to pay the indebtedness. But if the acknowledgment of the existence of the indebtedness be qualified by an expressed promise to pay same conditionally, a promise different from the one so expressed will not be implied. In such a case the fulfillment of the named condition becomes a prerequisite to the debtor's liability on the new promise." Citing authorities.
We do not believe there was any error in the ruling of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer. The letter relied on to toll the statute of limitation does not have that effect for the following reasons:
The suit is for the aggregate sum, principal, interest and attorney's fees, evidenced by the original $2,000 note. The Zaiontz letter affirmatively refuses acknowledgment of such debt. It, in effect, states that any such intimation or suggestion to that effect is "incorrect."
The letter states that Zaiontz has paid "all interest due on the $2,000 note together with approximately $1,000 * * * or more and that he also paid the funeral expenses of Mr. Rappmund amount to about $200, all of which he has a record of at home, and therefore the amount of such note is not correct." Clearly there is no acknowledgment of the debt as evidenced in the amount sued for.
The letter written October 28, 1937 by Mr. Schwartz to Mr. Zaiontz made inquiry concerning the note according to its particular terms and provisions. In his reply letter Mr. Zaiontz says: "The note does not state the correct amount" and points out that approximately $1,000 has been paid on the note. The exact amount so paid is not stated, but doubtless the term "approximately" stated a sum "nearly exact" or "not perfectly accurate" according to the standard definition of such term.
He also stated he had paid about $200 funeral expenses of Mr. Rappmund (original payee in the note). Here is another uncertainty. Webster's New International Dictionary says of the word "about": "Legally `about' is nearly equivalent to more or less; but the variation legally permissible varies with what appears as reasonable in the contemplation of the parties under the circumstances."
If these definitions and analyses of the terms seem to be an exploration into the technical, as they do to the writer, it is equally true that they are also an exploration into the indefinite and uncertain; and it is these latter elements of Zaiontz's letter which seem to bar the construction the appellant would give that communication.
Further, the funeral expenses paid — whatever the amount — represents a sum within itself which Zaiontz challenges. Such *873 expenses may or may not be just and may or may not be a proper offset, but whatever the amount, uncertain as it is, to that extent the appellee gives no acknowledgment, but rather the contrary. The Zaiontz letter does not purport to state the exact amounts paid, etc., but merely approximates them, and states that he has a correct record of them at home. Hence, no definite amount is stated and the balance of the old obligation is for that reason left in uncertainty. There is no basis for a contention that the letter acknowledged the original debt or note, and it is equally clear there is no acknowledgment of any definite balance. Before the plaintiff could recover the whole amount, or a portion thereof, on the theory of this suit, the burden of pleading and proving such definite amount rested upon her. Zaiontz was under no duty to write the letter and appellant must accept it as it is, burdened with indefiniteness and uncertainty.
In McDonald v. Grey,
There is no written acknowledgment, as required by the statute, of any part of the debt, and if it could be said from the contents of the letter that there is an implied acknowledgment for some balance of the original debt, then such part or balance is left indefinite and uncertain in amount. We would then have nothing more than an implied promise resting upon an implied acknowledgment and, in our judgment, that does not meet the requirements of the statute. In Poe v. Poe,
We agree with the appellee that the opinion in William Leigh v. Byrd Linthecum,
Under the facts of the instant case and in the light of the rules of law announced and applied by the authorities in Texas we are of the opinion that the Zaiontz letter does not contain the elements and substance essential to toll the statute of limitation as applied to the obligation evidenced by the barred note. The letter does not contain the written acknowledgment from which a promise to pay may be implied. The nature of such an acknowledgment is set forth and fully discussed in the opinion by this *874
court in Poe v. Poe, supra. Therein we quoted from the Supreme Court in Smith v. Fly,
Further analysis of the Zaiontz letter is unnecessary.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.