Ransonette v. State

Joseph RANSONETTE, Franklin

Aрpellant, Texas, Appellee. The STATE of No. 51550. Appeals Criminal of Texas. Oct. Rehearing 3,May Denied

Melvyn Barry Carson P. Bruder and Helft, Dallas, appellant. for Wade, Henry Atty., T. M. Dist. W. West- moreland, Jr., Douglas D. and Jim Mulder Dallas, Burnham, Attys., D. Asst. Dist. Jim Vollers, McAngus, Atty., David State’s S. Austin, Atty., the State. for Asst. OPINION

BROWN, Commissioner. appeal from conviction for

This is an kidnapping for Article extortion under 1177a, Appellant Vernon’s Ann.P.C. brother Woodrow Ransonette were jury jointly tried before a which found punishment guilty and them assessed (5005) man at five thousand and five each Department in the Texas years Correc- affirmed the conviction tions. This Court on April Woodrow Ransonеtte Appeal Ransonette Dismissed, 11,1975, November 423 U.S. 96 S.Ct. 46 L.Ed.2d 274. Mayhew Dealey Mrs. Amanda testified apartment she returned to her home shortly p. after 5:00 December Dallas m. on got that as out of stated she She parking apart- car in the lot behind her men, complex she was met one ment at into the gunpoint whom forced her wagon. front seat of Chevrolet station got as she into the stated that soon She placed car the men One of glasses agents blacked-out over positively identified eyes she her so that could not see. said She Woodrow Ransonette as the man he saw that she was driven to a vacant get house out of the van at one telephone where she was handcuffed and blindfolded He also booths. positively appel- identified gauze tape. further She testified as the driver of the van and stated that she was released unharmed stood “within a foot” of his broth- kidnappers during early morning the during hours one the kidnapper’s telephone er father-in-law, of December 22 after her Jo- with Agent Brown. conversations Sr., $250,- seph Dealey, paid M. a ransom of testimony The State also introduced the stated that she She was left bound aof man who stated that he sold the station grass and blindfolded in tall near a dead- wagon abduction, used in the initial a 1963 street, end but that wriggle she was able to II, Chevy ato man Jerry named Davis on bindings of her out and blindfold in time to December 1972. The witness ‍‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‍identified a white van with stripe” see a “dark bluish Woodrow Ransonette as the man who leaving Dealey the scene. Mrs. positively bought the car. Another witness testified identified Woodrow Ransonette as the man duplex that he rented a to a man named who her forced into the"car and with whom Jerry Davis on December 1972. This throughout she communicated her ordeal. witness also identified Woodrow Ranso- identify appellant She was unable to as one nette as the using Jerry man the name of her abductors because of her blindfold. Mrs. Dealey Davis. testified that the du-

Joseph Dealey, M. testified as to his plex Sr. was the vacant residence where she kidnappers with the concerning contact the captive. was held Another witness testified ransom demands. He stated that he noti- that he sold the white van to Franklin police agents fied and that of the Fed- Ransonette. Investigation eral Bureau of entered into The remainder of the evidence included Agent the case and that an Brown later testimony from various law enforcement telephone took over communication with about officers their involvement in the in- kidnappers eventually and delivered the vestigation of the case and circumstances

ransom. surrounding apprehension of the Ranso- developed nettes. It was that the employees of Bell license Several Southwestern on the van number was traced tо Franklin Telephone Company they testified that The van Ransonette. was found in the tracing phone were involved in the calls a parking apartment lot of Dallas house originating exchanges from various in the where Woodrow Ransonette resided. Offi- terminating Dallas area and at the cers knocked on the apartment, door of the residence. It was established most of identified themselves and were admitted. phone calls originating from a arrested, The Ransonettes were warned of group public telephones in the area of rights аnd searched. their Woodrow exe- Avenue at the intersection with Skillman cuted consent to search form and the Abrams Road. $250,000 apartment searched. The ran- of the FBI testified that surveil- Agents som, glasses the blacked-out and other evi- up in the lance was set Avenue Skillman kidnapping were all found in supplied by based on the information area apartment. The testified that officers telephone company employees. It was statement, spontaneous made the Woodrow precise determined times of the you enough we getting “I told wasn’t mon- kidnappers’ telephone calls coincided with I ey. going rap Now we’re to take the at the appearance Skillman area tele- you going get caught.” we were told of a white 1971 Chevrolet van with phones purple stripe. Photographs wide taken We note at the outset an exam agents depict Woodrow Ransonette in ination of record filed in this Court telephone one of the booths with the white serious doubts as to whether or not raises parked nearby. grounds of error van raised the briefs notation of the on this motiоn and the appellant’s properly are be- behalf filed the motion is copy 40.09, court’s order on Vernon’s Ann.C. us under Article fore unclear; however, appellant’s brief both trial coun- appears appellant’s C.P. It brief state that the motion and the State’s of time for granted extensions sel was was denied. brief, but when brief filing of filed, appointed judge careful trial such support contention represent appellant ap- other counsel error, appellant Brady relies on denial was then filed motion with peal. Appellant 83 S.Ct. Maryland, 373 U.S. newly-appointed to dismiss the court (1963) L.Ed.2d Means trial denied the counsel. The court rule of filed in behalf brief was and a long line of subse- law in those cases recently appointed We held counsel. suppression by quent decisions is that the right represent has the accused to an evidence favorable prosecution of on appeal. both at trial and Webb himself process the evi- violates due where accused (Tex.Cr.App.1976). pun- guilt either to or to dence material However, appellant in appears it his ishment. pro adopted briefs se has supplemental two cases applied The standard to be will,We appointed of counsel. brief his the suppression of or of evidence nondisclosure therefore, eight grounds all of error review by testimony may the the State whether briefs. in the three raised had an of have effect the outcome the of In his first error (Tex. trial. Smith v. 516 S.W.2d415 in deny- contends that the trial court erred Cr.App.1974). key elements which ing request his to have the court make an in (a) suppression must be shown are of evi of file inspection prosecutor’s thе to camera by the prosecution request after if it contained favorable determine defense, (b) the the evidence’s favorable appellant. to the defense, (c) for mate character riality Illinois, of Moore evidence. has been made a copy A of the motion 786, 408 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d appeal. first part of the record on It re- (1972). permit “to quests the court the defense the prosecuting attorney . to call Appellant has satisfied none of the above to . as a witness ... deter- motion, requirements. effect, His admits (he) (his) possеssion” has in

mine whether no that he knows of material evidence fa- of statements witnesses who were not any Rather, merely defense. he vorable any physical or called State or be file rummage through wishes to objects or evidence which tangible other anything may if there is which have to see “may any guilt have relevance or any guilt relevance to his or innocence. We or innocence” of which “could previously request held such too have anywise construed as favorable” to be in Campos broad to effective. guilt punish- аppellant on the issue of or Bell v. ment. “in requests

The motion then Supreme most The United States Court any foregoing . . . of the evi- event recently Brady Maryland addressed the exists,” dence or information the court ‍‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‍Agurs, rule in the case of United States v. produce should order the State to such evi- June 427 U.S. 96 S.Ct. decided alternative, In the inspection. dence for not- 49 L.Ed.2d 342. There requests the trial court to make significant ed that there was no difference inspection prosecuting cases, case, an camera of such the instant between attorney's entire file and to conduct merely general there been re- where has interrogation cases, the prosecutor quest exculpatory of “to deter- for matter and Agurs in been mine if such evidence exists.” The record such as which there has no Recognizingthat there were transcript hearing request contain a of the at all. does not obviously criminating positive where the evidence is was the identification situations material value to the as one of the occupants of such substantial two elementary requires fairness it ubiquitous white van purple defense with the specific stripe. disclosed even without a re- This place to be identification took at one pos- that “the mere quest, the Court stated of the telephones during Skillman Avenue sibility that an item of undisclosed informa- conversation kidnappers between the might defense, helped Agent tion have or Brown only prior to Mrs. hours might have the outcome of the affected Dealey’s release. Mrs. also saw trial, ‘materiality’ not in the does establish leave van the release site. sense.” constitutional Appellant was chargеd acting with to- require gether There is no his brother in kidnapping constitutional Dealey prosecutor Arguably, that the must make a com Mrs. ransom. ment plete accounting and detailed to the no direct evidence of the main fact. There defense investigatory work on a case. police of all is no direct evidence that Illinois, supra. prosecutor has in the Moore v. involved initial abduction. Nor is duty of dis any violated his constitutional there direct evidence that he made not sufficiently unless his omission is the ransom calls or that he was involved in сlosure physical in the restraint or significant result denial detention Mrs. right Dealey. that he to a fair trial. United There is direct evidence defendant’s Likewise, Agurs, supra. we know was the owner and driver of the van associ- States obligation kidnapping. of the trial ated with the In the constitutional absence peruse prosecutor’s any instruction, court to the file for of other or it is exculpatory clearly evidence in the absence of a requested charge error to refuse a specific request supported by showing some on circumstantial еvidence. Moore v. such evidence exists. S.W.2d 140(Tex.Cr.App.1976); Farris v. (Tex.Cr.App.1975). 496 S.W.2d 55 first Appellant’s ground of error is over- ruled. The issue then is whether the protected law of principals adequately the ground In his second of error rights in the the absence of failing that the trial in contends court erred charge on circumstantial evidence. Article charge the jury to on the law of circum- 36.19, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. timely stantial evidence. The presented requested his instruction on cir- We addressed similar situation in Dick (Tex.Cr.App. evidence which the court de- son v. 492 S.W.2d 267 cumstantial 1973). charged jury the on the In that case there was direct evi nied. The court with principals of and instructed them that dence of the defendant’s association law robbers, presence of a near the and his at the scene of presence party mere at or the the exactly of the commission of an offense does the crime coincided with of scene principal. Although complaining one the witness not constitute as robbers. five men could not state which of the who Although it is true that Mrs. actually entered the store shot and robbed identify appellant to of her not able as one him, he testified that the defendant entered abductors, the evidence does reflect with them the store with the men and left was arrested with his brother in money after had been taken. We held apartment only the latter’s hours after the refusing there was no error Dealey. of Mrs. All of the instru- release instruction on circumstantial evi requested kidnapping mentalities of the were found princi The instruction on the law of dence. apartment, including money ransom pals adequately protected the defendant’s which had been divided into two sums and rights. separate pieces luggage. in two placed (Tex.Cr. incriminating is also the statement There In Morr that a there was direct evidence appellant App.1974) Woodrow Ransonette to made by a “blonde- burglary Even more in- had been committed time of the arrest. at the one, know, you The other car. escaped. who de individual” haired silent, and burglary quite con this makes sense with connection with fendant’s you, Barnett at the scene fur Jack told because presence of his what sisted say charged jury out gestures. The cоurt didn’t a word there at tive Franklin doing instructed He said Woodrow was the arrest. law said, talking. presence is not sufficient to Like I Franklin’s them that mere all the kept We held that this road so he his principal. one as before constitute been down if on circumstan the refusal mouth shut.” even error, as no evidence could construed tial testimony refer earli- The remarks to the was shown. harm given by arresting offi- er in the trial case, Dickson, supra, like con The instant Woodrow Ransonette made cers that evidence of close tains direct said incriminating statemеnt while Franklin Ransonette. Woodrow association objection was voiced at that nothing. No Morr, supra, instant case contains Like objection during the was raised time and at places appellant which Nothing is argument. present- prosecutor’s pres ransom calls and in the scene Gibson v. ed for review. brother, of his with instrumentalities ence Shumake v. crime, at the their arrest. time of appellant’s rights find We Appellant’s ground fourth error adequately protected by giv overruled. supra; Morr Dickson v. en. supra; Helms v. ground appel his fifth of error 1973). (Tex. Cr.App. appointed appeal lant’s counsel on contends denied effective assist Appellant’s ground second of error retained trial of counsel counsel ance overruled. argu to his failure final present due appel In his third of error jury at punishment phase to the ments contends that trial court erred A review the record the trial. entire overruling pursuant his motion sever that appellant’s this case demonstrates 36.09, The Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. Article represented throughout him ably counsel by appellant’s contention raised broth same argument The waiver this trial. of State, v. 522 er overruled Ransonette strategy. Appellate might trial counsel (Tex.Cr.App.1975). 509 No evidence S.W.2d differently, the case have tried but that support was offered in inadequate representation. ‍‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‍show does not in the of such evi error shown absence State, (Tex.Cr. Rockwood v. 524 292 offered at the time the motion was App.1975). We find of coun no misconduct 36.09, Article presented and overruled. legal duty to of sel which amounts a breach Ann.C.C.P.; Ransonette, supra; Vernon’s faithfully represent an accused’s inter (Tex.Cr. Hawkins v. 509 S.W.2d 531 S.W.2d 618 ests. Hunnicutt 449 S.W.2d App.1974); Robinson (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Martin (Tex.Cr.App.1969). (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Farmer ground error is Appellant’s third of over- State, ruled. ground Appellant’s fifth of error is over- ground appel fourth of error In his ruled. jury argument during contends that lant improper made an reference prosecutor grounds three of error set out The at the to make a statement to his failure supplemental pro se will appellant’s briefs referred argument six, arrest. time his grounds as of error sev designated was as follows: en, eight. ground sixth “ evi challenges sufficiency Woodrow Ran- he . . identified . She Although aрpeal the record in this actually put one that her in dence. as the sonette only transcript proceedings contains two, error number in which it was asserted appellant, in behalf of we thoroughly have the trial court refusing erred in pages the fifteen re-examined hundred jury submit to the requested testimony 49,808, and exhibits in Cause No. instruction on the law of circumstantial evi- State, supra. Ransonette v. Viewing the original On dence. submission we held that light evidence in the most favorable to the the court’s refusal requested to submit the evidence, briefly we find that the as cirсumstantial evidence was above, supports the jury’s summarized find- error, clearly appellant’s rights but ing guilty. protected adequately because the submitted a Appellant’s ground sixth court on the error is over- law of principals. ruled. princi- A on the law of pals charge; protect it does not In his seventh of error rights. defendant’s An instruction on contends the trial court deny- erred in the law of does not eliminate the ing change motion for of venue. This necessity for an instruction on circumstan- already contention has been decided ad- tial if circumstantiаl evidence is versely in Ransonette v. upon to appellant’s guilt relied establish the supra. principal. McBride v. eighth ground appel In his of error S.W.2d 318 Seelies v. contends that it lant was error to admit into evidence the items seized at his broth (1962). However, we now find that there apartment during Appel er’s their arrest. was direct appellant’s par- evidence of the lant’s brother Ap consented to the search. ticipation in the commission of the offense pellant challenge legality. cannot now its and that the court’s refusal to submit the (Tex.Cr. Adams S.W.2d 746 rеquested charge on circumstantial evi- App.1976). dence was not error. eighth Appellant’s ground of error is Dealey Mrs. could not identify appel- overruled. lant as the man who was with Woodrow judgment is affirmed. Ransonette when she was abducted man, Woodrow Ransonette and another but Opinion approved by the Court. completed offense was not when she ROBERTS, Judge (dissenting). was abducted. The offense was a continu- grounds I dissent on was no ing offense until after the had been ransom against appel- direct evidence adduced paid Dealey and Mrs. hаd been released. request herein and a for a appel- Mrs. Before released denied, evidence was thus Griffin, lant was identified Will H. depriving appellant herein of a valuable agent, FBI as the driver van of a which and sub right overruling years silentio 125 took his brother Woodrow Ransonette to in of law this State. telephone public booths on two occasions. On these occasions Woodrow Ransonette majority agree The the failure to telephone with charge was had conversation Charles give “clearly error.” In (5005) five Brown who he not was an FBI year view the thousand five T. did know by jury, assessed I agent. sentence cannot that the

agree error was harmless. While Woodrow engaged Ransonette was part in acts which constituted a of the OPINION ON THE APPELLANT’S appellant for which the and offense Wood- MOTION FOR REHEARING indicted, appellant row Ransonette DALLY, Commissioner. aiding was identified as the man who was abetting for and his brother Woodrow Ranso- On the rehearing taking telephone have him the booths by we reconsidered nette

43 robbery. of the the calls were the car near the scene acting as loоkout while and appel- within one foot Griffin identified Agent stood case made. abetting his aiding Ransonette while the tele- of Woodrow as the man testi- phone during calls were made and the time the offense brother mony could have heard both committed. being parties telephone conversations. is rehearing appellant’s motion for direct There was evidence denied. participation the commission of the of- fense. by the Court. approved Opinion A evi charge on circumstantial ROBERTS, Judge (dissenting). required only where the evidence majority opinion on agree I guilt purely fact of the main essential to First, respects. I en- rehearing in several entirely g. circumstantial. See e. Wil holding majority’s thusiastically endorse State, 59, 154 .2d son v. Tex.Cr.R. 225 S.W is a principals law of charge on the that a (1949). A charge 173 on circumstantial evi a de- protect and does not charge State’s necessary only dence is when the State’s This is because rights. fendant’s depends entirely case circumstances upon for the makes it easier State principals on State, g. Nailing for conviction. e. v. See follows, rec- majority as the It to convict. 161, (1948); 152 211 Tex.Cr.R. 757 S.W.2d may not substi- a trial court ognizes, that State, 412, v. Wells 134 Tex.Cr.R. 115 parties, un- on tute a (1938). An S.W.2d 658 instruction —or on the new Penal Code—when der given circumstantial evidence need not be is mandated. evidence circumstantial part only where the State relies on cir State, evidence, cumstantial Lawler v. 110 agree I with the statements also 460, (1927); 9 Tex.Cr.R. S.W.2d 259 Cole that: majority man v. 90 Tex.Cr.R. 235 898 S.W. circumstantial evidence “A (1921), though even relies on a State necessary only when case de- chain of be con may circumstances that entirely uрon circumstances for pends major part sidered the of the evidence on State, 152 g. Nailing e. v. See conviction. relies for which State conviction. Dodd (1948); 211 S.W.2d 757 Tex.Cr.R. 156, 192 263 149 Tex.Cr.R. S.W.2d 115 Wells Tex.Cr.R. (1946). 682-683, See Tex.Jur.2d Instruc (1938). as to An instruction 123; tions, Sec. Morris given evidence need not be circumstantial (Tex.Cr.App.1966); Russell v. part only the State relies where .2d 117 S.W circumstantial evidence. Lawler (1927); knew what 110 Tex.Cr.R. Whether 297, 235 doing he made the 90 Tex.Cr.R. ‍‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‍his brother when Coleman (1921), telephone though calls and whether the even the State S.W. intent make his acts in required had on a chain of relies circumstances brother, aiding abetting his criminal major part may be considered the are not shown acts matters which need be on which the relies State may direct evidence but shown Dodd v. conviction. evidence. Davis v. (1946). ...” 516 157 Barber (Tex.Cr.App.1974); S.W.2d Ante, at 43. State, 462 v. S.W.2d 33 However, of these majority’s statement State, v. 172 Tex.Cr.R. 357

Schwartz ambiguous. What is somewhat rules (1962). 393 S.W.2d is that where upon relied hold authorities evi- Blankenship is both direct and circumstantial 481 147 there In S.W.2d no proved, fact to be authority relied dence of the main (Tex.Cr.App.1972) main required. is appellant, posi- charge by no one could circumstantial upon Dodd, The supra, 192 at 264. identify Blankenship as the man in S.W.2d tively See 44 tinued,

majority opinion should with the not be read hold- deceased and his brother ing charge that circumstantial evidence one side and the on defendant and son required aspect where one of the main day the other. Later that deceased proved by direct anoth- stopped fact evidence and his brother their buggy and on the evidence; by er circumstantial in such a of the road were getting side and out of the charge case a circumstantiаl evidence is re- buggy ap- when the defendant and his son Coleman, quired. supra, See 235 at proached S.W. in their car. The defendant was 901. driving; passed as the car within four or buggy, feet of the the defendant’s son five agree majori- What I cannot with is the the fatal shot. fired application these rules of law to the ty’s of this case. I believe that a circum- facts reversing because of the trial In court’s required stantial evidence give failure to a on circumstantial the failure to submit such a evidence, the Anderson Court held that it is reversible error. that, “well established when the actual kill- another, ing by presence is done the mere majority part relies in on the testi deprive accused does not him of the Brown, an FBI mony agent, of Charles who having privilege his criminal connection the voice of identified co-de with the offense determined the rule of person fendant as the voice of the who evidence.” Anderson kidnap made the demands over tele State, supra, at 640. The phone. As the 213 S.W. Court majority held in Mclnturf v. 544 observed that had (Tex.Cr.App.1976), S.W.2d 417 Id., given. was direct evidence at 640. The Court also of the co-defend been participation recognized, inapplicable, ant’s but found the rule the offense.1 How ever, appel it is not direct evidence of the “ guilt; lant’s it merely evidence of a sec proven the facts ‘Where are in such ondary guilt fact from which appellant’s relation to the main fact as to make close may be inferred. Anderson v. equivalent testimony, to direct them (1919); Tex.Cr.R. 213 S.W. 639 Burle charge on circumstantial evidence is un- ” son Tex.Cr.R. Id., at necessary.’ 641. (1936), followed in McCormick v. Tipton v. 95 Tex.Cr.R. also See (1959), (1923). 253 S.W. approval Blankenship аnd cited with The rule in Anderson was followed in State, supra, robbery Burleson case. majority upon appellant’s also relies case the defendant and one Jordan phone near the booth at the time presence agreed complainant to deliver to the appellant’s co-defendant made the calls to dollars’ worth counterfeit mon- hundred Brown and on the fact that drove ey exchange sixty-five dollars. On public phone his co-defendant to and from day robbery complainant However, previous booths. under our hold- agreed with the the com- defendant purely ings, this kind of evidence is also sixty-five give would Jordan the plainant circumstantial. night though the defend- even dollars

Thus, not be able to deliver supra, in Anderson v. a mur- ant and Jordan would money following in which fired the counterfeit until the der case the fatal shot was son, complainant, day. The defendant left the defendant’s the evidence was shortly thereafter Jordan came alone quarreled had with the defendant robbed him of killing complainant’s oc- ‍‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‍room and day before deceased gunpoint. at day quarreling sixty-five The next con- dollars curred. Melnturf, I will is not even direct evi held otherwise in I would hold that this guilt. holding purposes See the dis dence of the co-defendant’s for the of this concede senting opinion in Melnturf v. discussion. However, majority of this S.W.2d at complainant Jordan as he followed DILLARD, Appellant, D. Willie got left the room. Jordan into automo men with the defendant the two bile away together. The held drove Court Texas, Appellee. The STATE “manifestly” ease was reliant NUNLEY, Appellant, Eugene Harold upon circumstantial evidence reversed trial court’s becаuse failure also Bur on circumstantial evidence. See Texas, Appellee. STATE of (1857); rell v. Tex. 713 Ellsworth Nos. 52588. S.W. (1922); Denny Appeals of Texas. of Criminal March 1977. Similarly, in the case us the evi before Appellants’ Motion Opinion against appellant manifestly this is Rehearing April circumstantial. It must be remembered May Rehearing Denied Second directly direct evidence is that which proved, the main to be demonstrates fact proof circumstantial evidence is direct

while which, logical infer secondary fact ence, Craw demonstrates the main fact. (Tex.Cr.App. ford 1973). proved the main to be case fact principal was offender. proof co-de- There direct fendant committed the offense. There is evidence that

also direct present during part near co-defendant being of the time that the offense was And committed. direct evidence driving vehi- the motor helped convey cle which the co-defendant during the commission of offense. clearly

But are these like the facts in minor, Anderson Burleson : or second- ary, facts from which an inference must be facts, sepa- drawn. None these either together, directly prove rately or taken guilty principal. Therefore, given. charge should have been The failure so to do was reversible error.

Case Details

Case Name: Ransonette v. State

Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Date Published: Oct 6, 1976

Citation: 550 S.W.2d 36

Docket Number: 51550

Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.