Appellant in this case challenges the order of the trial court refusing to lower the amount of money that appellant was to pay for his son’s college education.
The undisputed facts show that the appellant and appellee were divorced by virtue of a decree of divorce entered on the 17th day of August, 1956. The decree approved the terms of a property settlement agreement entered into between the parties. This settlement agreement provided, inter alia, that the appellant "... agrees to pay all usual and customary expenditures which may occur in the normal four-year college education of said William Scott Randolph at a school of higher learning selected by said child.” The property settlement agreement was approved by the Illinois court and incorporated into the decree.
On March 8, 1971, the appellee filed a petition for order to show cause in the Pima County Superior Court alleging that the minor child of the parties, William Scott Randolph, had been aсcepted by and decided to attend Wabash College; that the total cost of attending the college was approximаtely $14,600 for four years and that the defendant had refused to pay for his son’s education in said college. The petition asked the court to issue an order to show cause why the defendant should not appear and show cause if any, why he should not pay for the еducation of his son at Wabash College. Attached to the petition was a copy of the decree of divorce and thе property settlement agreement attached as Exhibit “A” thereto.
Appellant, in response to the petition, filed a “Spеcial Appearance and Motion to Quash for Lack of Jurisdiction.” A hearing on the defendant’s motion and the plaintiff’s order tо show cause was held on March 22, 1971. There was not a court reporter present at the hearing. The clerk’s minutes show that the following took place:
“Scott Howard is sworn, examined and cross-examined.
Pltf’s. Exhibit 1, being list of anticipated college expenses, is marked for identification.
The Court takes the matter under advisement.”
On March 23, 1971, the court found that Wabash College was the choice of school of the boy and his guardian and ordered that the appellant pay the tuition, rоom, board, books, activity fees, student health and lab fees, and that the said payments should be made at the time it was required by the college for registration purposes for each semester. A written order pursuant to the minute entry order of the court was entered on April 1, 1971. Appellant appeals presenting the following questions. (1) Whether the trial court properly refused to receive and consider evidence of the comparative cost of attendance at colleges other than Wabash? (2) Whethеr the trial court should have considered the merits of colleges other than Wabash? in the selection of a college sincе the parents did not agree ? (3) Whether the 26th Amendment deprived the court of jurisdiction to enforce child support payment aftеr child becomes eighteen years of age?
EVIDENCE OF COST AND RELATIVE MERITS OF OTHER COLLEGES
On a motion for rehearing in the trial court, the court allowed as an offer of рroof that part of appellant’s motion for rehearing setting forth the cost of sending his son to the universities of Arizona, Illinois and to U.C.L.A. Thе cost of sending him to these three colleges is substantially less than sending him to Wabash. The court, however, rejected the offer of proof. Appellant now complains that the court
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erred in such rejection. In both the state of Arizona and the state of Illinois, а property settlement agreement incorporated into the decree of divorce becomes merged with the deсree and is no longer enforceable as an agreement, at least insofar as support and maintenance is conсerned, but is enforceable as a decree. Earley v. Earley,
None of these grounds, separately or together, constituted any reason for modification of the decree. Remarriage is not in and of itself a ground for the reduction of support payments. Fought v. Fought,
THE 26TH AMENDMENT TO THE IL S. CONSTITUTION
Appellant claims that the 26th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution giving eighteen year-olds the right to vote also terminates his obligation to support his son when he reaches eighteen years of age. We do not find where this issue was raised in the trial court and we would be entirely justified in not considering it on аppeal. Weston v. State,
Affirmed.
Note: Judge HERBERT F. KRUCKER having requested that he be relieved from consideration of this matter, Judge LLOYD FERNANDEZ was called to sit in his stead and participate in the determination of this decision.