313 F.3d 157 | 3rd Cir. | 2002
GIBSON, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) Ramsgate Court Townhome Association and other(cid:13) property owners1 (referred to collectively as "Ramsgate")(cid:13) appeal from the district court’s order dismissing their(cid:13) complaint against West Chester Borough for failure to state(cid:13) a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ramsgate’s(cid:13) putative class action challenged the Borough’s trash(cid:13) collection ordinance under the Equal Protection Clause of(cid:13) the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. The other plaintiffs are: James C. Hamilton, Inc., owner of a 19-unit(cid:13) apartment complex; John P. and Linda L. O’Connell, owners of a 14-unit(cid:13) apartment complex; and Gay Street Restaurant Development, LLC,(cid:13) owner of a mixed-use property that includes a restaurant and nine(cid:13) apartments.(cid:13) 2(cid:13) Constitution and under the Uniformity Clause of the(cid:13) Pennsylvania Constitution. The district court concluded(cid:13) that the ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate(cid:13) government purpose and therefore does not violate the(cid:13) Equal Protection Clause, and it declined to exercise(cid:13) supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. 2 We will(cid:13) affirm the judgment.(cid:13) The district court dismissed the complaint in response to(cid:13) the Borough’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Our(cid:13) review is de novo, but we use the same test as the district(cid:13) court in deciding whether the complaint should be(cid:13) dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can(cid:13) be granted. After accepting the complaint’s well-pleaded(cid:13) allegations as true and viewing them in the light most(cid:13) favorable to Ramsgate, if Ramsgate is not entitled to relief,(cid:13) then the complaint should be dismissed. Maio v. Aetna,(cid:13) Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000).(cid:13) The Borough provides waste removal services to all(cid:13) residential property owners except those whose property(cid:13) requires more than the equivalent of six thirty-gallon(cid:13) containers of rubbish per week. The Borough does not(cid:13) provide services to multi-unit condominiums and(cid:13) apartments or to mixed-use commercial and apartment(cid:13) buildings. The owners of these excluded residential(cid:13) properties make up the class. Members of the class are(cid:13) assessed real estate taxes on the same basis as other(cid:13) residential property owners in the Borough, but they(cid:13) receive no waste removal services from the Borough.(cid:13) Rather, they are required to pay for private waste removal(cid:13) services at significant cost. In other words, because they(cid:13) produce in the aggregate more than six containers of(cid:13) rubbish per week, multi-unit condominiums and(cid:13) apartments must arrange and pay for their own waste(cid:13) removal. In contrast, single-unit residences can have up to(cid:13) six containers collected each week at no additional cost.(cid:13) By its terms, the complaint challenges the Borough’s(cid:13) waste removal policy. It alleges that the class members are(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. Ramsgate does not raise the district court’s decision on the state law(cid:13) claim in this appeal, and therefore we will not review the district court’s(cid:13) discretionary ruling under 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c)(3) (2000).(cid:13) 3(cid:13) denied equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth(cid:13) Amendment because they do not receive the same waste(cid:13) removal services provided to other residential properties.(cid:13) The complaint assumes that the Borough’s waste removal(cid:13) ordinance is enforced as written. For our purposes,(cid:13) therefore, the Borough’s policy is synonymous with its(cid:13) waste removal ordinance. The ordinance states in relevant(cid:13) part:(cid:13) Garbage, rubbish and refuse shall be collected once(cid:13) each week from all properties having six (6) thirty-(cid:13) gallon cans (or their equivalent) or fewer. Those(cid:13) properties requiring more than the equivalent of six (6)(cid:13) thirty-gallon cans for the disposal of rubbish will be(cid:13) required to employ a private collector.(cid:13) West Chester Code S 62-4.B.(cid:13) The Borough filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ.(cid:13) P. 12(b)(6), which the district court granted. The district(cid:13) court applied the rational basis test to Ramsgate’s Equal(cid:13) Protection challenge, recognizing that it was free to consider(cid:13) a conceivable governmental purpose even if the legislative(cid:13) body had not articulated one. The district court concluded(cid:13) that the Borough has compelling health and safety reasons(cid:13) for requiring weekly removal of trash, and that it would be(cid:13) justified in taking into account economic considerations in(cid:13) deciding how it allocated its waste collection resources. The(cid:13) court concluded that the Borough made a rational decision(cid:13) to require residential property owners whose residents(cid:13) produce in the aggregate large amounts of waste to contract(cid:13) with and pay private waste haulers, and that it did not(cid:13) engage in invidious discrimination.(cid:13) On appeal, Ramsgate argues that a higher level of(cid:13) scrutiny should be applied to its equal protection challenge,(cid:13) although it never articulates exactly what test it advocates(cid:13) or why the rational basis test is inapplicable. It frames the(cid:13) question broadly, as "whether a municipality can selectively(cid:13) provide basic municipal services to a segment of its(cid:13) residential property owners while denying those very same(cid:13) services to other residential property owners without(cid:13) violating the Constitution."(cid:13) 4(cid:13) The district court correctly concluded that Ramsgate’s(cid:13) equal protection challenge to the Borough’s ordinance is(cid:13) subject to the rational basis standard. The ordinance does(cid:13) not draw a distinction based on a suspect classification,(cid:13) nor does it implicate a fundamental right. See Beauclerc(cid:13) Lakes Condo. Ass’n v. City of Jacksonville, 115 F.3d 934,(cid:13) 935 (11th Cir. 1997) (ordinance that excludes waste(cid:13) collection services for condominiums but provides service to(cid:13) all other residential properties does not draw a distinction(cid:13) based on a suspect classification, and there is no(cid:13) fundamental right to no-fee waste collection; therefore,(cid:13) rational basis test applies).(cid:13) In reviewing an ordinance that does not burden a(cid:13) fundamental right or target a suspect class, we are to(cid:13) uphold its constitutionality if it bears a rational relation to(cid:13) some legitimate end. Vacco v. Quil, 521 U.S. 793, 799(cid:13) (1997). We presume such an ordinance is valid, Cleburne v.(cid:13) Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985), and in our(cid:13) review we are not limited to considering only the goal stated(cid:13) by the legislative body. Delaware River Basin Comm’n v.(cid:13) Bucks County Water & Sewer Auth., 641 F.2d 1087, 1096(cid:13) (3d Cir. 1981). We are free to consider any conceivable(cid:13) legislative purpose so long as it reasonably could have been(cid:13) entertained by the legislature. Id. at 1097.(cid:13) The district court recognized that the Borough’s limits on(cid:13) waste removal are based on economic considerations. As(cid:13) the district court stated, "[t]he challenged classifications(cid:13) written into the ordinance in issue are based on the(cid:13) quantity of waste and nothing else. . . . The differences in(cid:13) the way property owners are treated under the ordinance(cid:13) are clearly based on economic considerations. Providing(cid:13) free trash collection costs money." Although the district(cid:13) court did not ignore the importance of trash removal to a(cid:13) community’s health and safety, it noted that the Borough is(cid:13) forced to divide its finite budget among various(cid:13) expenditures. By limiting this service, the Borough is able(cid:13) to spend its tax dollars elsewhere.(cid:13) Other courts have considered similar legislative objectives(cid:13) where a municipality has provided a higher level of waste(cid:13) collection services to one group of taxpayers than to(cid:13) another. See Beauclerc Lakes, 115 F.3d at 935 (legislature(cid:13) 5(cid:13) could assume that multi-unit condominium association has(cid:13) greater bargaining power with private waste removal(cid:13) services than do individual homeowners); Goldstein v. City(cid:13) of Chicago, 504 F.2d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1974) (same);(cid:13) Szczurek v. City of Park Ridge, 422 N.E.2d 907, 911, 914(cid:13) (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (same). We are persuaded that the(cid:13) district court’s conclusion is correct. Because of the(cid:13) presumption of constitutionality and the legitimate(cid:13) economic rationale for the ordinance, the ordinance(cid:13) survives equal protection scrutiny.(cid:13) On appeal, Ramsgate raises another issue. It asserts that(cid:13) the Borough’s practice is to exclude all multi-residence(cid:13) condominiums from its collection services, but that under(cid:13) the ordinance each separate condominium should be(cid:13) entitled to its own six-can allotment because each(cid:13) condominium is a "property." See S 62-4.B ("Garbage . . .(cid:13) shall be collected once each week from all properties having(cid:13) six (6) thirty-gallon cans. . . .").3 However, as Ramsgate(cid:13) acknowledges in its brief, it is arguing that "the Borough is(cid:13) simply violating its own policy in its application[of the(cid:13) ordinance] to [the class]." That is not a federal(cid:13) constitutional challenge, and thus is not within the scope of(cid:13) this appeal. This argument would be more appropriately(cid:13) brought in state court, should Ramsgate choose to pursue(cid:13) its cause of action following this disposition.(cid:13) Finally, Ramsgate argues that the district court erred by(cid:13) refusing Ramsgate’s request for leave to amend its(cid:13) complaint. We review for abuse of discretion, Lake v.(cid:13) Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000), and we find(cid:13) none. The Borough responded to plaintiffs’ complaint by(cid:13) filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which Ramsgate then(cid:13) opposed. Ramsgate concluded its brief in opposition to the(cid:13) motion to dismiss with this sentence: "However, in the(cid:13) event that the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. The ordinance defines "property" as"[a]ny building and/or tract held(cid:13) in single or separate ownership." West Chester Code S 62-1. We do not(cid:13) read this definition as providing the guaranteed services that Ramsgate(cid:13) asserts it does, as it is not clear whether a separately owned(cid:13) condominium within a multi-unit building qualifies as a "building(cid:13) and/or tract."(cid:13) 6(cid:13) state claims upon which relief may be granted, Plaintiffs(cid:13) and the Waste Removal Class respectfully request that they(cid:13) be granted leave to amend the Complaint." That is the only(cid:13) mention of amending Ramsgate ever made before the(cid:13) district court. Ramsgate never filed a motion to amend, nor(cid:13) did it provide the district court with a proposed amended(cid:13) complaint. As a consequence, the court had nothing upon(cid:13) which to exercise its discretion. See Lake, 232 F.3d at 374.(cid:13) As another circuit has held:(cid:13) [Plaintiff ’s] single sentence, lacking a statement for the(cid:13) grounds for amendment and dangling at the end of her(cid:13) memorandum, did not rise to the level of a motion for(cid:13) leave to amend. Because a motion for leave to amend(cid:13) was never properly before it, the district court did not(cid:13) abuse its discretion in failing to address [plaintiff ’s](cid:13) request for leave to cure deficiencies in her pleadings.(cid:13) Calderon v. Kansas Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. , 181 F.3d(cid:13) 1180, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999). The district court committed(cid:13) no abuse of discretion.(cid:13) We will affirm the district court judgment.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 7