Case Information
*1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 38877
RANDY POOLE and TRUDI POOLE, )
husband and wife, ) Boise, September 2012 Term
) Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants, ) 2012 Opinion No. 129
) v. ) Filed: November 14, 2012
) DARIN DAVIS, d/b/a DARIN DAVIS ) Stephen Kenyon, Clerk CONSTRUCTION, )
)
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Respondent. )
) Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bingham County. Hon. Peter D. McDermott, Senior District Judge.
The district court order finding that neither party prevailed is affirmed.
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, Idaho Falls, for appellants.
Maguire & Penrod, Pocatello, for respondent. _______________________________________________
ON THE BRIEFS
HORTON, Justice.
Randy and Trudi Poole filed an action against Darin Davis, dba Darin Davis Construction (Davis), alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud. Davis counterclaimed for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. The jury found that the Pooles had prevailed only on the fraud claim and that Davis had not proved any of his counterclaims. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Pooles for $65,331 in damages on the fraud claim. The Pooles moved for attorney fees and costs, claiming that as the prevailing party in a dispute over a commercial transaction, they were entitled to fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12- 120(3). The court determined that there was no prevailing party and denied the motion. The Pooles timely appealed, asking this Court to reverse the decision of the district court and find, as a matter of law, that the Pooles are the prevailing party and are entitled to attorney fees. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2007, the Pooles entered into a written contract with Davis to build the Pooles a house near Blackfoot, Idaho. After a dispute over the cost of the construction, the Pooles filed a complaint against Davis, alleging two counts of breach of contract and one count of breach of the implied warranty of workman-like performance. The Pooles later filed an amended complaint, adding a count of fraud and alleging damages of at least $171,592. Davis eventually filed a counterclaim for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. The case went to trial and the jury returned a verdict finding that Davis did not breach the contract or the implied warranty of workman-like performance, but did commit fraud. The jury awarded damages in the amount of $65,331. After the trial, the Pooles requested an award of attorney fees. The district court held a hearing at which both parties argued the attorney fees issue, and the court denied the request after determining that there was no prevailing party. The Pooles moved for reconsideration of the attorney fees issue. After conducting another hearing and considering the parties’ arguments, the district court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Determination of the prevailing parties in a civil action is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc.
, 141
Idaho 716, 718-19,
III. ANALYSIS
A. The record on appeal is not sufficient to permit this Court to review the Pooles’ claims.
The Pooles contend that the district court abused its discretion by finding that there was no prevailing party because “there are no written orders” that explain the district court’s reasons *3 for its determination. Davis responds that the Pooles have not provided a record on appeal that would permit this Court to determine whether the district court abused its discretion. We hold that the record on appeal does not permit this Court to meaningfully review the district court’s decision.
1. The district court is not required to issue written findings to support its prevailing-party determination.
To the extent the Pooles contend the district court erred by failing to explain its
prevailing-party determination in writing, their argument is not persuasive. As we have
explained, “the law is clearly settled that when awarding attorney fees in a civil action, the
district court must consider the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors, but need not make specific written
findings on the various factors.”
Lee v. Nickerson
, 146 Idaho 5, 11, 189 P.3d 467, 473 (2008)
(citations omitted). This rule is based upon the text of Rule 54(e)(3), which sets forth the factors
that “the trial court ‘shall
consider
... in determining the amount of such fees.’ (Emphasis
added.)”
Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co.
, 115 Idaho 346, 351, 766 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1988) (quoting
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)),
overruled on other grounds by Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of
Idaho
,
Similarly, the text of Rule 54(d) explicitly places the prevailing-party decision in the court’s discretion and requires only that the trial court “consider” all the issues and claims:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The analysis of Rule 54(e)(3) articulated in Lee and Brinkman is also applicable to prevailing-party determinations. The text of Rule 54(d) does not support a requirement for written findings. Rather, it provides for a discretionary decision to be based upon the court’s consideration of certain factors. We therefore hold that the district court’s *4 failure to issue any written findings regarding its prevailing party analysis is not, by itself, an abuse of discretion.
2. The Pooles have not provided a sufficient record on appeal.
It is a long-standing principle that this Court will not presume error by a trial court. As
early as 1867, the Territorial Supreme Court held that “[a]n appellate court will not presume
error in the court below, and thus throw the
onus
on the respondent of establishing its
correctness.”
Goodman v. Minear Mining & Milling Co.
, 1 Idaho 131, 134 (1867). The Court
continued that “[a]ll intendments must be in favor of sustaining the judgments of courts of
original jurisdiction, and to disturb such judgment, it is not sufficient that error may have
intervened, but it must be affirmatively shown by the record.”
Id.
(quotation omitted). More
recently, we held that an appellant bears the burden of providing a record that is sufficient “to
substantiate his or her claims on appeal.”
Jacklin Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV, Inc.
,
*5 In this case, the record on appeal does not allow us to determine whether the district court abused its discretion. The record shows that the district court held a hearing on the Pooles’ motion for attorney fees and costs on March 4, 2011, and at the conclusion of the hearing, found that there was no prevailing party. The Pooles moved for reconsideration of the court’s decision, and a hearing was held on April 22, 2011. The district court denied the motion, again concluding that there was no prevailing party. As the Pooles note, the record contains two documents titled Minute Entry and Order , which recite the court’s finding that there was no prevailing party, but there is no written explanation of the court’s rationale for the decision. The minute entries also indicate that counsel for both parties presented argument at the hearings. However, the record does not include a transcript of either hearing. If we had these transcripts, we could have reviewed them to determine whether the district court abused its discretion. Instead, the Pooles ask this Court to review the district court’s decision without knowing the the legal standard the court applied or the reasons for its determination. We must decline this invitation. Without transcripts from the hearings, the record is not sufficient to substantiate the Pooles’ claim that the district court abused its discretion.
Thus, without benefit of the hearing transcripts, the only way this Court could grant the
relief the Pooles seek would be to hold, as a matter of law, that where a plaintiff recovers on any
of its claims and avoids liability on all counterclaims, it is entitled to attorney fees as the
prevailing party. The Pooles filed two claims for breach of contract, one claim for breach of the
implied warranty of workman-like performance, and one claim of fraud.
[2]
They successfully
recovered damages on their claim of fraud and avoided liability on Davis’s counterclaims. But
they were not successful on their other theories of recovery. To hold that this factual scenario
entitles the Pooles to attorney fees as a matter of law would require the Court to ignore
precedent. For example, in
Israel v. Leachman
, the Court held that in cases where “there are
claims, counterclaims and cross-claims, the mere fact that a party is successful in asserting or
defeating a single claim does not mandate an award of fees to the prevailing party on that claim.”
alternative,” their fraud claim was filed in the alternative only as to the first breach of contract claim.
*6
Appellants contesting a denial of attorney fees after prevailing on some claims but not on others.
Id.
at 25-26,
B. Attorney fees on appeal.
The Pooles request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Under that statute, only the prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees. I.C. § 12-120(3). Because we affirm the district court’s order that neither party prevailed, the Pooles are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
Davis also requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120 and I.R.C.P.
54(d)(1)(B). When a party requests attorney fees pursuant to a statute, “the party must cite to the
statute and, if applicable, the specific subsection of the statute upon which the party relies.”
Capps v. FIA Card Servs., N.A.
,
Here, Davis’s request for attorney fees on appeal consists of a single sentence at the end of his brief, with citations to Idaho Code § 12-120 and to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The citation to Idaho Code § 12-120 does not include a subsection and Davis provides no argument supporting the application of either authority. Therefore, Davis is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s order finding that neither party prevailed. Costs, but not attorney fees, to Davis.
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and W. JONES CONCUR .
Notes
[1] While the presumption against error is well-established, our research yielded two prior cases in which we noted the
appellant’s failure to provide an adequate record, but still granted the relief the appellant requested.
Perkins v. U.S.
Transformer West
,