*1 orders, aside the default we decline to set him. See Drew
judgment entered Inc., Quantum Sys. trans. denied (Ind.Ct.App.1996),
595-96 for fail proper was
(holding dismissal discovery order comply
ure to with given additional time party
where the respond expressly and was
within which comply failure to would result
warned that dismissal, or motion for response and no made). time was
additional
Judgment affirmed remanded consistent with this proceedings
further
opinion. J.,
SULLIVAN, J., DARDEN,
concur.
Lenna Twin Lakes RANSBURG d/b/a
Apartments, Appellant-Plaintiff, RICHARDS, Appellee- L.
Barbara
Defendant.
No. 29A05-0101-CV-25. of Indiana. Appeals
Court
June *2 negligence. Specifically,
Twin Lakes' following clause: lease contained the damages Lessor shall not be liable for to person property by or sustained Lessee, servants, family, or agents bis visitors, any or building due appurtenances being repair out of or arising leakage stoppage gas, or steam, water, sewer or plumbing, pipes Smith, Fisher, Bain, Maas & Michael R. wiring from defective or from defective IN, Attorney Ap- for Bishop, Indianapolis, any construction of of the aforesaid. pellant. agreed that the common areas and Coots, Henke & Wheel- Jeffrey Zipes, S. the demise grounds, premises which IN, er, Carmel, Attorney Appellee. for located, facilities, are laun- recreational hallways, dry equipment, rooms and OPINION lots, walkways, stairways, parking lawns equipment and all other areas and to be BARNES, Judge. cccupants used in common all Summary Case apartment building grounds, and Twin Ransburg, Lenna Lakes gratuitously by provided and maintained d/b/a in- ("Ransburg"), brings this Apartments Lessor, appur- and that their is not use terlocutory appeal challenge the trial leased; hereby premises tenant summary judgment of her court's denial hereby expressly agrees and the Lessee negligence in a action filed her motion be made use that the same shall tenant, Lessee, servants, affirm. Barbara Richards. We fomily, agents his or visitors, his, shall be at or their such use
Issue risk, shall, own and that the lessor in no dispositive issue is whether the ex- event, be, thereby or become liable culpatory clause contained the residen- loss, any damage, persons prop- or or tial lease between the is void as property be con- erty, whether such whether, against public policy storerooms, in the common tained result, summary judgment denial of areas, premises ‘ in the or in leased Ransburg proper. favor of portion building other of said Facts though loss dam- grounds, even such May apart- In Richards leased an negligence age shall be caused at ment Twin Lakes. The written lease servants, Lessor, its or em- agents, that agreement provided Twin Lakes ployees. "gratuitously" maintain the common
would added). Appendix (emphasis 78p. Appendix p. agree- areas. 78. The lease January early morning ment In hours of provided further Richards' use facilities, 28, 1999, two approximately of the Twin Lakes it including snowed lot, her parking apartment would own risk." inches. Richards left "[her] When addition, Appendix p. morning, the lease she noticed the side- agreement appeared cleared. It also provided Twin Lakes was walk had been plowed and damages prop- parking not liable that the lot had been persons erty if As Richards walked across damages even such were caused cleared. car, fell slipped lot to her she Our parking standard review for the de nial of a summary judgment on snow-covered ice. motion is the same as it was for the trial court. Miller filed a subsequently Richards R.R., Inc., v. Grand Trunk Western *3 re- against Ransburg. Ransburg action 488, N.E.2d 491 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). We sponded summary judgment with a motion must determine genuine whether is a there alleged she that because of the wherein issue of material fact and whether lease, non-liability clause in the Richards moving party judgment is entitled to as a that any right had "waived she ha[d] matter of law. Id. We must consider the complain injuries damages...." Ap- of pleadings and designated pursu evidence p. opposition her brief pendix 56(c) ant to Indiana Trial Rule without motion, contended Ransburg's Richards deciding weight their or credibility. Id. genuine that there were issues of material Summary judgment granted should be regard fact with to whether Richards had only if such evidence shows that there is to remove the snow and assumed genuine no issue of material fact and that Ransburg's ice. The trial court denied judgment is warranted as a matter of law. motion. Id. Summary judgment generally is inap
Analysis
propriate
negligence actions. Miles v.
Christensen,
(Ind.Ct.
643,
724 N.E.2d
645
Ransburg argues that
the trial court
App.2000), trans. denied.
in denying
summary judgment
erred
her
motion
Richards waived
claim
Resolving
because
the question of wheth
summary
damages.
She claims
er this lease
against
is void as
judgment
granted
public policy
should have been
her
turns on fairly balancing the
requires
favor because "the law
that the parties'
freedom to contract
unambiguous
clear and
of May policy
terms
of promoting responsibility for dam
2, 1995,
Agreement
Residential Lease
and ages
by
negligent
one's own
acts.
corresponding non-liability
recognized
clause entered
Indiana courts have long
and
respected
the freedom to contract. Trot
[Ransburg]
into
and
[Richards]
be en
forced
Appellant's
as matter of law."
Nelson,
1150,
ter v.
684 N.E.2d
1152-53
(Ind.1997).
p.
support
Brief
6. In
argument,
recognize
"very
of her
she
We
strong
principles
presumption
relies on basic contract
enforceability
of
of contracts
recognition
validity
Indiana's
represent
freely
of ex
bargained agree
clauses,
culpatory
where
are al ment of the parties."
(quoting
Conti
agree
lowed to
in advance that
is
one
nental Basketball Assoc. v. Ellenstein En
ter., Inc.,
(Ind.1996)).
obligation
under no
care for
the benefit
669 N.E.2d
139
rule,
general
of the other and shall not be liable for the
persons
As
the law allows
Seq,
consequences
negligent
age
competent
conduct.
of full
understanding
Board,
e.g.,
County
liberty
contracting,
LaFrenz
Lake
Fair
the utmost
and their
(1977).
contracts,
Ind.App.
172
freely
The facts of the Franklin Fire case are
was not unconscionable
sion
the lease
those
clearly distinguishable
may
from
before
stating,
say
do not
that there
"We
a
dispute
The
in that case involved
cireumstances which could
us.
not be facts and
end,
averred,
us, upon
parties
lease. To that
but not now before
commercial
in
be warranted
power because which the court would
equal bargaining
were of
entities,
a
contained
similar
and the
they
corporate
holding
were both
null and
as uncon
in a lease would be
void
necessity
a
seeking
lessee was not
basic
We
PUBLIC POLICE AUTHORITIES
v. NHP
Vertucci
a residential
FOR
AND PROTECTION.
SECURITY
(Ind.Ct.App.
N.E.2d 604
Mgmt.
THAT
BE
ANY
MAY
SECURITY
1998),
sued the landlord for
where a tenant
THE
PROVIDED IS SOLELY FOR
sexually
injuries
when she
sustained
OF LANDLORDS
apartment
complex's
at her
PROTECTION
assaulted
by a non-resident of the
PROPERTY....
swimming pool
argued
the tenants
complex.
appeal,
On
(emphasis
original).
at 606
granting
erred in
sum
that the trial court
disagreed as to whether the sexual
in favor of the landlord
mary judgment
"casualty"
the mean-
was a
within
assault
designated evidence raised
because their
that an
ing
provision.
of this
We held
concerning
material fact
genuine issues of
act such
assault would
intentional
as the
gratuitously assumed
whether the landlord
and,
a "casualty,"
not be considered
there-
criminal
protect
them from the
fore,
that the
clause did
non-residents,
*6
the land
of
whether
actions
or
prevent
having
the landlord from
as-
duty,
this
and whether the
lord breached
from
suming
duty
protect
a
to
the tenant
in
resulted
proximately
landlord's breach
party.
the criminal actions of a third
The landlord claimed
the sexual assault.
Although the
case involves a
Vertucei
any liability on its
that the lease disclaimed
lease,
distinguishable
it too is
tenants,
that it had
injuries
for
part
today. The exeul-
from the case before us
duty
protect against
to
an
no common law
sought
in
to
by
patory
attack
a third
clause at issue Vertuceet?
unforeseeable criminal
"in-
liability
it
not assume such a
the landlord from
for
party, and that
did
insulate
signed by the
duty.
agreement
jury
person
property arising
The lease
to
or
from
following provision:
theft, vandalism, fire,
casualty occurring
tenants contained the
Landlord,
premises
building."
in the
or the
Id. As
agrees
Tenant
its em-
such,
not
ployees,
agents
shall
be liable for
landlord did not seek a blanket
the
Ransburg
Tenant,
negligence
release for its own
as
injury
any damage or
to
Ten-
addition,
enforceability
of
did here.
the
agents,
employees, or
family,
ant's
public policy
as a matter of
guests,
any person entering
or to
clause
In-
building of which the
not at issue and was not addressed.
premises or the
lessor,
5-321,
negligence
§
Property
from the
his
1. See N.Y. Real
which
opera-
agents,
employees,
servants or
states:
covenant,
premis-
the demised
Every
agreement or understand-
tion or maintenance
containing
property
the de-
es or the real
ing
to
in or in connection with or collateral
-
premises
deemed to be void
mised
shall be
property exempting
real
lease of
wholly
against public policy and
unen-
liability
damages
injuries
lessor from
for
resulting
person
property
by or
forceable.
to
caused
in.
stead,
merely sought
public policy
apparent
[Tlhe
to have
conflict
tenants
with the freedom of contract argument
scope
fall outside
the assault
exculpatory
in real-estate' lease
clause
that the
"casualty" such
term
cases, namely, that a landlord should be
negligence
ac-
prevent
would
negligent
liable for the
breach
of a
agreed,
We
the landlord.
against
tion
tenant,
which
is owed
his
is subser-
pro-
action to
negligence
permitted
vient to the
person
doctrine
has
question
never addressed
ceed. We
the right
freely
contract about his
provision
public
violated
whether the
cases, especially
affairs. Some
the older
did not at-
policy because
ones, have reasoned that
the relation-
from dam-
insulate the landlord
tempt to
ship
of landlord and tenant
no
its own
ages caused
interest,
public
event matter of
but is
holding
controlling
is not
evalu-
Vertucei
affair,
purely
private
so that such
enforceability
of the clause in
ating
cannot be held
purely
clauses
void on
case.
instant
policy
grounds,
.
Perovich, Annotation,
D.
Validity
John
whether exceul-
question
Because the
Exculpatory
Exempting
Clause in Lease
insulat
clauses
residential leases
patory
Liability,
Lessor
49 A.L.R.3d
lability
personal
landlords from
ing
(1978).
the land
injuries purportedly
application
princi-
However the
of these
are void as
lords'
in all contexts is not warranted. As
ad
specifically
has never been
policy
ples
Supreme
stated
Court of Wisconsin:
Indiana,
we look to the other
dressed
application
The unconsidered
considered this is
jurisdictions
have
contract,
principle of freedom of
even
differing conclusions.
and reached
sue
when
the rules of
accompanied
strict
issue,
majority
There is no
rule
construction,
always justified
is not
decisions,
conflicting
numerous
deci
"only
extenuating
where there are
cireum-
with contracts of indemni
sions concerned
degree
stances which
affect the
damage un
ty,
relating
property
cases
actually
which that
freedom
exists.
leases,
disposition
and a
der business
Therefore,
opinion
we are of the
that the
exeulpatory
the courts to emasculate such
*7
that
into ac-
better view is
which takes
clauses
means of strict construction."
particular
count
actual effect of the
the
Corp.,
v. United Homes
79
McCutcheon
question
clause in
and that the facts and
1093,
443, 447-48, 486 P.2d
1096
Wash.2d
upon
cireumstances attendant
the cre-
(Wash.1971).
relationship.
ation of the landlord-tenant
underlying
argument
the
The rationale
v.
College Mobile Home Park & Sales
enforceability
for
of such clauses has often
514, 519, 241
Hoffmann, 72 Wis.2d
N.W.2d
doctrine of freedom
upon
been based
174,
A
number
of
growing
177 (1976).
of contract and the view
lease terms
exculpatory
similar
claus
states have held
matter. This reason-
purely private
policy
are a
concerns and to
public
es to offend
be unenforceable.2
as follows:
ing has been summarized
See,
Co.,
Stanley
Creighton
(1978)
(en
eg.,
v.
911 P.2d
247
573 P.2d
143
Cal.Rptr.
Buckner,
Sales,
(Colo.App.1996);
banc); College
v.
705
Home Park &
Mobile
Crawford
(Tenn.1992); Taylor Leedy
When
affair" or
"purely
private
clauses are
standards of affir-
failure to observe
they
a matter of
are "not
conduct,
any conduct
mative
interest."
an
by virtue of
amounting
negligence,
(foot-
449-50,
P.2d at 1096-97
Id. at
lease, the
in a
stan-
exculpatory clause
omitted).
*8
negli-
nor
ship. Neither the standard
lability for
limiting
tial lease
the landlord's
can
in
genee
abstraction.
exist
to its tenants was void as
v. Buck
public policy.
against
Id. The court further
reasoned:
Crawford
(Tenn.1992).
Furthermore,
present
ner,
ignore
one must
In so
we majority parties. The declares that contrary public residential lease is to exculpatory question is void and as it seeks to immunize policy insofar long because it unenforceable "contravenes damages caused her Ransburg against established common law rules of tort liabil- maintaining negligence, any, if common ity" public and "offends the of the policy Therefore, not enti Ransburg was areas.4 In making state." this new rule the ma- law, and judgment to as a matter of tled prove, assumes what it seeks to jority trial denied her sum properly court namely, that the law of and the mary judgment motion. mutually law of contract occupy exclusive Conclusion spheres and cannot be on these reconciled type of the exculpatory clause here An facts, body notwithstanding Indiana long com- involved contravenes established contrary. majority ignores law to the liability of tort that exist in mon law rules plain meaning exculpatory of the relation- the residential landlord-tenant clause and violates the well-settled com- public it offends the ship. employed, As so right parties mon law to make such and will not be enforced policy state provision and to have it enforced accord- trial by the courts. The err did to ing doing, majority its terms. so summary judgment in denying Ransburg's unilaterally has altered the equa- economic motion. tion countless residential leases across the state. Affirmed. recognize Indiana courts the principle
DARDEN, J., concurs. are free to enter into contracts NAJAM, J., with separate and, indeed, dissents| presume repre contracts freely bargained agreement opinion. sent may bring cause of action tenants to enforce 4. The dissent to House Bill which refers - July becomes effective The dissent obligations, permitting alia landlords' inter points language relating damages to to recovery consequential dam- of actual personal injuries, which was removed Thus, despite ages. dissent's mischarac- Judiciary posits Senate Committee and it, specifically pre- the statute terization of enacted, would have modi- "if using exculpatory cludes landlords and, operation law fied common in its here con- clauses such as the one issue effect, prohibited have would liability damages away their tract clauses in residential leases." by failing satisfy duty their to maintain today Our decision is consistent with the permits pro- common areas and tenants imposes new statute as enacted. The statute duty. ceed landlords who fail in that landlords, including duties on various despite This the case the removal of remains duty keep to make "all reasonable efforts to language cited the dissent. The new premises common areas of a rental in' clean policy statute is consistent with the proper Law condition." Public No. 92- today, underlying reject and we our decision (to as Indiana Code Section codified way "usurp- we the notion that some 32-31-8-5(3)). provides The statute further ing" legislature by promoting the role of the Subject that a waiver of this is void. policy. sound prerequisites, certain the statute creates *11 A404 contains, following exculpatory in part, Fazli, Cut, v. 650 Inc. Fresh
parties. (Ind.1995). 1126, language: 1129 Where N.E.2d unambiguous, an instrument language of lots, [Wlalkways, stairways, parking is determined parties intent of equipment all areas and lawns and other Orme v. Estate corners." from its "four occupants in all used common be 355, Kruwell, (Ind.Ct.App. 356 453 N.E.2d building grounds, apartment of the Co., 1983); v. Gene B. Glick Zawistoski see gratuitous- and maintained provided are 790, (Ind.Ct.App. Inc, 792 727 N.E.2d [Ransburg], [Ransburg] and ... ly by lease). 2000) The (interpreting shall, event, be or become lable no of a contract is legal or effect construction loss, any damage, per- or thereby by the of law to be determined question though .:. such property or even son court. by the damage shall be caused loss that Indiana is well established [Ransburg], agents, or its negligence of agree advance permitted employees. servants obligation of care for under no that one is added). App. (emphases at 78 Appellant's other, and shall not be the benefit exactly correspond The facts this case of conduct that consequences liable for the contemplated by with the cireumstances negligent. Powell v. would otherwise clause. Richards contends exculpatory Fitness Ctr. Fort
American Health clearing Ransburg negligent that (Ind.Ct. Inc., 757, 694 N.E.2d 760 Wayne, But the parking lot of snow and ice. Further, it is well settled in App.1998). clearly that Richards will prévides lease containing exceulpa- contracts Indiana that area at her own risk and use the common against public are not tory agreements Ha- Ransburg shall not be or become Dixon, 998, v. policy. Marsh acts, negligent including ble for her own (Ind.Ct.App.1999); see Weaver 1000 parking maintenance of the lot where Co., 458, 257 Ind. 276 American Oil slipped Richards and fell. (Ind.1971). 144, Parties to a N.E.2d 148 exculpate one of them may agree lease majority acknowledges this state's Loper See from his own enforceability "strong presumption 84, Ind.App. 138 211 Standard Oil represent freely bar- contracts (1965) (upholding commer N.E.2d gained agreement parties," cial that indemnified land generally en- "exculpatory clauses are negligence); lord its own see also public policy are not void on forced and Co., 701 N.E.2d Mgmt. Vertucci v. NHP majority But the then dis- grounds...." (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (concerning 606-07 principles declares instead cards these clause).5 exculpatory residential lease of whether a residential question that the lease, Here, which insulates the landlord from his parties agree they en- both negligence, contract that is unconscionable and tered into a residential lease own terms; Noll, upon equal Co. v. Ind. two stand neither In Franklin Fire Ins. (1945), form of one nor the other is under App. recognized propriety compulsion stipulations; to make the either as follows: entry clauses in leases may equally accept well or refuse into relationship tenant. tenant, of landlord and Stipulations between a landlord and public policy We think it clear that does not determining arising which shall bear a loss immunity voluntarily misrepair nonrepair condemn tene- ment, immune, upon by parties. agreed these and which shall be are not Moreover, omitted). (Citation matters of concern. against public policy therefore void as "has and unaware of its terms. But the con *12 specifically been addressed in tract never must be one that no person sensible delusion, By phrasing question Indiana." in this not under duress or distress manner, make, majority attempts to distin- would and one that no honest and. guish types person residential leases from other fair accept. would In Nylen we Id. exeulpatory leases or contracts in which held that a standardized residential lease provisions upheld. agreement have been signed by college three stu dents was not unconscionable. - We long There is no such distinction. has that contracts are not unenforcea stressed been the law Indiana that a lease is to ble simply party because one enjoys an any manner be construed the same as advantage over the other. Id. at 185. The Zawistoski, contract. 727 at other N.E.2d fact Nylen that the lease in contained principle applies 792. This to commercial terms favorable to the landlord did not Loper leases. See v. Standard Oil 138 render that lease unconscionable. Id. (1965). 84, 797, Ind.App. 211 N.E.2d 800 Darden, court, And our Judge writing for Here, neither does the fact that recently principle reaffirmed that this also exculpatory clause Ransburg benefits applies Smyr residential leases. See more than Richards render that 534 unenforceable. majority points Marshall, 532, no 744 niotis N.E.2d signed evidence Richards the lease (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (citing Stout v. Kokomo 1060, Apartments, compulsion Manor 677 N.E.2d 1064 under majority or duress. The also fails to why demonstrate (Ind.Ct.App.1997)). lessees, Richards, such as are so disadvan Further, the issue of whether residential taged they special deserve "immuni
apartment leases are adhesion contracts ty" exculpatory protection clauses-a and, therefore, and unconscionable void upon has never bestowed a par against public policy already has been de ticular class of lessees.6 by Nylen cided this court. In v. Park Apartments, 178, Doral N.E.2d 184 Richards entered this agreement after having paralegal. denied, been trained as a (Ind.Ct.App.1989), trans. we ac knowledged supreme our opinion year-to-year court's She renewed her May lease in Weaver, that a contract January be declared and she fell in 1997. Rich- to unconscionability unenforeeable due ards had an opportunity to terminate or terms, there a great disparity bargain renegotiate when the lease but she re- ing power lease, which party leads the with the newed the Ransburg even after had power sign unwillingly lesser a contract informed monthly her rent would upheld exculpatory 6. court has This clauses in and that the victim was under no "public policy" otherwise, contracts where the concerns compulsion, economic to be in pit the restricted area. compelling present- far more than those were ed the lease here. In v. Lake Co. Likewise, LaFrenz Springs Corp., in Marshall v. Blue Bd., Ind.App. Fair 360 N.E.2d (Ind.Ct.App.1994), re- we (1977), patron we addressed whether to declare fused unconscionable a "liability derby, signed killed at a demolition who had signed by diving release" a scuba student exculpatory agreement an in order to receive prior taking subsequently who was lessons "pit pass" so that she could assist her hus- injured. holding, In so we noted that Mar- mechanic, bargained away band as a had her shall to take chose the scuba lessons for his right upholding to sue the Fair Board. enjoyment compulsion own no under clause, exculpatory we concluded that there outside source to the les- undertake unequal bargaining power was no between sons. Id. Marsh, 707 N.E.2d at negligence. See per more than $100 be increased suggest a facts neither These month. bargaining power nor
great disparity Here, unambigu- unwilling unaware that Richards was ously Ransburg will not be states the contract signed she of its terms when damages "caused liable for those losses Nylen, 585 two occasions. least [Ransburg], or its at 184. lan- employees." This agents, servants parties knowing guage demonstrates *13 majority attempts distinguish to The willing commitment to release Rans- and There, we consid case from Vertucei. damages resulting burg liability from for exeulpatory of an clause ered the effect her own See Clanton from the tenant had lease where a residential America, N.E.2d Skates 686 United Ver victim of sexual assault. been the ex- (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (upholding 901 tucci, By con N.E.2d 606-07. first to plaintiff agreed clause where culpatory clause sidering exculpatory whether lability any in- release defendant from outcome, acknowledged we controlled pres- of or jury which arose from his "use against public are not provisions that such ... upon the whether [flacilities ence Otherwise, we would have had no policy. fault negligence not caused or other exeulpa- whether the reason to determine [defendant]"). majority opinion The applied to shield the landlord tory clause clause, ignores agreement nullifies the majority liability. attempts from The but and, by declaring the clause parties, opinion its with Vertueci. fails to reconcile public policy, re-writes against void as Indiana law. I hold that the exculpatory While would Freedom of contract is a common law public policy, not violate
clause here does right. legislature Our has declared does not end the ultimate conclusion governs this state when the common law Notwithstanding parties' enquiry. - it is not inconsistent with our constitutions Ransburg to insulate from clear intention § 1-1-2-1. and statutes. See Ind.Code language negligence, its own supreme our court stated in Johnson As exculpatory provision legally must be suffi Assoc., Inc., v. Scandia 717 N.E.2d accomplish goal. to This court cient (Ind.1999), private, contracts are volun exeulpatory has held that an clause will not tary by which two or more allocations drafting party from lia act to absolve specific entitlements and parties distribute bility "specifically explicitly unless it and obligations. When a landlord enters negligence party refers] lease, voluntarily she confers Marsh, liability." from seeking release rights upon certain the tenant consider (citation omitted). at 1000 rent, promise pay ation of the tenant's to that an principle This rule is based on the illegal it for property, not waste the use party to release a from its own agreement beyond or "holdover" the term. purposes, negligence clearly unequivocally must and agrees legal Id. The landlord to this rela knowing willing manifest a commit costs and ben tionship balancing after party pay damages one ment efits, and the same is true for the tenant. negligence of the other occasioned Id. An party. does right not refer to the of a releasee is have the parties The obligations. it purports rights void to the extent to release define their mutual Bank party liability Jennings Realty Corp. its own v. First Nat'l Vernon, (Ind. introduced a that would have North App.1985). prov Ct. is not within our created a tenant's cause of action ince to make a new for the landlord for "any contract damages for personal or to ignore any provisions eliminate in injuries," and would have made at the instrument. majority opinion Id. The tempt to action, waive such an by contract rights violates the associated freely with otherwise, enacted, void. If the provi bargained for rights contracts and the inci sion would have modified the common law property dent to real ownership. Rans- and, in operation effect, its would have burg's right, owner, a property to con prohibited exculpatory clauses in residen trol the use of her private property an Now, tial leases. the majority opinion has essential feature of system. our economic invoked "public policy" to accomplish by rights associated ownership with judicial decree precisely what the General property right include the possess, en Assemblyhas declinedto do.7 sell, joy, destroy, or otherwise control the Henry *14 property. use See N. Bur supreme Our supports the tradi Analysis ler, Lawyers, Economic ror p. 357 precaution tional against the reckless use (1998). economies, In free market policy aas means invalidating rights enforced, of ownership typically contracts emphasized and has ° thwarted, not government. power of the courts to declare a contract Finally, the majority usurps the role of void being in contravention of sound legislature when it invokes "public poli- public policy very is a delicate and unde ey" justify opinion. its The flaw the Bell, fined power. Hogston v. 185 Ind. majority's "public reliance on policy" is 536, 883, (1916); 112 N.E. Straub v. underscored legislation. recent The Todd, B.M.T. by 599 n. 3 2002 session of the Indiana General As- (Ind.1994). Our courts should not invoke sembly enacted a bill that regulates resi- "public policy" to nullify an otherwise valid leases, dential Bill House which be- private agreement, exeept resort, aas last comes effective July 2002. The new and then only where legal justification legislation was enacted some twenty-six clear, is compelling and unavoidable. We years after legislation landlord-tenant private tinker with great peril. contracts at first introduced Assembly General doing jeopardize so we the freedom our and is the best evidence of the enjoy citizens agreements by make policy of our state on this It issue. is which significant they voluntarily that the Senate Committee allocate their re on Judiciary deleted from House Bill 1013 as spective rights, responsibilities. risks and majority point The contends that this a legislature is fact that our considered and rejected '"mischaracterization'' of the statute. provision The a given that would have majority opinion also asserts that right its is "con- "personal tenants a inju- to recover for enacted," statutory remedy undoubtedly ries" sistent with the statute as in that imposes statute landlord to contemplated negligence cause of action. "make all keep reasonable efforts common just important recognize what a stat- premises areas of a rental in a clean and say recognize ute does as it tois what it condition," proper Zirkelbach, say. City which cannot be waived. does Evansville v. Id.; Public Law majority No. 92-2002. The 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. de- language "specifically pre- legislative insists history nied. The is clear. Had cludes" disclaiming landlords from legislature prohibit their own wanted to landlords majority But the disclaiming errs when it from negligence, their own it equates "all reasonable efforts" with "all non- would have included such a in the negligent majority ignores efforts." And the statute. -Itdid not. lawfully clause here lability against Ransburg
shields re- We should claim.
Richards' summary denial court's the trial
verse judg- summary and order
judgment Ransburg. in favor of be entered
ment reasons, dissent. respectfully I these
For TRUCKING, also
QUIGG sometimes Trucking, Quigg Charles
known as
Appellant-Defendant, Autumn Bell A. NAGY
Christian *15 Appellees-Plaintiffs.
Nagy,
No.79A05-0110-CV-465. Indiana. Appeals
Court 20, 2002.
June notes short, to exist. such dard ceases concept negli- destroys clause recently, Supreme More the Tennessee relation- gence the landlord-tenant in a tenant's residen Court held
