43 F. 249 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Michigan | 1887
1. Objection is taken to the first claim of plaintiff’s principal patent, (and the sixth is like unto it,) that it is an attempt to assert a monopoly for every method of giving an impetus to a cash carrier, irrespective of the motive power; in other words, that it is a claim for the principle of propulsion, and not for a mechanical contrivance. We think this claim is either too broad, or too indefinite to be of any service to the plaintiff. If it be construed as a combination of a way, a carrier adapted to move on such way, and of any and every means for giving an impetus to such carrier, then it is too broad, since it would include propulsion by the hand. It is an attempt to patent the principle of propelling a carrier by an impetus given at the end of the wire. It is well settled that this cannot be done. Thus, in Wyeth v. Stone, 1 Story, 273, it was held that a claim for cutting ice of a uniform size, by means of an apparatus worked by other power than human, was the claim of an abstract principle, and therefore void. So in O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112, the eighth claim of the Morse patent, which was the use .of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current,
But if this general description is to ho construed as limited by the concluding words of the claim, “substantially as set forth,” and this we deem to be the proper construction, (Stone v. Sprague, 1 Story, 270; Gray v. James, Pet. C. C. 394; Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 547,) a new difficulty is encountered, since his use of springs is only one, and tho “preferable, ” method of giving the carrier “an initial impetus of sufficient force to impel it to its destination, as distinguished from impelling the carrier by a continuously acting force, as by gravity, in the use of inclined ways.” The “initial impetus” here described is quite as general, ami, in fact, a mere restatement, in slightly different language, of “the means forgiving an impetus” stated in the claim, and is equally objectionable as embodying a principle.
We are forced then to construe this claim in connection with, the springs described in the specifications and illustrated in the drawings; and thus limited, the first and sixth claims are practically the same as the third and fourth, viz., claims for tho way, the carrier, and the springs used in producing the impetus.
2. No infringement is claimed of the second and fifth claims. It is also argued that the third and fourth claims aro void upon their face, because they do not contain elements enough to make an operative combination. They are for a way, a carrier, and a spring, hut no mention is made of the means of putting the spring under tension, viz., the cord by which the rubber spring 'is elongated, nor of any means of holding tho car while tho spring is being put under tension, viz., tho catch, which holds the car until the spring is stretched, and then releases it and permits tlie spring to propel it. We had occasion to consider this subject very fully in the ease of Inspirator Co. v. Jenks, 21 Fed. Rep. 911, and then came to the conclusion that in drawing the claims for a combination patent it was not necessary to include any elements except such as were essential to the peculiar combination, and affected by the invention. Other portions of the machine are usually shown in the drawings to exhibit their relations to the patented combination, but they are wholly unnecessary to the validity of the claims. As said by the supreme court in Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580, 586: In setting forth his claims, the patentee “may begin at the point where his invention begins, and describe what lie has made that is new, and what it replaces of the old. That which is common and well known is as if it were written out in the patent, and delineated in the drawings.” It is perfectly manifest to the ordinary observer that a cord passing over a pulley is necessary to stretcii the rubber spring, and the catch to hold the car while the tension is being applied. But neither of them were any part of the invention. While the omission of anything absolutely material to the utility of the invention described is a fatal defect in a description, this rule does not apply where the omission would naturally
3: Starting then with the assumption that .this is a patent for a spring projector of a carrier over a wire railway, we are next led to consider whether it is anticipated by any of the devices offered in evidence. The English patent to Jacob Brett, issued in 1845, for atmospheric propulsion, and the manufacture of tubes for atmospheric railways, covers an atmospheric railway in which compressed air distributed from a reservoir through pipes is employed to propel a car or train of cars. The The general arrangement of the device is as follows: At a central station, at which the air is compressed, is a reservoir or holder for the air. From this reservoir or holder the air is distributed through pipes to devices which project upward through the track, and which are intended to operate in connection with the car when it comes along. The projections upward through the track are placed at or about the distance of 8,000 yards apart, and, from one of these upwardly projecting devices to the other train, is supposed to travel by the impulse it receives while passing over the upwardly projecting device, which is, in fact, a fixed piston co-operating with a slotted tube placed underneath the engine or car. The patent is obviously the result of some of the futile experiments that were made in England, when the science of railway travel was in its infancy, and before the present method of propelling railway trains had become firmly established. The device does undoubtedly contain a way and carrier, and a method of propulsion by means of atmospheric elasticity, and is thus within the literalism of plaintiff’s patent. At the same time, we think it very far from being an anticipation of this patent. It is not, in any sense of the term, a cash carrier, or a device adapted for use as such. Indeed, it is intended for a purpose so entirely dissimilar to that of a cash carrier that not only -would it require invention to adapt it to that purpose, but we cannot conceive that it would be of any service to McCarty as a suggestion of a cash carrier. It lies so far out of the track of the patentee’s invention that if he had seen it while engaged in his experiments, he would probably never have given it a second thought. We do not mean to say that a
The loom patents, in all of which a shuttle is thrown from one end of its path to the other by the blow or push of a picker-staff operated by the force of a spring, the Hotchkiss patent, by which a toy mouse is projected by an interior spring, and the Ireland patent, by which a toy fire-engine is propelled from its house by the recoil of a rubber spring, are all claimed as anticipations of the McCarty patent; but in none of them is there a way or a carrier in any proper sense of the word. They .no more contain the principle of McCarty’s invention than does the ordinary spring gun to which they are much more closely allied. They all resemble the McCarty patent, in that they contain the principle of propulsion by a spring, which is as old as the use of the b.ow and arrow, but none of them.could be adapted-to a cash carrier without the employment of the inventive faculty. But if there were any doubt regarding ■this question, we should still consider it our duty to resolve the doubt in favor of the patent in this case, since it is shown that the device has gone into very general use, and has largely supplanted cash carriers propelled by other means. While the single fact that- the device has gone into general use, and has displaced other devices which had previously been employed for analogous uses, does not establish in all cases that the later device involves a patentable invention, it may, however, always be considered; and when the other facts in the case leave the question in doubt, it is sufficient to turn the scale. Smith v. Vulcanite Co., 93 U. S. 486, 495.
4. Beyond doubt the most important and serious question in this case is that of infringement. Defendant’s apparatus, as described by the plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Brevoort, is as follows:
“Defendant’s device consists of an upright cylinder with a piston in it, which piston can be by the operator moved up and down within the upright •cylinder. Projecting at right angles from the lower part of the cylinder is another cylinder smaller in diameter than the upright cylinder, and having within it a piston attached to one end of a piston-rod, which projects through the forward end of the horizontal cylinder. This piston-rod, at the end, is provided with a spring plunger, the shaft of which is smaller than the piston-rod. This plunger can be pushed into the piston-rod for the distance of about half or'three-eighths of an inch. On the end of the horizontal cylinder two jaws are arranged, which are provided with springs, and which jaws are forced apart by the outward movement of the end of the piston-rod. The catches at their outer extremities are provided with hooks or jaws, which ■catch around the carrier. Thus, the carrier cannot move along the wire until these jaws or catches have separated, and this separation is effected by the advance movement of the piston-rod of the horizontal cylinder.”
It will be observed here that the defendants do not employ a metallic or rubber spring to project its carrier, but we apprehend, and we understand it to be admitted in this case, that if the carrier be actually propelled over the way by the elastic expansion of an imprisoned body
5. The seventeenth claim of patent No. 325,618 is as follows:
“In a store service apparatus, the combination with a stretch wire of a wheel carrier traveling thereon, a receptacle removably locked to such carrier, and a spring cover for the receptacle held permanently by the carrier substantially as set forth.”
The receptacle is locked to the carrier hy a ring containing two slots in the ordinary manner in which a lamp is inserted in a lantern; from the bottom the spring is such-as is sometimes used in the top of a lantern to hold the glass firmly in place. The invention consists only in combining the two, in inserting the cash box into the carrier, and in holding it firmly by the aid of the springs. As both elements of the combination are shown to exist in a lantern offered in evidence, though acting independently, we think there was no invention in combining the two, and the plaintiff’s claim under this patent is not maintainable. There must be a a decree for the plaintiff upon the third, fourth, and seventh claims of the first patent, an injunction, and the usqal reference to a master to compute the damages.