79 Wash. 152 | Wash. | 1914
The legislature of the state of Washington, at the biennial session of 1913, passed an act- (Laws
“That whenever it is deemed advisable by the common council of any city or town and the county commissioners of any county in this state to purchase or construct a bridge within or partly within such city or town, the council and commissioners are authorized and empowered to enter into an agreement for the construction of such bridge, upon such terms as may be mutually agreed upon, each contributing such sum towards the purchase or construction of the same as may be determined to be just and proper, and enter into*155 contract for the construction of such bridge and to spend public funds thereon, and if deemed necessary may bond the county or city or town in the manner herein specified. The contracts for letting the same and notice given to bidders, and all other matters pertaining to the construction shall he governed by the laws in force governing the construction of bridges by county commissioners in the state of Washington, provided the payments to be made on the contract by the respective municipal corporations be made direct to the contractor.” (3 Rem. & Bal. Code, § 5686-11.)
The laws in force governing the construction of bridges by county commissioners referred to in the section quoted, in so far as they are pertinent to the inquiry, empower such board to enter into contracts for the construction of such bridges in behalf of the county, and to superintend and control the construction thereof, as if the matter were the business solely of the county disconnected entirely from state business.
Acting in pursuance of the powers granted in the statute cited, the board of county commissioners of Clarke county, Washington, on July 9, 1913, adopted a resolution in which it was recited that the board deemed it for the interests of Clarke county that it, together with the city of Vancouver, join with the county of Multnomah, in the state of Oregon, in the construction of an interstate toll bridge across the Columbia river, which formed the boundary line between the two counties, and that Clarke county should incur a bonded indebtedness in the sum of $500,000 to meet the cost thereof and the expenses connected therewith. The board thereupon ordered that' the question whether or not such indebtedness should be incurred be submitted to voters of the county at a special election called for August 12, 1913, and directed that the notice thereof he given in the manner required by law. Notice was given and an election held on the day named in the resolution, at which more than three-fifths of the legal voters voting thereat favored the incurring of the indebtedness for the purposes expressed in the resolution.
Article 8, § 7, of the state constitution, provides:
“No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money or property, or loan-its money or credit, to or in aid of any individual, association, company, or corporation, except for .the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company, or corporation.”
The appellant cites, as holding contrary to the principle here announced, the case of State ex rel. Potter v. King County, 45 Wash. 519, 88 Pac. 935. The syllabus of that case does support the contention, but it will be observed from an examination of the opinion itself that the syllabus does not
“If the argument of the respondents is sound, the several boards of the county commissioners in this state have now all the power that the legislature can constitutionally confer upon them in the matter of determining the objects and purposes for which public money may be expended. With such a contention we cannot agree. The most favorable view that can be taken of the bonds in question, from the standpoint of the respondents, is that they are bonds in aid of the Federal government, for if they are not, they are manifestly in aid of a private individual and utterly void. If in aid of the Federal government, they may be free from constitutional objection, under the decision in the Lancey case, but they are none the less aid bonds, and, as such, are extraneous to the general objects and purposes for which county governments are created. If any question can be settled by a long line of judicial decisions, State and Federal, it is the proposition that power to issue bonds in aid of internal improvements cannot be inferred or implied from any general grant of power to counties or other municipalities.”
But we think the rule may rest on narrower grounds. The county of Clarke is not proposing to issue bonds in aid of the construction of a bridge by the county of Multnomah. Its purpose is to join with that county in the construction of a bridge, and it will retain an interest therein proportionate to the amount of money it contributes therefor. It is thus no more aiding Multnomah county in the construction of the bridge than Multnomah county is aiding it, and this clearly cannot be said to be giving its money “to or in aid of any
The statute governing the giving of notice for special elections, held under the provision of the act under which the commissioners proceeded, provides that such notice must be given by publication in some newspaper having a general circulation in the county in which the election is proposed to be held “for a period of at least four (4) weeks next preceding the date of the election.” In this instance the notice was directed to be given in two newspapers having a general circulation in Clarke county. In one, the first publication of the notice was made on July 17, 1913, while in the other it was made on July 18, 1913, in each of which the notice was published weekly in four successive issues of the paper. Since the election was held on August 12, 1913, it will be observed that the first publication was made only twenty-six days prior to the election, and in the other only twenty-five days prior thereto. This, it is claimed, renders the election and all subsequent acts founded thereon invalid. This court, however, early held that requirements of a statute providing for the giving of notices of an election, either general or special, were directory rather than mandatory, unless the statute itself declares that the election shall be void if the statutory requirements are not strictly observed, or the court can see from the record that the result of the election might have been different had there been a strict compliance with the statutory requirements. Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 427, 33 Pac. 1059; Richards v. Klickitat County, 13 Wash. 509, 43 Pac. 647; State ex rel. Mullen v. Doherty, 16 Wash. 382, 47 Pac. 958, 58 Am. St. 39; Hesseltine v. Wilbur, 29 Wash. 407, 69 Pac. 1094; Murphy v. Spokane, 64 Wash. 681, 117 Pac. 476; Hill v. Howell, 70 Wash. 603, 127 Pac. 211. In State ex rel. Mullen v. Doherty, Judge Gordon, delivering the opinion of the court, used this language:
“The rule established by an almost unbroken current of authority is that the particular form and manner pointed out*160 by the statute for giving notice is not essential, and where the great body of the electors have actual notice of the time and place of holding the election, and of the questions submitted, this is sufficient. The vital and essential question in all cases is whether the want of the statutory notice has resulted in depriving sufficient of the electors of the opportunity ■to exercise their franchise to change the result of the election.”
In this instance, it is conceded that there is no statutory provision declaring the election void if the statutory notice be not given; nor are we able to discover from the record that the result of the election might have been different had notice thereof been given in the strictest compliance with the statute. On the contrary, it appears that the object and purpose of the election, as well as the time and places at which the election was to be held, were given the widest publicity. The court found:
“That for several months next preceding the date of said special bond election of August 12, 1913, and the date of the meeting of the board of county commissioners on the 9th day of July, 1913, the question of whether the county should be bonded in the sum of $500,000 for the purpose of joining and aiding in the construction of an interstate bridge at Vancouver, Washington, over the Columbia river at that point was widely discussed by the people of southwestern Washington, and especially the electors and citizens of Clarke county, Washington, and during said time and immediately preceding the meeting of the' board of July 9, 1913, and between that date and the date of the special election of August 12, 1913, numerous meetings were held throughout Clarke county, where the matter was generally and publicly discussed by the residents and voters of the county, and that prior to the meeting of the board on July 9, 1913, to wit: on the 27th day of April, 1913,.a public meeting was held in the superior court room- of the court house at Vancouver, Washington, to which the people and electors from all portions of the county were invited to attend for the purpose of discussing the question of whether the county should join in the construction of such bridge and incur an indebtedness necessary to construct the bridge; that at said*161 meeting hundreds of voters were present from the various portions of the county and the matter was widely advertised and discussed; that a resolution was passed at said meeting favoring the construction of the bridge and the incurring of the indebtedness; that the resolution of said meeting was published in the newspapers throughout the county and generally circulated among the electors of the county. That for months previous to said July 9, 1913, and next preceding the date of the election of August 12, 1913, the daily and weekly papers which circulate through the county and among the residents and electors of the county, contained numerous and repeated references to the proposed construction of the bridge and the bonding of the county, and the widest publicity and notoriety was given to the proposed construction and proposed bond issue; that on the 9th day of July, 1913, the date of the meeting of the board of county commissioners, the Daily Vancouver Columbian, a daily paper published in said county and circulated among the electors of said county, contained an account of the meeting of the board of commissioners and was published in large letters on the front page of the paper the announcement that the special bond election for the purpose of the construction of the bridge at Vancouver, Washington, would be held on the 12th day of August, 1913; and the Weekly Vancouver Columbian of the issue of July 10, 1913, and the weekly Clarke County Sun, published on Friday, the 11th day of July, 1913, and the Portland daily papers which circulate extensively throughout Clarke county, contained extended reference to the bridge matter and the voting of the bonds, and thereafter these papers contained almost daily and repeated reference to the proposed bond election and the construction of the bridge, and all of the papers mentioned were circulated extensively throughout the county and among the residents and electors of the county, and for weeks and months next preceding the date of the special election of August 12, 1913, meetings were held in the several precincts throughout the county where numerous electors and citizens were present and the proposed bond issue was thoroughly and fully discussed, and the proposed bond issue and construction of the bridge was discussed by the people generally in their home, from the platform, and the electors were fully informed of the said special bond election and the purposes and objects of the election and the*162 proposed bond issue was a matter of public notoriety throughout the county, and the great body of electors of the county had actual notice of the time and place of holding the election; that the electors of the county generally participated in the election; that there was a total vote cast at said special election of 6197, of which 5393 were in favor of the issue and 804 against it; that the total vote of the county as ascertained at the last general election in November, 1912, for the election of county and state officers and presidential electors was 8359.”
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said, with any show of reason, that any elector of Clarke county was denied the privilege of voting at the election for want of sufficient notice, or that the result of the election would have been different had the official notice of the election been published two or three days earlier than it was actually published. We conclude, therefore, that there is no cause for holding the election invalid on the ground here suggested.
The ballot used at the election contained explanatory matter in addition to the matters required by the statute. It is suggested that this is fatal to the election, but we met and determined the question, contrary to the suggestion, in the case of Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 126 Pac. 628, 127 Pac. 580. As we are satisfied with the rule there announced, we do not feel called upon to discuss the matter further.
The resolution calling for the bond election, passed by the board of county commissioners, and the notices.given of such election, described the bonds proposed to be issued as bonds bearing interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, payable annually. The statute authorizing the issuance of such bonds provides that they shall “bear interest at a rate not exceeding six per cent per annum, payable semi-annually.” Manifestly, it was the legislative intent, by this provision of the statute, to limit the rate of interest for which bonds could be lawfully issued, not to fix a hard and fast rule as to the character of bonds that could be issued. Bonds which
Lastly, it is argued that the commissioners are without power in themselves to enter into a contract for the construction of the bridge; that this power is vested by the statute in the state highway board and state highway commissioner, notwithstanding the bridge is constructed for a county purpose, and the county is furnishing the means for its construction.
The particular provisions of the statute under which the county commissioners are proceeding we have hereinbefore epitomized. Standing alone, they justify the procedure adopted by the county. The act, however, contains many sections seemingly contraditory of those set forth, which the appellant cites and relies upon in support of his argument. We think, however, that a careful study of the act will show that it has a multiple purpose. It provides for the construction of bridges in which the state alone, or the state in conjunction with one or more counties, cities or towns, joins with an adjoining state, or some subdivision thereof, in the construction of an interstate bridge, as well as providing for the joining of a single county with such adjoining state, or subdivision thereof, in such construction. In all cases where the state does so join with an adjoining state or some subdivision thereof in the construction of a bridge of the character mentioned, whether alone or with a county, city, or town, the state is given the management and control of the enterprise through its highway board, and the special provisions of the statute cited by the appellant undoubtedly apply. But, without reviewing them at length, we think they have no application to a case where, as in the present instance, the enterprise is undertaken by a county and city without the aid of the state; that, in such cases, the county itself may control and expend the fund raised for the purpose, and may
The foregoing conclusions require an affirmance of the judgment, and an affirmance is ordered.
Parker, Morris, Main, Mount, Ellis, and Gose, JJ., concur.