53 Ga. App. 250 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1936
Three independent suits against the same defendant, growing out of the same automobile collision, one by Duckett, the driver of one of the cars, another by his wife, a guest in his car, and the third by Mrs. Tierce, another guest, were tried
The portion of the charge which is pertinent to the ruling made is as follows: “The plaintiffs, Mrs. H. C. Duckett and Mrs. J. W. Tierce, contend that they were guests in the automobile being driven by Duckett, that they were voluntary guests, that they had nothing to do with the operation of the automobile by Duckett, that they were under no duty and had no right to control his method and manner of handling the car in which they were guests, and they contend that they did not undertake to do so. The law required them to be in the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety, and the law required Duckett to be in the exercise of ordinary care; and ordinary care as applied to these plaintiffs here has the same meaning and definition as that already given you. The question arises now, gentlemen, as to whether or not, if Duckett was negligent, the plaintiffs, denying that he was, such negligence, if it existed, would be charged against the other two plaintiffs as their own acts, and if Duckett’s conduct might be imputable to the women plaintiffs, then, gentlemen, you will apply as to all three plaintiffs here the rule now to be stated as applicable to the three plaintiffs. And if the husband’s conduct and acts are not imputable to them, then this rule should only be considered in considering the husband’s case, Duckett’s case. And the rule referred to is what is known in law, gentlemen, as the passive-negligence rule.- I will give you that rule right now; but, as I
1. “For the negligence of one person to be properly imputable to another, the one to whom it is imputed must stand in such a relation or privity to the negligent person as to create the relation of principal and agent.” Code of 1933, § 105-205. Accordingly, where a wife is merely accompanying her husband as a guest in an automobile driven by him, and a collision occurs, which might in part be attributable to the negligence of the husband as driver of the automobile, any such negligence on his part is not imputable to the wife. Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 128 Ga. 383 (57 S. E. 687, 11 L. R. A. 829, 119 Am. St. R. 390). While in such a case the doctrine of imputable negligence is not applicable so as to charge the wife as a guest with the husband’s negligence, it is nevertheless the rule that every normal adult person shall exercise ordinary care for his or her safety under any and all circumstances. While the exercise of such care on the part of the guest does not ordinarily require supervision of the driver, the guest can not close his or her eyes to known or obvious dangers arising either from the acts of the driver or from the acts of others; and if there is such a danger from either cause, and the circumstances are such that it would become apparent to a person of ordinary prudence under like circumstances, then it is the duty of the guest to do whatever in the opinion of the jury a person of ordinary prudence would or should have done under like circumstances. Lazar v. Black & White Cab Co., 50 Ga. App. 567 (3) (179 S. E. 250); Russell v. Bayne, 45 Ga. App. 55, 56 (163 S. E. 290).
2. In the instant suit for damages by a wife, riding in an automobile as the guest of her husband, on account of injuries alleged to have been occasioned in a collision brought about by the negligence of the defendant, where the defendant, denying the negligence charged against him, sought to show by his testimony that
3. The evidence authorized but did not demand the verdict. None of the numerous other exceptions would authorize a reversal.
Judgment reversed.