Rancho La Valencia, Inc. and Charles R. "Randy" Turner v. Aquaplex, Inc. and James Edward Jones, Jr.
383 S.W.3d 150
Tex.
2012
Check Treatment

RANCHO LA VALENCIA, INC. and Charles R. “Randy” Turner, Petitioners, v. AQUAPLEX, INC. and James Edward Jones, Jr., Respondents.

No. 12-0038.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Oct. 26, 2012.

briefs, we held in that a claimant cannot recover damages under section 541.060 from a workers’ compensation insurer for unfair claims settlement practices. . We also held that amendments to the Act eliminated the need for a cause of action for breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing against workers’ compensation insurers. (overruling ). In accord with our decision in we agree with TMIC that Morris cannot recover on either of these claims.

Finally, we address whether Morris can recover under Insurance Code section 541.061. We held in that a cause of action under section 541.061 for misrepresentation of an insurance policy is not necessarily incompatible with the workers’ compensation system. . TMIC argues that the basis of Morris‘s claim for misrepresentation is TMIC‘s filing of the dispute based on a lack of causal relationship between the 2000 injury and the disc herniations, and that its dispute simply was not a misrepresentation of its policy. Morris does not contest TMIC‘s position or point to any statements or actions by TMIC that he contends constituted untrue statements about or failure to disclose something about the insurance policy. TMIC‘s Notice of Refused or Disputed Claim specified that TMIC disputed whether Morris‘s compensable June 2000 back strain extended to his lumbar disc herniations and whether he had a disability as a result of the original back strain. The testimony and other evidence bore out that question as being the basis for TMIC‘s denial of compensability. Thus, the dispute between Morris and TMIC was the extent of Morris‘s injury, not what the policy said or whether it covered the disc problems if they were related to the back strain. See . We agree with TMIC that there is no evidence it misrepresented its policy.

Morris‘s DTPA claim depends on the validity of his Insurance Code claim. Because his claims under the Insurance Code fail, he cannot recover on his DTPA claim. See .

We grant TMIC‘s petition for review. Without hearing oral argument, see TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment that Morris take nothing.

Brian Alan Turner, Law Office of Brian Turner, Elliot Clark, James G. Ruiz, Winstead PC, Austin, TX, for Rancho La Valencia, Inc.

Amy L. Saberian, Ben Jay Cunningham, D. Douglas Brothers, George & Brothers, L.L.P., Austin, TX, for Aquaplex, Inc.

PER CURIAM.

This case is before us a second time. It concerns a business dispute between Rancho La Valencia, Inc. and Aquaplex, Inc.1 In the earlier appeal, we held that the evidence of fraudulent intent by Rancho in connection with the execution of a memorandum of settlement agreement (MSA) was legally sufficient. . We next analyzed the court of appeals’ treatment of damages for fraudulent inducement of the MSA, and held that “some evidence supported an award of damages for fraud under the MSA, just not at the level awarded by the trial court.” . We remanded the case to the court of appeals to “determine whether to remand for a new trial on damages, or whether to suggest a remittitur,” (citations omitted), and to consider other issues.

On remand, the court of appeals addressed certain previously unaddressed issues, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial on the issue of damages including punitive damages. The court declined to suggest a remittitur in light of the state of the record. .

Rancho now complains to us that the court of appeals should have remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial on both liability and damages, as Rancho requested in a motion for rehearing to the court of appeals. We agree. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1 addresses reversible error in civil cases. Rule 44.1(b) provides in part: “The court [of appeals] may not order a separate trial solely on unliquidated damages if liability is contested.” In this case, Rancho contested liability and the alleged damages are unliquidated. We stated in that the court of appeals, on remand, must decide whether “to remand for a new trial on damages” or instead suggest a remittitur. We did not expressly state that, if the court of appeals concluded a remand to the trial court for a new trial was warranted, it must remand for a new trial on both liability and damages, but Rule 44.1(b) requires this result. Failure to comply with this rule is reversible error. ; (interpreting prior rule). Further, the Supreme Court, like the courts of appeals, “may not order a separate trial solely on unliquidated damages if liability is contested.” TEX. R. APP. P. 61.2. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 provides that for good cause a rule of appellate procedure in a particular case may be suspended. But we did not indicate in an intent to suspend the operation of Rule 44.1(b) or Rule 61.2, and we do not see any good cause in this particular case for suspending the Rules.

The court of appeals has already decided not to suggest a remittitur in light of the state of the record; instead it simply remanded the case for a new trial. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, see TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, we grant the petition for review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment insofar as it ordered a new trial on damages only, and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial on damages and liability on the claim for fraud under the MSA.

Notes

1
Parties to the dispute also include Charles Turner, a principal in Rancho La Valencia, Inc., and James Jones, Jr., a principal in Aquaplex, Inc. For convenience herein, Rancho La Valencia, Inc. and Turner are collectively referred to as Rancho; Aquaplex, Inc. and Jones are collectively referred to as Aquaplex.