The appellant, Darryl Dwayne Randall, was convicted of child molestation and aggravated child molestation, for which he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, he contends that evidence of a similar transaction was improperly admitted, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. We affirm.
1. For approximately seven years prior to his arrest, the appellant lived with his girl friend and her eleven-year-old daughtеr. When the daughter was around five years old, she had told her grandmother that the appellant had “messed” with her, but the family had not believed her. In May 1990, the daughter again complained about sexual abuse by the appellant, but an investigation by the Glynn County Police Department was dropped when the daughter refused to talk about the matter further. At trial, two family friends and the sister of the appellant’s girl friend testified that on June 3, 1991, the daughter recounted to them multiple episodes of sexual abusе by the appellant, including acts of sexual intercourse and sodomy.
Their conversations with the daughter on that day had been precipitated by their suspicion that the appellant had molested the three-year-old daughter of one of the two family friends when the child had spent the weekend at the appellant’s mobile home. During a pretrial hearing, the state explained that it actually did not seek admission of evidence of a similar transaction; rather, it wanted to adduce the testimony to explain why these individuals had approached the victim in the first place, and because the evidence was relevant to show a possible motivating factor behind the victim’s decision to reveal the sexual abuse. The trial court allowed the testimony, but instructed that any reference to the possible molestation of the three-year-old child must not implicate the appellant.
Pursuant to that limitation imposed by the trial court, the two family friends and thе aunt of the victim testified that the three-year-old child had spent the weekend at the appellant’s residence; that the child had blood spots on her panties when her mother picked her up; *638 that the mother took the child to the hosрital; that they approached the victim to ask her if she knew what happened to the three-year-old child; and that they then asked the victim if the appellant had “messed” with her. An investigator with the Glynn County Police Department also testified that she had occasion to investigate the possible sexual abuse of the victim as a consequence of another investigation concerning the three-year-old child. None of the witnesses actually stated that the three-year-оld child had been molested, and none indicated that the appellant was suspected of molesting that other child.
Evidence of independent offenses committed by a defendant generally is inadmissible, as it impermissibly places the defendant’s character in issue. However, such evidence may be admitted for the limited purpose of showing bent of mind, identity, intent, motive, scheme, or course of conduct, if the defendant is identified as the perpetrator of the independent offense, and there is sufficient similarity between the independent offense and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter.
Williams v. State,
In the instant case, the testimony of the state’s witnesses regarding this matter that caused them to approach the victim was heard during the pretrial heаring, so that the parameters of the allowable testimony could be determined. During the hearing, although the trial court, assistant district attorney, and defense counsel referred to the evidence in question as a similar transaction, the state emphasized that it sought admission of the testimony only for the purpose of explaining why the witnesses approached the victim and showing the circumstances surrounding the victim’s revelation of the sexual abuse. See
Taylor v. State,
The appellant also complains that evidence of independent offenses was impermissibly brought out during defense counsel’s cross-examination of a prosecution witness. This witness testified about an incident when he interruрted an episode of sexual activity between the appellant and the victim at the appellant’s mobile home. Upon cross-examination by defense counsel about whether he had reported the incident to anyone else, the witness stated that he had recounted
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it to another individual, who had told him that the appellant “had been in trouble before about that. . . .” At that point, the assistant district attorney and the trial court, and not the defense counsel, instructed the witnеss not to broach that subject. This “testimony came in response to a question put to him by defense counsel, who voiced no objection to the response of the witness. The enumerated error suffers two characteristics fatal to аppellate review: error, if any, was induced by appellant; and appellant waived any error by failing to object. [Cit.]”
Montes v. State,
The defense presented several witnesses who testified as to the appellant’s good reputation and veracity. Upon cross-examination, the state asked some of these character witnesses whether they were aware of allegations that the appellant had molested another child, and referred to their responses during closing argument. The appellant now contends that this questioning and closing argument also impermissibly placed his character in issue by referring to the other transaction. However, the appellant failed to raise any objection to this line of questioning or closing argument, and objections not raised at trial are deemed waived.
Cole v. State,
2. In a related enumeration of error, the appellant relies upon
Moore v. State,
3. The appellant contends that at trial he was deniеd effective assistance of counsel because of his trial counsel’s lack of preparation,
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and his inadequate cross-examination of the physician who testified about the findings of his physical examination of the victim after she reported the sexual abuse by the appellant. In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and that his defense was рrejudiced by the deficient performance so that he was deprived of a fair trial.
Williams v. State,
With regard to the extent of the trial counsel’s preparation, the appellant points out that his trial counsel had only approximately two wеeks to investigate the matter, locate witnesses, and prepare for trial. However, mere shortness of time for preparation of counsel is insufficient to show ineffectiveness.
Brown v. State,
At trial, a physician testified that he examined the victim on June 3, 1991. Externally, the child appeared normal, with no signs of trauma. There was some opening of the hymenal ring, which could be normаl for an 11-year-old child. However, the physician noted that some degree of penetration could occur without totally perforating the hymen, and his physical findings were consistent with sexual abuse. He also recounted that the child gavе a history of multiple episodes of sexual abuse. During the hearing on the motion for new trial, the appellant’s new counsel contended that the trial counsel was deficient in his cross-examination of the physician, because he failеd to ask whether the limited physical findings were consistent with the extensive sexual abuse reported by the child during the examination.
At the hearing, the trial counsel agreed that such a question would have beеn pertinent, and he thought that he had made that inquiry. The transcript reveals that he did not actually raise that question, but he did engage in a thorough cross-examination of the physician regarding the extent of his physical findings. “It is rank speculation to suggest thаt it is reasonably probable that a
more
thorough and sifting cross-examination of the [physician] would have resulted in appellant’s acquittal.”
Garrett v. State,
In summary, the trial counsel’s performance in the instant case was within the range of “ ‘reasonably effective assistance.’ ” Weldon v. State, supra. The trial court’s finding that the appellant was afforded effective assistance of counsel thus was not clearly erroneous, and must be upheld. Williams v. State, supra at 495.