658 N.E.2d 313 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1995
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *10 Appellants, Lisa A. Ransome and minor Ashley Ransome, through her duly appointed guardian ad litem, appeal from the decision of the Miami County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, denying their motion to vacate its prior judgment dismissing a paternity action with prejudice.
On December 23, 1983, Lisa and Ashley Ransome filed a motion to determine parentage and a complaint seeking child support against appellee, Dean Lampman. There was no guardian ad litem or separate counsel appointed to represent the interests of Ashley in the parentage action.
The trial court ordered that the parties submit to blood tests, the results of which revealed a 98.9% probability that Lampman was the biological father of Ashley. No further action was taken on the case for approximately one year.
On February 27, 1985, Lisa Ransome and Lampman entered into a compromise agreement in accordance R.C.
On April 18, 1985, the trial court filed a journal entry of dismissal which stated, "Upon request of the parties and for good cause shown it is ordered that the within cause be and the same hereby is dismissed with prejudice and at the costs of the Defendant herein." The journal entry was approved and signed by the prosecuting attorney and the attorney for the defendant. The journal entry did not expressly incorporate the terms of the compromise agreement.
Lampman complied with his obligation to pay $15 per week for several years. Lisa alleges that Lampman stopped paying in 1990. Lisa further claims that when she tried to enlist the help of the Miami County Child Support Enforcement Agency to enforce the compromise agreement, she was told that they could not enforce the agreement because paternity was not established and child support was not ordered by the court.
On April 27, 1993, Lisa and Ashley Ransome filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment wherein they sought to have the trial court's judgment dismissing the paternity action with prejudice vacated. Lisa and Ashley Ransome asserted numerous arguments in support of the motion including the following: (1) It is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective effect because Lampman has breached the compromise agreement; (2) the trial *12
court did not initially approve the compromise agreement as required by R.C.
Lampman filed a motion in opposition to the motion for relief from judgment arguing that Ransome's motion was untimely because it was filed approximately eight years after the initial dismissal of the paternity action with prejudice.
On March 30, 1994, the trial court entered judgment denying Lisa and Ashley Ransome's motion to vacate the judgment. The trial court found that R.C.
Lisa and Ashley Ransome then filed this timely appeal.
On appeal, Lisa asserts two assignments of error, essentially raising the same arguments as raised in her motion to vacate the judgment. Ashley, through her guardian ad litem, concurs in the arguments raised by her mother. Since we believe that the assignments of error may not be resolved identically with respect to each of the appellants, we will separately address the assignments of error as they relate first to Lisa, then to Ashley.
As her first assignment of error, Lisa raises the following:
"The trial court erred to the prejudice of plaintiff-appellant in overruling her motion for relief from judgment."
In support of this assignment of error, Lisa argues that the trial court erred in overruling her Civ.R. 60(B) motion to set aside the dismissal of the paternity action with prejudice because she is entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(4) and (5) based on several alternative grounds.
Civ.R. 60(B) provides that a party may be relieved from judgment when certain requirements are met. The rule provides:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:
"* * * *13
"(4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time. * * *"
It is firmly established that the trial court has discretion in determining whether to grant a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams (1988),
The standard for granting a motion for relief from judgment was set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in GTE Automatic Elec.,Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. (1976),
"To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken." Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus.
Lisa contends that she has adequately demonstrated these requirements and is thus entitled to relief from judgment.
First, she claims that she is entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(4) because it is no longer equitable for the judgment to have prospective application. In support of this claim, she argues that it is inequitable for the judgment to have prospective application because Lampman has stopped paying the $15 per month due under the compromise agreement, thereby breaching the agreement.
R.C.
"After an action has been brought and before judgment, the alleged father and the mother, subject to the approval of the court, may compromise the action by an agreement in which the parent and child relationship is not determined but in which a specific economic obligation is undertaken by the alleged parent in favor of the child." *14
Essentially, the statute allows for the parties to a paternity action to enter into a settlement agreement concerning the action.
The trial court held that Lisa was not entitled to relief pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(4) based on its finding that she has a remedy by way of a breach of contract complaint. We agree. Settlement agreements, as binding contracts, may be enforced through a breach of contract action. See Boster v. C. M Serv.,Inc. (1994),
Lisa next argues that she is entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to the catchall provision contained in Civ.R. 60(B)(5) ("any other reason justifying relief from the judgment") for the following reasons: (1) The trial court did not initially approve the compromise agreement as required by R.C.
Initially, we note that relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5) should be granted only in extraordinary situations. Adomeit v.Baltimore (1974),
Lampman argues that, even if Lisa might otherwise be entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), relief should be denied because she could have raised these same arguments immediately after the initial judgment was entered, and, therefore, did not move for relief from judgment within a reasonable time.
We find no error in the trial court's decision not to grant relief from judgment to Lisa pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(5). The trial court specifically found that it properly approved the compromise agreement entered into by the parties. R.C.
Finally, although it is true that the child was not represented by a guardian ad litem in the paternity proceedings, that is not a sufficient reason to *15 relieve Lisa from a judgment that was a result of her voluntary agreement with Lampman. There is no reason to believe that the appointment of a guardian ad litem would have altered Lisa's agreement with Lampman. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding that Lisa failed to demonstrate substantial grounds for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(5).
Moreover, we note that, in our opinion, Lisa's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(5) was not filed within a reasonable time. Although there is no fixed time period for bringing a motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), the motion must be made within a "reasonable time." Most of the reasons cited by Lisa in support of her motion were in existence immediately after the judgment of the trial court was entered, nearly eight years before she brought the motion for relief. There should be "substantial and compelling reasons" for opening a judgment after such a long period of time. In reDissolution of Marriage of Watson (1983),
Finally, Lisa argues that she should be relieved from judgment because the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the judgment dismissing the action. She claims that the trial court's jurisdiction was never properly invoked in the paternity action because the state, not she, initiated the paternity action.
Initially, we note that a judgment granted by a court that is without jurisdiction to rule on the matter before it is void. A motion to vacate a void judgment need not comply with the requirements of Civ.R. 60(B) and may be granted by virtue of the inherent power of the court. Patton v. Diemer (1988),
Pursuant to the language of R.C.
Lisa cites Washington v. Gregory (Feb. 19, 1985), Clinton App. No. CA84-06-022, unreported, 1985 WL 8179, in support of her argument that a trial court is without jurisdiction to determine a paternity action where the action is initiated by the child support enforcement agency. In Washington, the court found that the state, rather than the mother, filed the action.Id. Thus, the court held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the matter. Id. *16 The trial court based its finding on a combination of facts including the following: the mother only named the alleged father under pressure from the prosecutor; the trial court referred to the state as a party to the action; and the state actually argued against the mother in a related contempt action.Id.
We find Washington to be distinguishable from the present case. In the present case, the only fact that Lisa points to in support of her claim that the state initiated the action is the fact that the prosecutor from the child support enforcement agency signed the complaint. The state was not named as a party to the action, and there is nothing to indicate that the trial court considered the state as the plaintiff in the action. The fact that the prosecutor represented Lisa in the action does not support a conclusion that the state was the plaintiff in the action. Prosecutors are often required to represent plaintiffs in paternity actions where the plaintiff is a recipient of public aid. Such representation, standing alone, does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction. See, generally, Anderson v. Jacobs
(1981),
Next, we address the first assignment of error in relation to Ashley Ransome. In regard to Ashley's claim, the trial court stated in its opinion that "no action by the mother can prejudice the rights of her child not to become a public charge and to require the father to assist in the child's support. This would require a new action to be brought in the child's behalf to determine paternity and establish support." Clearly, the trial court contemplated that Ashley would be able to file a new paternity action in her own name in the future. However, the trial court failed to expressly relieve Ashley from its prior judgment dismissing the paternity action with prejudice, even though Ashley was specifically named as a plaintiff in the original action. Ashley argues that, without being expressly relieved from the judgment of dismissal of the paternity action with prejudice, she will be barred by the doctrine of resjudicata from bringing a future action.
We find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to expressly relieve Ashley from the judgment dismissing the paternity action with prejudice. Although Ashley was named as a party in the original parentage action, we find that her interests were not adequately represented, and, therefore, she should be relieved from the judgment. The Ohio Supreme Court, inJohnson v. Norman (1981),
The record discloses that Ashley was not represented by a guardian ad litem or separate counsel in the paternity action. R.C.
Lisa Ransome's motivation in compromising the paternity action may have been merely to cooperate with public authorities so that she might continue to receive public assistance for her and her child. Ashley's interest in this litigation was considerably broader than that of her mother. She had the right to know the identity of her father so that she might enjoy the physical, mental, and emotional support of both of her parents during her lifetime, as well as the bundle of rights which accompany the determination of parentage, e.g., inheritance, social security, etc. See, generally, Dept. of Public Aid v.Liesman,
Recently, the Supreme Court of Nevada refused to grant res judicata effect to a consent judgment whereby the parties to the paternity action agreed that the defendant putative father would provide support for the support of his alleged child in return for sealing the determination of paternity. The Court concluded that a consideration of the policies and purposes behind the Uniform Parentage Act required a departure from the otherwise appropriate application of the bar and merger principles of res judicata to preclude an action by the child to determine paternity and compel support. Willerton v. Bassham (1995),
"It seems apparent, then, that the drafters of the model act envisioned widespread settlement of paternity claims on the basis of the strength and accuracy of blood test evidence, not based upon the mother's willingness to accept a final settlement agreement where the chances of establishing paternity at trial *18 are weak or precarious. The facts of the instant case illustrate this result. The blood tests conducted during the pretrial proceedings were compelling evidence that Keith might be the father. In the interpretation of blood test results, the results indicated a strong probability that Keith, as compared to the average random Caucasian male, was the father of Zachary.
"If practice follows theory, and most paternity claims are to be settled on the basis of strong evidence, as in the instant case, then the statute would tip overwhelmingly in the alleged father's favor if given preclusive effect on both the issue of paternity and the nonmodifiability of the order. The alleged father would be able to secure a favorable ruling on paternity (a non-determination) even in the face of compelling evidence, and would also secure a `frozen' obligation of support. The mother and child would obtain support but without the option to modify the order. These results would obtain from a desire to avoid the `inconvenience and embarrassment' (whose we are not advised) of trial.
"With this as background, we analyze each party's interest in prosecuting a paternity action and seeking to compel support. We discern no persuasive reason why affording preclusive effect to a compromise agreement with the mother would contravene the policies of the act in any substantial fashion with regard to the determination of paternity. Unlike the child, the mother has no additional rights flowing from a determination of paternity beyond the right to receive support for the care of the minor child. If the support provisions are modifiable under the policies of Nevada's Obligation of Support Act, see infra, then there is no independent reason why the mother should retain a right to reinstitute suit on the issue of paternity. Accordingly, a stipulation-based judgment entered into as a result of the compromise procedure of NRS
"A minor child, however, has legal interests that flow from a determination of paternity beyond the right to collect support. Such interests include the right to prosecute an action for wrongful death, a claim under a workmen's compensation act and the right to an inheritance. See, e.g., Harold C. Havighurst, Settlement of Paternity Claims, 1976 Ariz.St.L.J. 461, 469 (citing cases and stating that it `appears that the answer should be in the negative' when presented with the question whether a prior settlement of a claim for support against a man who denies paternity should be binding upon a minor child). In addition, there is a real dignitary and psychological interest held by the child in being free to ascertain his or her heritage and lineage. For these reasons, we conclude that a minor child is not barred from instituting a later action to determine paternity *19 when a prior action brought in his name has reached judgment through a stipulated agreement.
"Keith argues that Zachary was represented by a guardian ad litem and that his interests were therefore properly protected. In addition, Keith points to the general provision of NRS
"As stated, the judge either made no findings as to Zachary's best interest or the parties have simply failed to include such important findings in the record on appeal. There is also no evidence that the judge first `evaluated the probability of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship in a trial' and then made a determination that a judicial declaration of the relationship would not be in the best interest of the child. See NRS
We further find that Ashley's motion to vacate was filed within a reasonable time. Although the judgment was entered nearly eight years ago, Ashley is quite young and cannot have been expected to have sought relief from the judgment in the interim period. Courts have recognized the importance of relief from judgment when the best interest of the child is at issue. See Watson, supra. Undoubtedly, Ashley's best interest is at issue in this action.
The first assignment of error is sustained as to Ashley Ransome.
As her second assignment of error, Lisa raises the following:
"The trial court erred to the prejudice of plaintiff-appellant in declaring that the statute which provides for compromise agreements in paternity actions, Ohio Revised Code
In support of this assignment of error, Lisa argues that the statute unlawfully discriminates against illegitimate children, denying them equal protection of the law. Lisa and the amicicuriae argue that R.C.
Although these arguments present an interesting issue and have been thoroughly briefed by the parties, we are constrained by the principle that constitutional issues should not be decided unless absolutely necessary. In re Miller (1992),
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to appellant Lisa Ransome. The judgment of the trial court as to Ashley Ransome is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Judgment accordingly.
WOLFF and FAIN, JJ., concur. *21
