This suit was begun before a justice of' the peace and went to the circuit court by appeal; the cause-
“Now comes plaintiff above named and for her cause of action alleges: That she was plaintiff in an action against G. A. Rhode, David Godsey, W. O. Rogers, A. A. Baldwin and others, which said action was pending in the October term of the Howell county circuit court, 1897, and was triable at such term of court, and was instituted by her for the purpose of recovering about $1,400 damages from said defendants for the wrongful conversion by them of personal property belonging to this plaintiff; that on the fourth day of the October term of said court, it being on the 14th day of October, 1897, defendants made application for a change of venue of such action, filing their affidavit therefor, and that thereupon Hon. W. N. Evans, presiding judge of such court, granted a change of venue of such action, defendants having paid into the court the $10 required by law, and such change was by the request of this plaintiff made to the circuit court of Texas county, Missouri, which court convened at Houston, in said Texas county, on the 8th day of November, 1897. Plaintiff states that the above named defendant, George L. Garoutte, was at the time the change of venue was taken in such action and is now the circuit clerk of Howell county, Missouri, and that he failed and neglected to make out a full transcript of the record and proceedings in said cause of action, and transmit them to the clerk of the circuit court of Texas county, Missouri, as required by such order of removal and by section 2265, R. S. 1889.
“AVherefore this plaintiff feeling aggrieved by the failure and neglect of the defendant to transmit such transcript and proceedings in the cause to perfect such change of venue, so that said action would have been for trial in the November term of said Texas county circuit court (1897), respectfully asks judgment against the defendant for the statutory penalty of one hundred dollars, with costs of this action.”
Counsel for defendant objected to tbe introduction of any evidence on tbe ground tbat tbe petition failed to state a cause of action. Tbat tbis objection may be made, has been ruled by tbe supreme court in Young v. Shicke, H. & H. Iron Company, 103 Mo. 324, and by tbe Kansas City Court of Appeals in Murphy v. Insurance Company, 70 Mo. App. 78, and by tbis court in Hatten v. Randall, 48 Mo. App. 203, and in Jones v. Philadelphia Underwriters, decided at tbis term, and not yet reported. It will be observed tbat tbe petition nowhere alleges tbat tbe plaintiff suffered any pecuniary loss or damage by tbe alleged failure of tbe clerk to make and transmit. She says tbat she feels aggrieved, but fails to state specifically wherein she is aggrieved. If tbe word aggrieved as used in tbe statute is to be taken in its ordinary sense “to give pain or sorrow, to afflict, to oppress or injure in one’s rights” (Webster’s Dictionary), and tbe penalty of $100 is given as a punishment for disobedience to tbe mandate of tbe statute, tbe petition is sufficient. On the other hand, if tbe word as used in tbe statute is to be taken in its sometimes legal signification, to mean “to suffer loss or.injury, damnified, injured” (Black’s Dictionary) “damages, injury, exposed to loss” (Anderson’s Dictionary and Abbott’s Dictionary), then it is sufficient in tbat it fails to aver any pecuniary loss or damage whatever. In Swackhamer v. Kline, 25 N. J. Eq. 503, and in Raleigh v. Rogers, Id. 506, in construing a statute allowing an appeal to tbe party aggrieved, and tbe court says tbat only one whose pecuniary interest is affected by tbe decree was an aggrieved party. To tbe same effect are Adams v. Woods, 8 Cal. 306; Ely v. Frisbie, 17 Cal. 250; Labar v. Nichols, 23 Mich. 310; Kiefer v. Winkens, 39 How. Pr.