73 Tenn. 184 | Tenn. | 1880
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
Complainants are creditors, by decree of this court, rendered in 1875, of respondent A. C. Quillen. This
On the 2d day of July, 1866, A. C. Quillen, the father, made a conveyance of the tract of land now in controversy to his son, L. B. Quillen, for the expressed consideration of about $2,500, to be paid, in the proportions therein specified, to his children, seven in number. On the 24th of September, 1869, L. B. Quillen conveyed the land to his mother, Mary Quillen, this conveyance purporting to be for a valuable consideration, and on the 23d of June, 1875, the mother conveyed to her son, Winfield S. Quillen. The bill in this case was filed July 3, 1876, and seeks to set asidé all these conveyances, as both fraudulent in fact and voluntary, consequently void as to complainant, a creditor.
We need not discuss the question of fact, as to whether the deed from the father was fraudulent in fact, and made with the purpose of hindering and delaying the creditors of A. C. Quillen in the» collection of their debt. We may assume, for the purposes of this opinion, that it was a voluntary conveyance, that the debt of complainants was then in existence, and that the debtor did not retain property sufficient to pay his debts, and, under a well-considered series of
Conceding the conveyances to be voluntary, and, under the facts, void as to the creditor, the case, as we understand it, turns upon the defense made by the respondents in their answer, of the statute of limitations of seven years. They claim to have been in possession, openly and notoriously, holding for themselves from the date of the first deed in July, 1866, that is to say, that L. B. Quillen went into possession and remained, holding under his deed, until his sale to his mother in September, 1869, and then the mother went into possession and held till her conveyance of June 23, 1875, when Winfield S. went into possession, and so remained until this suit was commenced, July 3, 1875.
The weight of the proof is very decidedly in favor of the fact being as claimed. Tax receipts are in the record, showing payment of taxes by these parties in accord with this view for all the period mentioned. It is true, however, that for most of the time the father and mother remained together on the land, but the son, L. B., is shown to have also been in possession at the same time, during the period he claimed it, before the conveyance to the mother. After this conveyance, the husband and wife oeoupid the land until some year or two before this suit was brought,
The question is, when did the statute commence to-run as against complainants, or when did the right of action accrue in their favor to commence suit to-enforce their claim against' this land, in the hands of the voluntary grantee, or grantees, who set up the statute as a bar to the right asserted by this bill?
It need only be stated, that possession under a void deed for the period fixed by the statute, if purporting to convey title in fee simple, is as effective as if the deed were valid. See cases cited in note to Thomp. & St. Code, vol. 2, sec. 2763. The fact,, then, that this deed was either fraudulent in fact or by construction in law, as being voluntary, could not prevent the effect of adverse possession, or interfere in. any way with the result of such possession.
These principles being assumed, the question in this, case is, as we have said, when does the statute commence to run in favor of a fraudulent or voluntary vendee or grantee, as against a creditor as to whom such conveyance is void and conveys no title.?
Before the act of 1852, carried into the Code secs.. 4288 to 4293, this was a vexed question, and the-decisions of our predecessors were wholly irreconcilable and antagonistic to each other. In the majority of' the cases it was held that the statute commenced to-run against the creditor’s right from the time the possession commenced under the fraudulent conveyance,, notwithstanding it was then required .that he should first have judgment against his debtor, and probably
We think these latter cases announced the only sound principle applicable to the question. The fallacy that underlies the argument of Judge Catron, and
We think, beyond question, the true principle was ■announced in the two cases cited from 1 Hum., and the statute can only be held to begin to run, as against the creditor’s right, when that right accrues in such form as that he is in condition to enforce it by legal proceedings. By the act of 1852, and sections of the Code embodying it, the creditor is authorized to proceed by bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance without first having obtained a judgment, as formerly required, and to “subject the property, by ■sale or otherwise, to the satisfaction of his debt.” And by sec. 4293, it is provided the statute shall not
These principles being settled, the determination of this case is easily effected. The right to sue on his notes wrongfully or fraudulently in the hands of the •debtor at the time the conveyance was made in July, 1866, is beyond question. He could have proceeded •at once to enforce his claim by his bill, as he seems to have done, and in the same proceeding attacked the conveyance now sought to be set aside, and have had the property impounded by attachment, as authorized by .sec. 4289. Being, then, in condition at that time to test the validity of the conveyance, the right being clear, if the parties have failed to bring suit for seven years to enforce their right, then the statute of limitations operates to perfect the title in the voluntary grantee, who is holding or claiming all this time under an assurance of title, purporting to convey a fee, notwithstanding it is void in its inception, as against the right of the creditor. Time, by virtue of the statute, gives the title, as against all persons not under disability, though the conveyance itself did
The result is, the chancellor’s decree must be reversed and the bill be dismissed with costs.
Concurrence Opinion
concurs in the result, but does not agree with the reasoning on the general question of .statute of limitations before the act of 1852.