Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
GIDEON RAPAPORT,
Plaintiff, 24-CV-5942 (JGLC) -against- OPINION AND ORDER ABIGAIL FINKELMAN, Defendant.
JESSICA G. L. CLARKE, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Gideon Rapaport, who is now proceeding pro se , is a former summer associate of the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis LLP, and a graduate of New York University School of Law. Plaintiff filed this action on August 5, 2024, asserting that Defendant Abigail Finkelman (a New York-based lawyer) defamed him by publishing a series of tweets regarding Plaintiff’s complaint in a separate lawsuit in the Southern District of New York bearing case number 23-CV-6709 (“ Rapaport I ”). The Rapaport I complaint generally alleged that unnamed John Does—who were later identified to be New York University lаw students Ajay Srinivasan Iyer and Zachary George Garrett—conspired to post defamatory statements and photographs of Plaintiff in order to ruin his reputation. Defendant’s tweets provided mostly sarcastic and mocking commentary regarding the allegations in the Rapaport I complaint, such as her suggestion that “all of #lawtwitter” read Plaintiff’s complaint in , and her “promise” they would “not regret it.” Defendant also tweeted one of the alleged defamatory photographs at issue in that she received from an “anonymous tipster.”
Although the Comрlaint criticizes Defendant’s twitter thread as “negative” and “obsessive and intensely personal commentary,” Plaintiff has clarified that he now only challenges the posting of the allegedly defamatory, and fake, photograph. However, Defendant is *2 immune from liability under New York Civil Rights Law § 74’s fair report privilege. And in any event, her tweets amount to nothing more than non-actionable opinions or, at most, statements which can be verified as true. For these reasons and those stated below, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss and although not requested, denies Plаintiff leave to amend.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are, unless otherwise noted, taken from the operative complaint and presumed to be true for the purposes of this Order. See J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch. , 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff is a graduate of the New York University School of Law (“NYU Law”) and a citizen of Canada. ECF No. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”) ¶ 1. Abigail Finkelman is a member of the New York State Bar, a graduate of the Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law, and a practicing attorney at the Legal Aid Society in New York. Id. ¶ 2. On July 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint to commencе Rapaport I . 1
Beginning on August 6, 2023, Finkelman published a series of tweets from her account,
“@clapifyoulikeme” (using the name “Mrs. Detective Pikajew, Esq.”), regarding the complaint. Defendant’s twitter thread generally involved screenshotting portions of the Rapaport
I complaint, and providing reactions or commentary with respect to that snapshot. See generally
ECF No. 1-2. For instance, the thread began with the statement “I need all of #lawtwitter to read
this complaint. I promise you will not regret it.” ECF No. 1-2 at 2. The complaint
1 The Court may take judicial notice of other judicial proceedings and filings, and does so here
merely to discuss the fact of those filings, and does not suppose the truth of any assertions
contained therein. See, e.g., Kramer v. Time Warner Inc .,
alleged, among other things, that unnamed individuals forged a document styled as a “wanted” or “public enemy” poster, and included a corporate headshot style photograph of Plaintiff at the top, which they then posted on Reddit.com and Top-Law-Schools.com. Rapaport I , ECF No. 1 (“R1 Compl.”) ¶¶ 6–9.
In relation to this allegation, Finkelman tweeted “[Shaking my head] why wouldn’t you include screenshots, I wanna see the fake ‘wanted’ or ‘public enemy’ poster.” ECF No. 1-2 at 3. Finkelman continued to highlight and comment on other parts of the complaint in an apparent sarcastic and mocking tone. See generally ECF No. 1-2. Then, in the last tweet from the August 6, 2023 chain, Finkelman tweeted a copy of the fake photograph purportedly described in the complaint, writing “[w]e got it lads, [shoutout] to an anonymous tipster.” 2 ECF No. 1-2 at 20. The image reflects a picture of Plaintiff’s face and the following text:
DO NOT ADMIT GIDEON RAPAPORT KIRKLAND AND ELLIS Id. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges (as he alleged in the Rapaport I complaint) that the photograph is fake, and that even though the photo was taken down from other websites, it remained publicly available due to Finkelman’s tweet. Compl. ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that the photograph, “taken together with the context in which it appears, is susceptible to a defаmatory connotation” because it “falsely accuses plaintiff . . . of being a trespasser” and implies “he is unfit to practice his profession.” Id. ¶ 20.
Plaintiff commenced this action on August 5, 2024. ECF No. 1. On October 21, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss. ECF Nos. 17, 19 (“Mem.”). After the motion was 2 Rapaport attached a nearly identical photograph to his amended complaint in . See , ECF No. 38-2. *4 fully briefed, the parties filed supplemental authority letters in April 2025 related to Defendant’s arguments based on New York Civil Rights Law § 74 (“Section 74”). ECF Nos. 50, 51.
Defendant also filed a motion for sanctiоns against Plaintiff along with the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 20. Plaintiff filed his own sanctions motion as well. ECF No. 24. The Court stayed further briefing on the sanctions motions pending resolution of the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 30. The Court also, upon motion by Defendant, stayed discovery pending disposition of the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 45.
LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “constru[e] the
complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Goldstein v. Pataki ,
Pro se 3 complaints “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus ,
DISCUSSION
The Court first concludes, following the reasoning from the MTD opinion in , that New York law applies, and Plaintiff’s claim for false light and invasion of privacy is therefore dismissed. The Court then finds that the Complaint does not plausibly state a claim for defamation because New York Civil Rights Law § 74 immunizes Defendant’s tweets, and that in any event Defendant’s tweets are non-actionable opinion statements that cannot support a defamation claim.
I. New York Law Applies and Plaintiff’s False Light and Invasion of Privacy Claim Is
Dismissed
Plaintiff invokes New Jersey law in this case with respect to his false light and invasion of privacy claim. Compl. ¶¶ 34–41. For the reasons discussed at length in the Court’s MTD Order in , New York’s choice of law dictates that this state’s substantive law governs. 3 While Plaintiff filed the complaint with the assistancе of counsel, he has proceeded pro se in opposing the Defendant’s motions to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to apply this more lenient standard.
Rapaport v. Iyer , No. 23-CV-6709 (JGLC),
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for false light and invasion of privacy is dismissed with prejudice because Nеw York law does not recognize this cause of action. See Iyer , 2025 WL 966275, at *4–6. The Court also declines to invoke the doctrine of dépeçage for substantially similar reasons as those set forth in the MTD opinion. See id. at *5–6.
II. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Defamation
While Plaintiff discusses Finkelman’s entire chain of tweets and attaches the same as an exhibit, he appears to only assert one “defamatory” statement: Finkelman’s posting of the allegedly faked photograph. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 27–33. Indeed, Plaintiff asserts the “gravamen of this action” is Finkelman’s “willful and malicious posting” of the defamatory photograph. Id. ¶ 6; see also Opp. at 4 (“[T]he only stated cause of action for defamation in this matter is [Defendant’s] republication of the first version of the defamatory image . . . .”). And Plaintiff concedes that Finkelman’s other tweeted comments “were within her First Amendment rights, despite their *7 critical nature.” Compl. ¶ 13. The Court therefore understands Plaintiff to only be asserting that the tweeted photograph is defamatory. 4
A. Applicable Standard
“Defamation is the making of a false statement which tends to expose the plaintiff to
public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of plaintiff in the minds
of right-thinking persons, and to deprive plaintiff of their friendly intercourse in society.” 3P-
733, LLC v. Tawan Davis ,
Under New York law, a claim for libel requires a plaintiff to allege (1) a written
defamatory statement of fact concerning the plaintiff, (2) publication to a third-party, (3) the
applicable level of fault, (4) falsity, and (5) special damages or a showing of libel per se . Celle v.
Filipino Rep. Enterprises Inc .,
277, 284 (1st Dep’t 2018) (“A defamation plaintiff must plead special damages unless the defamation fаlls into any one of four per se categories: (1) statements charging the plaintiff with a serious crime; (2) statements that tend to injure the plaintiff in her trade, business or profession; (3) statements that impute to the plaintiff a ‘loathsome disease’; and (4) statements that impute unchastity to a woman.”).
In addition, New York has enacted what is commonly referred to as an “Anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. N.Y. C IV . R TS . L. § 76-a (McKinney 2025). The New York Anti-SLAPP statute dictates that for any communication in a place open to the public or public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, a plaintiff must make a showing by “clear and convincing evidence” that the alleged tortfeasor acted with actual malice—i.e., “with knowledge of [the statement’s] falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false . . . .” Id. § 76-a(1). The statute defines “public interest” broadly to include “any subject other than a purely private matter.” Id. § 76-a(d).
Plaintiff alleges that Finkelman’s tweeting of the photograph is defamatory per se because it “accuses [him] of conduct incompatible with being an honorable member of the legal professiоn.” Compl. ¶ 29. Defendant seeks to dismiss the defamation claim arguing: (1) that New York Civil Rights Law § 74, provides immunity for statements which are fair and true reports of a judicial proceeding; (2) that the statements are otherwise non-actionable opinions; and (3) in the alternative, the statements are true, and were not made with “actual malice” as required by the Anti-SLAPP statute. The Court considers these issues below.
B. New York Civil Rights Law Section 74 Immunizes Defendant from Liability for the Tweeted Photograph
Defendant first contends that New York Civil Rights Law § 74—which provides immunity for fair and true reports of judiciаl proceedings—requires dismissal of Plaintiff’s *9 defamation claim. Mem. at 8–10. Plaintiff appears to agree that, had the photograph been attached to the original complaint, Defendant could have tweeted it without exposing herself to liability. Opp. at 6. However, because Defendant allegedly “sought out the image for her malicious reasons,” Plaintiff argues the immunity does not apply. Id. The Court disagrees and extends the fair report privilege to Finkelman’s tweeting of the allegedly fake photograph because it is substantively described by the complaint.
Section 74 of the New York Civil Rights Law was enacted, at least in part, to “encourage
accountability through public legal proceedings and the truthful reporting of whatever transpires
in open court.” Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale ,
A civil action cannot be maintained against any person, firm or corporation, for the publication of a fair and true report of any judicial proceeding, legislative proceeding or other official proceeding, or for any heading of the report which is a fair and true headnote of the statement published.
This section does not apply to a libel contained in any other matter added by any person concerned in the publication; or in the report of anything said or done at the time and place of such a proceeding which was not a part thereof.
N.Y. C IV . R TS . L. § 74 (McKinney 2025). Section 74 also extends to “background material with
regard to the case” as long as the statement “is a substantially accurate description of the
allegation.” Fishof v. Abady ,
The relevant tweet shares a photograph described in detail by the Rapaport I complaint,
accompanied by Defendant’s statement “[w]e got it lads, [shoutout] to an anonymous tipster.”
ECF No. 1-2 at 20. Even though the photograph was not attached to the original Rapaport I
complaint, it was substantively described in the Rapaport I complaint. R1 Compl. ¶¶ 7–8. By
saying we got “it,” and replying to her earlier tweet regarding the allegations in the complaint (which described the photograph as fake), Finkelman conveyed the message that the
same fake photograph described in the complaint is the same one she received and was tweeting.
Moreover, while Defendant asserted that she received the photograph from an “anonymous
tipster,” that fact itself does not prevent application of Section 74. “[T]he fact that a defendant
derive[s] information about the judicial proceedings from secondary sources [does] not mean
that [Section 74 is] inapplicable.” Cholowsky v. Civiletti ,
Defendant did not provide comments or information that was different than, or separate
from, the underlying allegations in the complaint. Finkelman did not, for instance,
offer commentary about the visual authenticity of the photo, or give an opinion on whether,
based on the photograph, Plaintiff’s allegations had merit. Cf. Holy Spirit Assn. for Unification of
World Christianity v. New York Times Co. ,
The Court thus finds that the tweeted photograph—even though it was not attached to the
original complaint—would enable an ordinary viewer or reader to determine “from
the publication itself that the publication is reporting on a judicial proceeding.” Kinsey , 991 F.3d
at 178 (cleaned up). Defendant’s tweet in the entire context of the thread presents a clear relation
to the relevant paragraphs from complaint: that allegedly, three John Does posted
faked photographs of Plaintiff on the internet, and the photographs showed a “public enemy”
styled poster with a picture of him and the words “DO NOT ADMIT.” R1 Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8; see
Kinsey ,
C. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Defamatory Statement
Even if the Court found the Section 74 privilege to be inapplicable, Plaintiff’s defamation claim would still fail because (1) the Defendant’s tweet of the photograph does not constitute an actionable statement of fact based on the context in which it was made; and (2) the tweeted photograph would be protected by a defense of truth. The Court addresses these issues in turn.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s tweet of the photograph, taken “togеther with the
context in which it appears, is susceptible to a defamatory connotation” because it “falsely
accuses plaintiff . . . of being a trespasser” and implies “he is unfit to practice his profession.”
Compl. ¶ 20. In evaluating the viability of a defamation claim, the words must be construed in
the context of the entire statement before an ordinary audience, and if the statement is not
reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning, the claim is not actionable. Silsdorf v. Levine ,
Based on the full surrounding context, an ordinary reader would not view Finkelman’s tweet as suggesting Plaintiff is a “trespasser” or that he is “unfit to practice his profession” as an attorney. Compl. ¶ 20. The alleged defamatory tweet containing the photograph came at the end of an entire thread devoted to the Rapaport I complaint, which itself аlleged that the photograph was falsified. ECF No. 1-2 at 20; R1 Compl. ¶¶ 6–9. And the thread involved Defendant screenshotting, and adding commentary regarding, the Rapaport I complaint. It would have therefore been clear, to an ordinary reader, that Defendant derived both the subject and source of the content in the Twitter thread from the complaint. Indeed, the vast majority of Plaintiff’s tweets included screenshots of that complaint. See generally ECF No. 1-2.
Defendant is not alleged to have any personal knowledge or familiarity with any of the
material disсussed in the complaint, or any prior (or current) relationship with
Plaintiff. Further, Defendant did not at any point suggest that Plaintiff’s allegations with respect
*13
to the photograph lacked merit or were untrue. In other words, Finkelman did not write or
suggest anything that would cause an ordinary reader to have a different opinion than one they
would have if they merely read the complaint (which Finkelman screenshotted
throughout the thread). It is therefore only susceptible to “one meaning.” Pantheon Properties,
Inc. v. Houston , No. 20-CV-3241 (ALC),
Even construing the remaining tweets in the most charitable light to Plaintiff (which, as
discussed supra , Plaintiff concedes do not support his defamation claim), Finkelman, at most,
called Plaintiff’s lawyering ability into question by mocking various allegations in the complaint.
ECF No. 1-2. But these are the types of non-actionable opinion statements which cоurts have
long recognized cannot sustain a defamation claim. See Mann v. Abel ,
The tweeted photograph would also not support a claim of defamation because the
“truth” defense would apply. “Truth is an absolute defense to an action based on defamation.”
Goldberg v. Levine ,
Consistent with the above analysis regarding Section 74, the tweeted photograph, in full context, would not produce a different effect on the reader than the Rapaport I complaint itself. In the first relevant tweet, Defendant described the photograph as “fake.” ECF No. 1-2 at 3. The “truth”—as Plaintiff essentially concedes—is that the photograph is not real. That is exactly how Defendant described it. And Plaintiff himself discusses and chаracterizes Defendant’s tweeted photograph as the same faked photograph described in that was posted on Reddit and Top-Law-Schools.com. Compl. ¶¶ 6–16. Plaintiff also attached a nearly identical photograph to his amended complaint in . See Rapaport I , ECF No. 38-2.
Plaintiff’s claim for defamation is therefore dismissed. 5
III. Plaintiff Is Sua Sponte Denied Leave to Amend
Plaintiff will not be permitted leave to amend his complaint, because any such
amendment would be futile. To be sure, “[l]eave to amend should be freely given, and a pro se litigant in particular should be afforded every reasonable opportunity tо demonstrate that [he] has
a valid claim.” Atherley v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ. , No. 23-CV-383 (JGLC),
However, “[l]eave may be denied ‘for good reason, including futility, bad faith, undue
delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.’” TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc. , 758 F.3d
493, 505 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp .,
Moreover, Plaintiff has “neither sought leave to amend nor suggested that he possesses
any additional facts that could cure the defects in his dismissed claims.” Whitfield v. City of New
York ,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant Finkelman’s motion to dismiss in its entirety. In addition, the stay which the Court previously imposed on the sanctions briefing is LIFTED, and the previously filed sanctions motions (ECF Nos. 20 and 24) are DENIED as MOOT. To the extent Defendant seeks to renew this motion, she must file any such motion, if desired, by September 15, 2025 .
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate ECF Nos. 17, 20, and 24. Dated: August 29, 2025 New York, New York
SO ORDERED. JESSICA G. L. CLARKE United States District Judge