OPINION
Appellant, James Nelson Ramsey, the District Attorney General for Anderson County, has appealed the suspension of his law license for one-hundred and eighty (180) days. He raises four basic grounds as to why the Order of Suspension should not stand: (1) jurisdiction, (2) denial of due process, (3) constitutional right to free speech, and (4) the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law.
Appellant, a native of Oak Ridge, was in 1972 admitted and licensed by this Court to practice law in Tennessee. In 1978, Appellant ran for and was elected District Attornеy General. Appellant contends that “after his election, he was faced with appearing before two judges who allied in political hostility against him.”
A complaint was filed against Appellant with the Board of Professional Responsibility on April 18, 1985. A Petition for Discipline was filed by the Board on August 29, 1985. A three-member Hearing Panel of the Board heard this cause on March 16 and 17, 1987. The Hearing Panel filed its Findings and Judgment on April 8, 1987. The Panel stated:
“[I]t seems appropriate to observe that the issues in this case affect or involve many pеrsons; nevertheless, the operative facts are focused primarily on two persons. The case presents the lengthy and rather sad saga of the relationship between these two persons. One of these persons is the [Appellant], James Nelson Ramsey, a licensed attorney and the duly elected District Attorney General of Anderson County, Tennessee. The other is Judge James B. Scott who likewise is a licensed attorney and the duly elected Judge of the Circuit and Criminal Court of Anderson County....
The relationship betweеn the [Appellant] and Judge Scott is complex and it cannot be accurately described with one or even with a few words. Suffice it to say that the level of disaffection between them is exceeded only by the level of suspicion which each harbors for the other. The panel feels constrained to point out in this submission that the failure of these two elected officials to work cooperatively is harmful to the administration of the justice in Anderson County and borders on being a public disgrace.
The Petition for Discipline alleges multiple acts of contemptuous behavior by the [Appellant], multiple public expressions regarding either the court’s adjudications of contempt or the Board of Professional Responsibility’s prior adjudication of discipline, and in addition, the Petition charges a pattern of behavior which violates the Disciplinary Rules.”
The Panel first addressed the charges of unethical conduct based on the Appellant’s public expression to the media. The Panel found “the right of free speech may not be absolute, but it does appear to be broad enough to protect these expressions.”
The Panel next addressed the contempt adjudications in 1983, and 1985, and found Appellant’s actions were not only contemptuous but were also violative of DR 1-102(A)(5) and DR 7-106(C)(6).
1
The Panel further found Appellant’s “conduct since 1979, as alleged in the Petition and established by the evidence, shows a pattern of disrespect for the Court. Every instance is different but they all contain a common thread of indifference toward and disrespеct for the Court.” The Panel adjudged that Appellant “should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one-hundred and eighty (180) days.” The Panel
On July 1, 1987, the Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Chancery Court of Anderson County. A special judge was designated by this Court on July 29, to hear this сause. On December 15, 1987, a de novo review of the Panel’s determination was held by Chancellor William H. Inman. The Chancellor abstained from the jurisdiction issue, finding that the Supreme Court “has the exclusive prerogative to determine the constitutionality of its Rules.” The Chancellor found no merit in Appellant’s due process argument as it related to the Hearing Panel members allegedly having interests adverse to Appellant. With reference to Appellant’s argument that his right to free speech guaranteed by the Tennessee and United States Constitutions was violated — the Chancellor found Appellant’s “pronouncements are simply not privileged.” The Chancellor adopted the Hearing Panel’s findings of fact and affirmed the Panel’s suspension of Appellant’s law license for 180 days.
Pursuant to Rule 9, Section 1.3 Appellant appealed the Chancellor’s decision to this Court.
I
JURISDICTION
Appellant contends that, as an elected public official, neither Rule 8 nor Rule 9 of this Court’s rules can be applied to him. 2 To do so, he submits, would violate both the Tennessеe Constitution and the United States Constitution. Appellant avers that in suspending him the Disciplinary Board, and presumably the Chancery Court, exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
Appellant argues that under the Tennessee Constitution, judges and district attorneys are treated identically and Article VI, Section 6 ordains a single and exclusive method of removal — impeachment by the Legislature. We agree that the exclusive method of removal from officе for judges and district attorneys is by impeachment. However, this does not mean that district attorneys and judges are not subject to discipline. The right of this Court to establish Rules of practice and procedure for disciplining attorneys is clear.
Petition of Tennessee Bar Ass’n,
This Court has inherent, original and exclusive jurisdiction pertaining to the licensing of attorneys.
Belmont v. Board of Law Examiners,
The office of District Attorney constitutes no shield or protection to an attorney who violates his oath as an attorney or the disciplinary rules of this Court. Judges and district attorneys alike are not only subject to the disciplinary rules of this Court, but are subject to annual registration and payment of a license fee to support the attorney disciplinary system.
Petition of Tennessee Bar Ass’n,
Disciplinary proceedings which result in disbarment or suspension from the practice
The issues of whether Judge Murphy’s federal convictions were serious crimes so as to warrant “disbarment” and whether the convictions were grounds for “removal from office”- were not identical.
Id.,
at 513, 514. Two separate and distinct procedures are involved in disbarment and impeachment. In
Schoolfield v. Tennessee Bar Ass’n,
In response to Appellant’s argument that he cannot be disbаrred while serving as District Attorney General, the Court, in
Schoolfield,
specifically found that “[a] lawyer may be disbarred for misconduct occurring while he is acting as a judge....”
Appellant avers that the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 8, Rules of the Supreme Court, at no point purports to regulate district attorneys. He is in error. Rule 8, DR 7-107 expressly applies to prosecutors.
See, In re John Zimmerman v. Board of Professional Responsibility,
II
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
Appellant avers that the manner in which the proceedings were conducted before the Hearing Panel and the Chancellor violated the guarantees of procedural due process afforded by Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He first avers that the Hearing Panel and the Chancellor were not neutrаl, detached, and impartial triers of fact. He alleges that the decision makers were tainted with the appearance of interest and bias. Appellant has made allegations of actual and apparent interest or bias on the part of the triers of fact, but the record fails to support these claims. Assuming,
arguendo,
that Appellant had proved interest or bias existed on the part of the Hearing Panel, this would have been cured by the de novo hearing in the Chancery Court. A de novo
Appellant next asserts that due process requires that notice be given both of the charges and the faсts which would support an adverse decision against an individual, and that the Petition for Discipline failed to meet the minimal standards of adequate notice. The first three paragraphs in the Petition set out the jurisdiction of the Board to consider this matter and the procedure by which the matter came before the Board. Paragraphs four through twelve set forth the facts, and paragraphs thirteen through fifteen set forth the various disciplinary rules which Appellant is accused of violating and a brief explanation of the reason for such violations. Counsel on direct examination of Appellant went over the allegations in the Petition paragraph by paragraph, and Appellant’s answers to counsel do not indicate any misunderstanding by him as to what he was being charged with. We find that the Petition gave adequate notice to Appellant.
Appellant also contends that he was denied a true de novo hearing before the Chancellor, and that neither the Hearing Panel nor the Chancellor made a true judicial determination of his case. The record simply fails to support these contentions.
Ill
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
The Petition for Discipline charged the Appellant with making four impermissible “remarks to the public” that were “gross, disrespectful, knowingly false, derogatory, and damaging to the legitimacy of, and trust in, the judicial system — in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) and [DR] 8-102(B).” 5 The Petition also charged that Appellant’s remarks constituted “conduct adversely reflecting upon [his] fitness to practice law, unprofessional conduct, and conduct rendering [him] unfit to be a member of the bar” in violatiоn of DR 1-102(A)(1)(5) and (6) and T.C.A. § 23-3-201(5). 6 The remarks were as follows:
1. On February 23, 1979, Appellant was reported as having stated to The Oak Ridger: “My bottom line is that the judge is mucking up my cases and I can’t stand for that.”
2. On October 24, 1979, Appellant was reported as having said to The Oak Ridger: “I don’t have time for this horse manure.”
3. On March 30, 1981, Appellant wrote to The Guiness Book of World Records requesting inclusion in same as “The District Attorney with most contempt and disciplinary actions filed against him.”
4. On December 3, 1981, Appellant was reported by
The Clinton Courier News
as having said of [the November 1981 recommendation by a hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility that he be
The Hearing Panel found that although thе “statements are crude and unbecoming of any licensed lawyer ... we do not believe they should be found to be violative of the Rules of Discipline. The right of free speech may not be absolute, but it does appear to be broad enough to protect these expressions.” The Chancellor found, however, that the remarks “are simply not privileged” nor constitutionally protected. Disciplinary Counsel candidly points out that the remarks of Appellant are more impressive as indications of lack of remorse than as individual violations of the disciplinary rules. Disciplinary Counsel contends that “lack of remorse” is an aggravating factor in determining the type of discipline imposed or the degree of sanctions to be meted out.
Appellant admits making the above cited, out of court, public statements; however, he avers that the quote about “the judge is mucking up my cases” was creative journalism on the part of the reporter. He states that “I did not say those words. I do feel that’s the case, however.” The remarks mаde by Appellant were disrespectful, ill-advised, and, as the Hearing Panel stated, they were “crude and unbecoming of any licensed lawyer.”
Appellant’s principal argument is that each of his remarks is fully protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Freedom of Speech clause of the Tennessee Constitution, Article I, Section 19. 7
In dealing with First Amendment questions, we must balance the right of the speaker to communicate and the right of the listener to receive his expressions with the need of the courts to enforce attorney discipline to the end that a lawyer will not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, DR 1-102(A)(5), or degrading to a tribunal, DR 7-106(C)(6), and thereby diminishes the confidence of the public in our courts. There is thus a delicate balance between a lawyer’s right to speak, the right of the public and the press to have access to information, and the need of the bench and bar to insure that the administration of justice is not prejudiced by a lawyer’s remarks. In balancing these rights, we must ensure that lawyеr discipline, as found in Rule 8 of the Rules of this Court, does not create a chilling effect on First Amendment rights.
The right of free speech and free discussion as it relates to the institution of the law, the judicial system and its operations, is of prime importance under our system and ideals of government. A lawyer has every right to criticize court proceedings and the judges and courts of this State after a case is concluded, so long as the criticisms are made in good faith with no intent or design to willfully or maliciously misrepresent those persons and institutions or to bring them into disrepute. As stated by this Court in
In re Hickey,
Recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in addressing the free speech issue stated, “In keeping with the high trust placed in this Court by the people, we cannot shield the judiciary from the critique of that portion of the public most perfectly situated to advance knowledgeable criticism, while at the same time subjecting the balance of government officials to the stringent requirements of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
[
Statements made by a lawyer designed to willfully, purposely and maliciously misrepresent the judges and courts of this State, and to bring those persons and institutions into disrespeсt, will not be tolerated or condoned. There is no First Amendment protection for remarks critical of the judiciary when those statements are false. A statement shown to be false will subject a lawyer to disciplinary sanctions. False statements with reference to judges and courts can be prejudicial to the administration of justice and subject to disciplinary action under DR 1-102(A)(5).
It is the duty of an attorney to refrain from doing anything which will tend to destroy the confidence of the public in the courts, or to bring the courts into disrepute....
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain toward the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges not being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism and clamor.
This is a duty which the attorney owes to his profession; an obligation to which he should subordinate his personal animus toward the particular individual who happens to be filling the office.
In re Hickey,
Thе remarks made by Appellant were disrespectful and in bad taste; however, we agree with the Hearing Panel that the right of free speech is “broad enough to protect these expressions” made by the Appellant. Use of the Disciplinary Rules to sanction the remarks made by General Ramsey in this case would be a significant impairment of First Amendment rights.
IV
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Appellant concludes by arguing that “no evidence was presented and no proof adduced sufficient to find that Appellant had violated any of the disciplinary rulеs listed in the Petition.” We have before us concurrent findings of fact that Appellant violated DR1-102(A)(5) (conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and DR 7-106(C)(6) (undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal).
The Hearing Panel made findings of fact which were adopted by the Chancellor. Our review of the record supports their findings. We shall describe some of the incidents in outline form, for a detailed recitation of the facts is unnecessary. On February 21, 1979, Judge Scott deferred action on a motion to suppress in a cаse involving Sally Davis. Appellant argued that if the confession in question was not suppressed before the trial commenced, jeopardy would attach and he would be unable to build a case without the confession. Appellant then stated that he would then file a nolle prosequi. Judge Scott then indicated that he would not allow the State to dismiss the action and the Appellant responded that he refused to prosecute the case. Judge Scott then announced to the jury that the State did not wish to prosecute the case. While the court was so announcing to the jury, the Appellant rose from his chair and “in a noisy and hostile fashion” slammed the door as he left the courtroom. Appellant admitted before Chancellor Inman that he did in fact slam the door. The court ordered the Appellant to appear on February 26, 1979, to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Judge Joseph Nigro was designated to hear the contempt matter. At the hearing, Judge Nigro found Appellant guilty of contempt “in that he has been guilty of willful and deliberate аttacks that attack the dignity of the court and show disrespect for the authority of the court.” Judge Nigro ordered the Appellant to pay a $50.00 fine and serve five days in jail. The jail sentence was suspended, and no appeal was taken.
On October 15, 1979, Roger Ridenour was representing a criminal defendant named Culbertson. After a phone conver
On April 25, 1983, the Appellant was asked a direct question by Judge Scott and he refused to answer. Judge Scott found Appellant in contempt and fined him $50.00. An appeal was taken and the Court of Criminal Appeals, in affirming Judge Scott, held: “The transcript before us contains sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of facts in finding General Ramsey guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.” This Court denied Appellant’s Rule 11 Application for Permission to Appeal.
The final incident which we will discuss has been termed the “capias contempt.” Judge James Witt was appointed by this Court to hear this matter, which involved a contempt by Appellant of an order of Judge Scott. On April 15, 1985, Judge Witt found Appellant in contempt of court and fined him $50.00 and ordered him to serve 10 days in jail. No appeal was taken.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above-dеscribed incidents, we find that an attorney who fails to abide by court orders and fails to respond to questions from the court while appearing before the court, and who slams courtroom doors during hearings has not only degraded that court, but acted in a manner prejudicial to the administration of justice. We find the evidence sufficient to support the decision of the Hearing Panel and the decision of the Chancellor that the Appellant violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and DR 7-106(C)(6). The next issue concerns sanctions. Notwithstanding the judgments below, upоn determining the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, this Court may modify the judgment of the trial court.
Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court v. Banks,
We are of the opinion that the foregoing violations are sufficient to justify the imposition of a suspension from the practice of law for 180 days, and the judgment of the Chancery Court is affirmed. However, under all of the circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that it would be appropriate to have the Appellant’s license suspended for only 45 of the 180-day period, and the remaining 135 days will be suspended provided the Appellant is not again found in contempt of court and in violation of the disciplinary rules of this Court during the remainder of his term of office ending August 31, 1990. If Appellant is again found to have violated Rule 8 of this Court, then his license to practice law will be automatically suspended for the remaining 135 days. Counsel for the parties shall agree upon the beginning date for Appellant’s 45-day suspension. The suspension shall be completed on or before September 4, 1989. If the parties are unable to agreе upon a beginning date, the Court will fix the time of commencement.
The judgment of the trial court, as modified, is affirmed at the c.ost of Appellant.
Notes
. “DR 1-102(A)(5) (A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice)," and "DR 7 — 106(C)(6) (In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal).”
. Rule 8, Rules of the Supreme Court, is entitled "Code of Professional Responsibility.”
Rule 9, Rules of the Suprеme Court, is entitled "Disciplinary Enforcement.”
. Judges and district attorneys alike are also subject to mandatory continuing legal education. Rule 21, Section 2.01 et seq., Rules of the Supreme Court.
. Judge Murphy was convicted of a felony by a court of competent jurisdiction, and his law license was suspended by this Court pursuant to Rule 9, Section 14. This same rule applies to any attorney, be he judge, justice or district attorney general. If a district attorney were convicted of a felony and sentenced to imprisonment, his law license wоuld be suspended, although he would still be entitled to his full salary unless removed from office by impeachment, Article VI, Section 6, or by the voters of his district at the next general election.
. DR 1-102. Misconduct. — (A) A lawyer shall not: (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
DR 8-102. Statements Concerning Judges and Other Adjudicatory Officers. — (B) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against a judge or other adjudicatory officer.
. "DR1-102. Misconduct. — (A) A lawyer shall not: ... (1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule_ (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the аdministration of justice. (6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.”
"T.C.A. § 23-3-201. Grounds for disbarment or discipline. — Any attorney, solicitor or counselor at law admitted to practice in the courts of the state may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law: ... (5) Who shall be guilty of any unprofessional conduct, dishonesty, malpractice, or any conduct which renders him unfit to be a member of the bar.”
. “The free communication of thoughts and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty_” Article I, Section 19.