This is аn appeal from an order of the lower court denying appellants’ motions for new trial. 2 We affirm.
The lower court aptly stated the facts and procedural history of the case:
*229 The above-captioned cases were tried in a consolidated action with five other cases in a reverse bifurcated trial. Trial commenced before this Court and a jury on April 5, 1993. Plaintiffs presented thеir cases and rested on April 12, 1993. Immediately thereafter, defendants moved for nonsuit in each case, based on plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy Eckenrod v. GAF Corporation, 375 Pa.Super. 187,544 A.2d 50 (1988), alloc. den., 520 Pa. 605,553 A.2d 968 (1990). At the close of plaintiffs’ cases, this Court entered nonsuit in the other five cases and permitted Randt, Rynlciewicz, and Lepore, to go to the jury.
The jury entered verdicts in favor of the defendants, finding that none of the plaintiffs suffered from a compensable asbestos-related disease at that time. Plaintiffs filed Post-Trial Motions requesting new trials. On May 13, 1994, this Court denied plaintiffs’ motions. Thereafter, Notice of Appeals were filed with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
I. FACTS
In the instant case, plaintiffs were all former or present employees of Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) at the Comly depot. Plaintiffs alleged contraction of asbestos-related diseases over the course of their careers at SEPTA caused by exposure to asbestos-containing brake products and clutches manufactured by defendants.
John Randt worked for SEPTA beginning in 1948 and ending in 1988, where he began performing brake and other mechanical work in 1972. Medical testimony at trial asserted the existence of a possible mild pleural thickening and no pulmonary asbestosis. Furthermore, Dr. Allan P. Freeman’s [sic] testified, via videotaped deposition, that Mr. Randt’s shortness of breath was attributable to asthma, coronary artery disease and obesity, contrary to Dr. Auerbach’s belief that the respiratory symptoms were due to Mr. Randt’s exposure to asbestos. Moreover, Mr. Randt’s own testimony established he had been diagnosed with emphysema as well as obesity.
*230 Robert Rynkiewicz worked for SEPTA from 1958 to 1991. Testimony indicated Mr. Rynkiewicz was diagnоsed with pleural thickening in 1984. Furthermore, Dr. Altschuler’s [sic] stated Mr. Rynkiewicz had contracted asbestosis. Mr. Rynkiewicz claimed shortness of breath walking up two flights of stairs and problems with waking up at night not able to breath[e]. Contradictory evidence of a medical examination conducted by Dr. Allan P. Freeman maintained there was no evidence of asbestos-related diseases or conditions. Furthermore, Mr. Rynkiewicz had a history of obesity, restrictive ventilatory impairment and arterial hypertension.
Louis Lepore worked for SEPTA from 1969 through the time of trial. Dr. Gelfand testified Mr. Lepore contracted restrictive ventilation and reduction of residual volume and functional residual capacity due to asbestos exposure. To the contrary, Dr. Allan P. Freedman stated he could not make a diagnosis of рleural thickening and there was no indication of pulmonary asbestosis.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was presented with three questions. First, had each plaintiff contracted an asbestos-related disease. Second, if any plaintiff had contracted an asbestos-related disease, was the disease compensable at the present time. Last, what amount should be awarded to each plaintiff, if the disease was found to be compensable.
The jury found each plaintiff did contract an asbestos-related disease. It then concluded none of the plaintiffs’ disease[s] [were] .compensable at the present time. Therefore, no decision on the amount of damages was necessary.
Trial court opinion, February 17, 1995, at 1-3. Appellants raise the fоllowing issues on appeal:
1. Did the lower court commit an abuse of discretion and/or error of law when it refused to grant a new trial where the jury had determined Plaintiffs had contracted an asbestos-caused disease but awarded no money damages?
*231 2. Did the lower court err when it denied the motion to recuse because the lower court’s son is a paralegal in an asbestos firm?
3. Are the opinions of the Superior Court in Marinan, Ottavio, and Giffear legally erroneous and violative of Supreme Court precedent?
4. Was the order denying a new trial a final order?
We will address these claims in order.
Appеllants first contend that the trial court committed an error of law when it refused to grant a new trial on damages after the jury determined that appellants had developed asbestos-related diseases, but had awarded no damages. A new trial should be awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.
Thompson v. City of Philadelphia,
In the instant case, the jury was instructed to answer three questions in regard to each case. The first question was whether the plaintiff had an asbestos-related disease. The jury was to answer this question with a “yes” or “no” response. If they answered the first question “yes,” then they were to proceed to a second question: whether the asbestos-related disease was compensable at the present time. Agаin, the jury was instructed to answer “yes” or “no.” If they answered “no” to the second question, they were to proceed no further and come back into court. If they answered “yes” to the second question, then they were to proceed to the third *232 question: the amount of damages to be awarded. (N.T., April 14, 1993, at 128-29). In each of the cases on appeal, the jury answered the first question “yes,” and the second question “no.” In other words, in each case, the jury found that the plaintiff was suffering from an asbestos-related disease but that the disease was not compensable at the present time.
It is clear from the questions presented to the jury that it.was possible for them to return a verdict that a plaintiff was suffering from an asbestos-related disease but was not entitled to a damages award. Appellаnts made no objections to these interrogatories when the lower court presented them to the jury. Where a party fails to specifically object to a trial court’s jury instruction, the objection is waived and cannot subsequently be raised on appeal.
Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Company, 457
Pa. 255,
Moreover, the interrogatories were in- conformance with the law. Asymptomatic asbestos-related disease is not compensable.
Giffear v. Johns-Manville Corporation,
*233
The decisions relied upon by appellants to support their theory that an award of damages was required in this case involved factual situations in which the cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries was not disputed.
See, e.g., Neison v. Hines,
The jury’s verdict in this case was supported by the evidence. There was expert testimony to the effect that Mr. Randt had possible mild pleural thickening but that it would not аccount for his shortness of breath. Similarly, expert testimony was admitted indicating that Mr. Rynkiewicz had no shortness of breath related to his asbestos exposure. As to Mr. Lepore, there was expert testimony to the effect that the plaintiff had no pleural thickening or evidence of pulmonary asbestosis, but that he was obese and a diabetic. On the other hand, expert testimony offered by appellants showed that Lepore had bilateral pleural thickening caused by exposure to asbestos, and a moderately severe reduction of residual volume, by pulmonary function study, the degree of which the expert could not attribute completely to Lepore’s obesity. Randt offered testimony that he had asbestos related pleural disease, with respiratory symptoms some of which had to be attributed to his asbestos exposure. Mr. Rynkiewicz’ expert witness testified that Rynkiewicz had asbestos-related pleural plaque and asbestosis and that there was no other explanation for his symptoms.
*234
A jury is entitled to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.
Rafter v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in its charge by not instructing the jury that appellants had the right to collect for “fear and risk of cancer.” Appellants assert that where there is a disease or- injury, the traditional items of damage are to be collected, “such as fear and risk and emotional distress and the value of restriction in life function.” Brief for appellant, at 14. They argue that if a plaintiff “has contracted symptoms due to his asbestos inhalation then he should be ablе to collect for emotional distress, pain, shortness of breath, interference with his life functioning and fear of the conditions worsening even if he can’t collect for fear of cancer.” Id.
Appellants’ argument addresses two separate aspects of damages: (1) damages which may be awarded to a plaintiff suffering from asbestos-related disease for the fear and risk of cancer; and (2) damages which may be awarded to such plaintiff for “emotional distress, pain, interference with his life functioning and fear of the conditions worsening.” It
*235
is well-established that damages for fear and risk of cancer cannot be awarded when the plaintiff has not yet contracted that disease.
Marinari v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd.,
As to the second kind of damages claimed by appellants, recent case law makes clear that damages may only be awarded where an asbestos-related condition has produced a compensable injury,
ie.,
the condition is symptomatiс and produces an impairment or disability.
Giffear v. Johns-Manville Corporation,
Appellants also contend that Marinari, Ottavio, and Giffear should not be applied to the instant case, but should be applied' only to cases in which the complaints were filed after those' decisions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has set forth the correct approach to the question of retroactivity of judicial decisions:
The general rule followed in Pennsylvania is that we apply the law in effect at the time of the appellate decision. Commonwealth v. Cabeza,503 Pa. 228 ,469 A.2d 146 (1983). This principle applies with equal force to both civil and criminal proceedings. Id.; Commonwealth v. Brown,494 Pa. 380 ,431 A.2d 905 (1981). This means that we adhere to the principle that, “a party whose case is pending on direct appeal is entitled to the benefit of changes in law which occurs [sic] before the judgment becomes finаl.” Common *237 wealth v. Brown, supra,431 A.2d at 906-07 , citing August v. Stasak,492 Pa. 550 ,424 A.2d 1328 (1981). We noted in August that at common law, a decision announcing a new principle of law is normally retroactive. We further noted in August that although retroactivity is the general rule, a sweeping rule of retroactive application is not justified. Retrospective application is a matter of judicial discretion which must be exercised on a case by case basis. August v. Stasak, supra,424 A.2d at 1330 , citing Linkletter v. Walker, [381 U.S. 618 ,85 S.Ct. 1731 ,14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1985) ].
Blackwell v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Commission,
In the instant case, both
Marinari
and
Ottavio
were decided prior to the trial. Appellants’ argument that these two decisions should not be applied to the instant case is therefore without merit. At the time
Giffear
was decided (September 16,1993), appellants had filed post-trial motions in this case which were then pending in the lower court. It was determined in
Dempsey v. Pacor, Inc.,
Appellants also allege that the trial court erred in failing to recuse itself from the case bеcause the trial judge’s son is employed by “an asbestos defense firm as a paralegal.” Brief for appellants, at 15. The propriety of a judge’s decision on a motion for recusal is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard.
Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,
The fact that the undersigned’s son works as a paralegal for a defense firm in New Jersey which represents an asbestos defendant did not require recusal from this case. Furthеrmore, the undersigned had nothing to do -with his son’s procurement nor preservation of the job as paralegal. This court was fully able to dispose of the matter fairly and without prejudice. Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion.
Trial court opinion, February 17, 1995, at 11. We similarly find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to deny the recusal motion. Appellants have not set forth any specific allegations of the trial judge’s bias or prejudice in the instant case. Based on our review of the record, we agree that the trial court was “fully able to dispose of the matter fairly and without prejudice.” Id.
Order affirmed. 5
Notes
. An appeal of an order denying a motion for new trial after a trial by juiy “may be remanded or subject to other appropriate action of the appellаte court when the order is such that it may be reduced to judgment or final decree and entered in the docket but such action has not been taken.” See Note, Pa.R.A.P., Rule 301, 42 Pa.C.S.A. According to the certified record submitted to this court in the instant case, judgment has not been entered on the record. However, in the interests of judicial economy, we will "regard as done that which ought to have been dоne.”
See McCormick v. Northeastern Bank of Pennsylvania,
. Until a decision of the Superior-Court is overruled by the Supreme Court, such decision is the law of the Commonwealth.
Baker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
. Appellants have failed to apprise this court that any such evidence was admitted at trial. We note that the record certified to us on appeal was incomplete in that the notes of testimony were not includеd. The lower court was not able to provide us with those notes despite our request, which is not our responsibility to undertake.
See Commonwealth v. Feflie,
. As we previously noted, although appellants have failed to petition for judgment to be entered on the docket, we will consider done "that which ought to have been done.” McCormick v. Northeastern Bank of Pennsylvania, supra, note 1.