Ramos v. Howard Industries, Inc.Ramos v. Howard Industries, Inc.
Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
In this рroducts liability action, defendant manufacturer was denied summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. Because we conclude that defendant met its initial burden by presenting competent evidence that its product was not defective and plaintiff failed to create an issuе of fact excluding all other causes for the product’s failure not attributable to defendant, we reverse the Appellate Division order and dismiss the complaint.
In June 1997, plaintiff John Ramos sustained personal injuries when a transformer designed and manufactured by defendant Howard Industries, Inc. allegedly exploded. According to plaintiff, the explosion occurred shortly after he energized the transformer in the course of his employment as a lineman for nonparty Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation. Initially, plaintiff reported to his еmployer and doctors that he was injured when he reached out of an aerial bucket while installing the transformer on a utility pole. More than two years later, however, plaintiff claimed that the transformer exploded, the force of which caused him to fall inside the bucket, injuring his back. By that time, the transformer could not be located for inspection or testing to determine the cause of its failure. Plaintiff explained that he failed to promptly disclose the transformer explosion because he feared disciplinary action or the loss of certain employment-related benefits.
In May 2000, plaintiff commenced this products liability action, alleging that the transformer was defectively designed and manufactured. Following discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In support of its motion, defendant submitted the affidavit of an expert engineer who, after visiting defendant’s plant, concluded that its manufacturing processes, quality control, testing and inspection were “current and state-of-the-art.” The expert noted that an internal electrical fault could cause an explosion as described by plaintiff, but concluded that such a defect “would have been readily identified at several stages of the manufacturing process.” He stated that, “[g]iven the various stages of testing and
In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff offered the affidavit of an expert engineer, who asserted that the transformer was defectively designed and manufactured because it “experienced an internal electrical fault due to defective coil/windings and/or insulation.” Plaintiff’s expert further stated that the “electrical fault generated excessivе heat within the transformer’s tank and superheated the oil contained therein” causing “excessive internal vapor pressure to build up, and ultimately produced the explosion.” The expert also asserted that two safety devices placed on the transformеr by defendant failed to operate and prevent the explosion. In addition, the expert rejected the theories presented by defendant to explain the explosion other than a manufacturing defect.
Supreme Court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment. It concluded that, although defendant’s expert’s assertion that a defect in the transformer would have been readily identified during the manufacturing process “might be a sufficient statement to obtain Summary Judgment if other causes of the accident were excluded,” here, “other possible causes of the accident have not been excluded by the Defendant in the first instance.”
The Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, affirmed, but for different reasons than Supreme Court. The court held that defendant failed to meet its burden on summary judgment, concluding thаt its evidence “does not establish as a matter of law that the transformer was not defective and that a manufacturing defect therefore did not cause the explosion” (
It is well settled that a products liability causе of action may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and thus, a plaintiff need not identify a specific product defect (see Speller v Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
In Speller, the plaintiffs alleged that a defective refrigerator caused a house fire. The manufacturer and retailer moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, offering evidence of an altеrnative cause of the fire, i.e., a stovetop grease fire. We stated that, “[i]n order to withstand summary judgment, plaintiffs were required to come forward with competent evidence excluding the stove as the origin of the fire” (id. at 42). Based on plaintiffs’ three expert opiniоns, which concluded that the fire originated in the refrigerator and not from the stove, we held “that plaintiffs raised a triable question of fact by offering competent evidence which, if credited by the jury, was sufficient to rebut defendants’ alternative cause evidence” (id. at 43). Put another way, we stated, “based on plaintiffs’ proof, a reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiffs excluded all other causes of the fire” (id.).
Here, contrary to the Appellate Division’s conclusion, defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Without the product available for testing and inspection (admittedly caused by plaintiff’s lengthy delay in reporting the incident), defendant was unable to provide an expert opinion based upon an examination of the transformer. Instead, defendant presented competent evidence demonstrating that its transformers were designed and manufactured under state of the art conditions according to Niagara Mohawk’s specifications and that its manufacturing process complied with applicable industry stаndards. The evidence further demon
Because defendant met its initial burden, in order to defeat summary judgment, plaintiff must raise “a triable question of fact by offering competent evidence which, if credited by the jury, [i]s sufficient to rebut defendant’s] alternative cause evidence” (Speller,
Plaintiff failed to present evidence excluding all other causes for the transformer’s malfunction not attributable tо defendant such that a reasonable jury could find that the transformer was defective in the absence of evidence of a specific defect. Although a plaintiff is not required to identify a specific defect in a circumstantial case, plaintiffs theory here—that the explosion resulted from a manufacturing defect in the form of an “internal electrical fault”—is pure speculation. Furthermore, as noted by the Appellate Division dissent, plaintiffs expert failed to exclude the possibility presented by defendant’s expert that thе transformer exploded because it was improperly rewired or rebuilt by Niagara Mohawk employees after leaving defendant’s possession. In sum, based on plaintiffs proof, a reasonable jury could not conclude that all other causes of the transformеr explosion were excluded, and thus, plaintiffs manufacturing defect claim fails as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted and the certified question answered in the negative.
Dissenting Opinion
The issue before the Court is whether defendant Howard Industries, Inc. is entitled to summary judgment when the object of the products liability action was unavailable for inspection or testing. Because I think that this question should be answered in the negative, I respectfully dissent.
The majоrity relies on defendant’s evidence, proffered by expert affidavit, that states that “its transformers were designed and manufactured under state of the art conditions” according to specifications and that “its manufacturing process complied with applicablе industry standards” (majority op at 223). The majority also relies on statements “that each transformer was individually tested before leaving defendant’s plant” and that it would be “virtually impossible for a transformer with an internal fault to leave [defendant’s] plant” (id. at 224). In my view, this showing is insufficient to entitle defendant to judgment as a matter of law.
The available inference from defendant’s bare assertions— that this transformer could not have left its plant with a defect—is purely speculative. Defendant’s own expert conceded as much: “without the transformer to test and examine, there is simply no evidence or proof that [defendant] sold a transformer containing a defect.”
Yet, defendant’s experts proceeded to speculate as to possible causes of the explosion, of course, excluding a manufacturing defect. For example, they posited numerous theories: that a negligent worker could have “inadvertently cause[d] an internal short (fault) by permitting the wires to become kinked”; that a negligent worker could have dropped “an object such as a nut, metal tool or other conductive material” into the transformer; that the transformer may have been rebuilt by Niagara Mohawk; or that a negligent worker could have allowed rainwater to enter the transformer while it was being rewired.
Although the majority correctly states the law in its discussion of Speller v Sears, Roebuck & Co. (
Here, on the other hand, defendant speculated as to possible causes of the transformer explosion which, according to its own experts, could not be established, while plaintiff was expected to exclude these very causes. The unique facts surrounding the unavailability of the transformer are equally disadvantageous, and neither party could definitively establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the burden shifting exercise in this case is impractical, thus rendering these facts fundamentally unlike Speller (cf. Speller,
Accordingly, I would hold, as did the Appellate Division, that defendant failed to meet its burden, thus obviating the need to consider the adequacy of plaintiffs submissions in opposition.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read and Smith concur with Judge Pigott; Judge Jones dissents in a separate opinion.
Order reversed, etc.