41 A.2d 559 | Pa. | 1945
This is an appeal from a dismissal of a bill in equity seeking to compel a husband to return to his wife, (whom he allegedly had deserted) $3400 which she claimed she had "delivered to the defendant, her husband, for safekeeping *414 with the distinct understanding that the same would be returned to her upon the successful termination of the operation" she then contemplated undergoing. The court below held that the plaintiff had a full, complete and adequate remedy at law, and that this remedy must be resorted to.
The facts as pleaded make the fund in controversy prima facie a trust fund: Werle v. Werle,
Under the facts pleaded the beneficiary of this trust could maintain an action at law as for a debt, but as we hereinafter point out, she is not bound to do so. We said in Williams v.Finlaw, Mueller Co., Inc.,
In Peoples-Pittsburgh Tr. Co. v. Saupp,
In Steinmeyer v. Siebert,
In Kirkpatrick v. McDonald, Executor,
In Bierbower's Appeal,
In Conemaugh Gas Company v. Jackson Farm Gas Company,
"But this element [of convenience] is almost invariably combined with other circumstances of inadequacy and is too indefinite safely to afford an independent ground" for equitable relief: 21 C. J. Sec. 29, p. 52. "The greater promptness of the remedy in equity is often given as a reason for sustaining its jurisdiction . . . but it relates rather to directness of remedy and the avoidance of circuity of action and multiplicity of suits": Ibid Sec. 30, p. 53.
Scott on Trusts, Vol. 2, sec. 198.3, p. 1075, makes this statement: "There is a difference of opinion on the question whether, where the beneficiary of a trust can maintain an action at law against the trustee and the remedy at law is an adequate remedy, it is an exclusive remedy and the beneficiary cannot maintain at his option a suit in equity against the trustee. In some cases it has been held that the remedy at law is exclusive. But the better opinion is that the beneficiary can maintain a bill in equity if he chooses. Lord ELDON once said: 'This Court [the Court of Chancery] will not allow itself to be ousted of any part of its original jurisdiction, because a court of law happens to have fallen in love with the same or a similar jurisdiction, and has attempted (the attempt for the most part is not very successful) to administer such relief as originally was to be had here and here only.' Similarly, in a Massachusetts case [Wilkinson v. Stitt,
In Volume 1 of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Sec. 197, appears the following: "Except as stated in Sec. 198, the remedies of the beneficiary against the trustee are exclusively equitable." Section 198 reads as follows: "If the trustee is under a duty to pay money immediately and unconditionally to the beneficiary, the beneficiary can maintain an action at law against the trustee to enforce payment. If the trustee of a chattel is under a duty to transfer it immediately and unconditionally to the beneficiary and in breach of trust fails to transfer it, the beneficiary can maintain an action at law against him." Comment (a) reads as follows: "Although the beneficiary can maintain an action at law against the trustee as stated in this Section, he has also equitable remedies against the trustee." Section 199 declares that "the beneficiary of a trust can maintain a suit (a) to compel the trustee to perform his duties as trustee; . . . (c) to compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust." Comment (a) says: "It is immaterial that there is an adequate remedy at law (see Sec. 198)."
In Scott on Trusts, Vol. 2, Sec. 198, it is stated: "Although the remedies of the beneficiary against the trustee are ordinarily exclusively by a proceeding in equity, there are certain situations in which a remedy at law has been permitted. In these situations the liability of the trustee is definite and clear and no accounting is necessary to establish it. The first situation includes cases where the trustee is under an immediate and unconditional duty to pay money to the beneficiary. The second situation includes cases in which the trustee is under a *418 duty immediately and unconditionally to transfer a chattel to the beneficiary. In other situations it is held by the weight of authority that the remedies of the beneficiary are exclusively equitable." It is a corollary of the principle just cited that while the beneficiary of a trust may proceed to an action at law where the liability of the trustee is "definite and clear" (as in the instant case), the forum of equity is also open to him.
In People v. Houghtaling,
In the instant case the facts pleaded makes the defendant a trustee of the $3400 "entrusted to him for safekeeping," and this trust fund is located in the bank of another state, to-wit, the First National Bank and Trust Company of Huntingdon, New York. While the plaintiff could undoubtedly maintain an action at law for the recovery of the definite sum of money of which she claims the defendant is trustee, this remedy is not exclusive.
Certainly the less circuitous, that is, the more "convenient" and "prompt" remedy, within the correct meaning *419 of those terms as used in decisions determinative of equity jurisdiction, for this plaintiff to employ to secure the return of her money now in the custody of a bank in a foreign jurisdiction, is the remedy she did employ, to-wit, a bill in equity filed against her husband in the jurisdiction where both are domiciled, for, of course, the decrees of equity act primarily in personam, and "equity jurisdiction depends upon the control of the court over the parties, by reason of their presence or residence and not upon the place where the property is situated in regard to which relief is sought." See Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 14th Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 93, footnote.
The decree of the court below is reversed and the bill reinstated, with a procedendo. Costs to abide the final decree.