EDUARDO RAMIREZ v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al.
NO. 24-3035
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
June 30, 2025
Padova, J.
Plaintiff Eduardo Ramirez brings claims for violation of his rights under the United States Constitution and state law against the City of Philadelphia (“the City“) and five Philadelphia police detectives arising out of his 1998 murder conviction, which was vacated in 2023 after he had been incarcerated for 27 years. Four of the six Defendants have brought a Partial Motion to Dismiss, in which they ask the Court to dismiss three of the claims asserted against them in the Amended Complaint. Specifically, the City seeks dismissal of Plaintiff‘s municipal liability claim, while Defendants John McDermott, Michael Gross, and Stephen Vivarina seek dismissal of Plaintiff‘s failure to intervene and Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claims. For the reasons that follow, we grant the Motion in part and deny it in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The Amended Complaint alleges the following facts.
A. The Murder and Robbery
Early on the morning of February 20, 1995, Joyce Dennis was murdered at the laundromat where she worked in Philadelphia. (Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) Dennis was alone at the time of the killing, the last customer having departed by 12:45 a.m. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 25-27.) When Dennis failed to return home as expected, her husband notified police, who forced open the door to the laundromat‘s office and discovered Dennis dead on the floor. (Id. ¶¶ 32-35.)
B. The First Phase of Investigation
Police learned from laundromat employee Jay Darnell, Sr., who lived nearby, that on the night of the murder, his children had been at home socializing with friends, including Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.) Around 11:00 p.m. that night, Darnell‘s daughter, Mary Emanual, and Plaintiff left the house to pick up some items at a 7-Eleven before going to the laundromat for a particular kind of soda. (Id. ¶¶ 54-55.) They ran into a friend named Peter Gozzi and got a ride with him back from the 7-Eleven, but then realized that they had forgotten to pick up the soda. (Id. ¶¶ 56-57.) Plaintiff went across the street to the laundromat between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m., bought the soda, and exchanged phone numbers with another customer. (Id. ¶ 58.) At 1:00 a.m., the guests, including Plaintiff, Gozzi, and Billy Weihe, were asked to leave the Darnell house. (Id. ¶ 71.) Gozzi drove Plaintiff and Weihe to Weihe‘s house, where the two spent the night. (Id. ¶ 72.) Neither said anything to Gozzi about the murder and Gozzi did not notice anything suspicious. (Id. ¶¶ 73-74.) Sometime after 1:00 a.m., Plaintiff called the customer he had spoken with at the laundromat, and the two spoke for about twenty minutes. (Id. ¶ 59.)
Defendants Vivarina and Snell first interrogated 18-year-old Weihe on March 1, 1995. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 170.) Weihe initially claimed that on the morning after the killing, Plaintiff had shown him “a big knot of money” and admitted to robbing and hitting Dennis. (Id. ¶ 173.) Weihe then changed his story in response to police prompting, stating that Plaintiff had expressed his intention to rob the laundromat on the night of the murder. (Id. ¶¶ 174-75.) Before leaving the Homicide Unit, Weihe recanted his statement, which was noted in concealed police activity sheets but not on the statement itself. (Id. ¶¶ 182-83.) Police also concealed records indicating that they attempted to influence Weihe by setting up a confrontation between him and Emanual the next day (March 2). (Id. ¶¶ 236-37.)
Police also questioned Sarah Hurd, age 15, who had supposedly hosted a party where Plaintiff confessed to the murder. (Id. ¶¶ 75, 77.) On March 17, 1995, Defendants Vivarina and
On March 17, 1995, police obtained a statement from Plaintiff and Weihe‘s friend Joseph Maio, then seventeen years old. (Id. ¶¶ 132.a, 137.) Maio stated that on the night of the crime he had been with Plaintiff, Weihe, and another friend, T.A. Dennis (no relation to the victim). (Id. ¶¶ 139, 200.) He insisted, however, that he knew nothing about the murder, that Plaintiff did not have extra money afterwards, and that he did not think Plaintiff was involved. (Id. ¶ 141.)
On the evening of March 20, 1995, Defendants Worrell and Gross showed up at the home of 15-year-old Luis Rivera, insisting that he come to the police station for questioning
C. The Grand Jury
After several months of investigation, the Philadelphia District Attorney convened a Grand Jury, which heard testimony from Darnell, Emanual, one of Emanual‘s brothers, Gozzi and Detective Hoffner. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 210, 212.) None of the witnesses implicated Plaintiff, and the Grand Jury did not return an indictment. (Id. ¶¶ 211, 220.) Indeed, Hoffner came to believe that Plaintiff was not the culprit, since the statements implicating him referenced coins, which had not been stolen, and because the only evidence that there had been blood on Plaintiff‘s clothes on the night of the murder was a statement from Weihe that there had been a spot of blood on one of Plaintiff‘s shoes. (Id. ¶¶ 217, 221.) When the Homicide Unit first sought a warrant for Plaintiff‘s arrest, Hoffner voiced his concerns and the District Attorney refused to approve the warrant. (Id. ¶¶ 222-23.) Hoffner was later removed as lead investigator and replaced by Defendant McDermott. (Id.
D. The Second Phase of Investigation
On April 11, 1995, Weihe was interviewed a second time, this time by Defendants Worrell and Gross. (Id. ¶ 186.) He initially reaffirmed his first recanted statement implicating Plaintiff, before recanting a second time. (Id. at 186-87.) Weihe‘s second recantation was initially concealed, though it ultimately came out at trial. (Id. ¶¶ 186-87.) During this second interview, Defendant Worrell and others held Weihe for five hours and threatened him with criminal charges. (Id. ¶ 255.) Police also made an effort to elicit information from Weihe through a confidential informant, which they concealed after obtaining nothing inculpatory. (Id. ¶¶ 238-39, 327-28.)
On April 25, 1996, Defendant McDermott and another detective pressured incarcerated drug dealer Corey Wadkins to sign a statement implicating Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 128-29, 131.) Defendant McDermott left Wadkins handcuffed to a chair in the Homicide Unit interrogation room for hours until he agreed to sign a statement that Defendant McDermott had prepared. (Id. ¶¶ 130-31.) The statement, which Wadkins never read, falsely indicated that Maio had told Wadkins that Weihe claimed to have committed the crime, and that, a few days later, Weihe had tried to purchase PCP from Wadkins with a pocket full of change. (Id. ¶¶ 132-33.) Defendants later leveraged this false statement to elicit a confession from Weihe and concealed that the statement was coerced and fabricated. (Id. ¶¶ 135-36.)
Investigators also repeatedly questioned Wadkins‘s girlfriend Melanie Foreman, a drug dealer and acquaintance of Hurd and Plaintiff, who persistently denied any knowledge of the murder. (Id. ¶¶ 117-18, 129.) On May 1, 1996, Defendants McDermott and Vivarina interviewed Foreman, who was the subject of three unrelated open criminal cases, and baselessly threatened to
In June of 1996, police tricked an individual named David Wadsworth into accompanying them to the Homicide Unit for questioning. (Id. ¶ 206.) There, Defendant McDermott threatened Wadsworth with arrest and imprisonment if he refused to give a statement implicating Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 207.) Wadsworth ultimately made a statement, which Defendants concealed, claiming that he had heard that Plaintiff, Weihe, and T.A. Dennis were involved in the murder, but that both Plaintiff and T.A. Dennis had denied any knowledge of the crime when he directly confronted them. (Id. ¶¶ 208-09.)
On June 19, 1996, police again questioned Maio, who had previously claimed that he was with Plaintiff on the night in question and knew nothing of the crime. (Id. ¶¶ 137, 139, 141.) During this second interview, Detectives McDermott and Vivarina threatened to charge Maio with an unrelated stabbing to coerce him into implicating Plaintiff and Weihe in the Dennis murder. (Id. ¶ 143.) Maio endorsed a fabricated statement claiming that Plaintiff‘s pockets had been loaded with change at Hurd‘s party and that Plaintiff had confessed to committing the crime with Weihe
On July 2, 1996, Defendants McDermott and Vivarina questioned 19-year-old Joseph McDevitt. (Id. ¶¶ 97-98.) McDevitt refused to cooperate until Defendants McDermott and Vivarina threatened to baselessly arrest him for an unrelated burglary. (Id. ¶¶ 100-01.) McDevitt denied any knowledge of the murder, and specifically denied being at Hurd‘s party, hearing Plaintiff confess, or even seeing Plaintiff on the night of the murder. (Id. ¶¶ 102, 104, 106-07.) Defendants McDermott and Vivarina pressed McDevitt to admit that Plaintiff had bought marijuana from him with loose change, but McDevitt insisted that although he did sell marijuana, he would never have accepted payment in coins. (Id. ¶ 104.) Defendants McDermott and Vivarina then threatened to charge McDevitt with the robbery and murder, falsely claiming that other witnesses had implicated him. (Id. ¶¶ 103, 108.) Hungry and scared after hours of interrogation, McDevitt signed a false statement, written by Defendants McDermott and Vivarina, saying that he had heard Plaintiff confess. (Id. ¶¶ 109-11.) Later, when prosecutors contacted McDevitt about testifying at Plaintiff‘s trial, he said he would be happy to talk to anyone about “how [his] police report was a lie and all the things that the cops did to [him] to sign the report.” (Id. ¶¶ 113-14.) McDevitt was never called as a witness, and this encounter, as well as his initial statements and the coercive tactics employed against him, were all concealed. (Id. ¶¶ 114-16.)
On July 3, 1996, Defendants McDermott and Vivarina interrogated Weihe a third time. (Id. ¶ 188.) This time, they confronted him with the false statements implicating him and Plaintiff
To bolster their case against Plaintiff, Defendants suppressed additional exculpatory evidence. For example, “because multiple witnesses failed to identify blood on Mr. Ramirez when they saw him shortly after the murder,” evidence of bloody nature of the crime was concealed. (Id. ¶¶ 228-32.) Defendants also concealed evidence that only paper currency had been stolen, which contradicted the trial testimony of two witnesses, Maio and Weihe, that Plaintiff‘s pockets were bulging with coins after the crime. (Id. ¶¶ 233-34.) Finally, Defendants suppressed evidence of alternative suspects, including several leads involving brothers John and Kenneth Oberholzer (id. ¶¶ 240-47) and two involving one of Darnell‘s sons, J.C. Darnell (id. ¶¶ 248-50).
E. Conviction and Post-Conviction
Plaintiff‘s trial commenced in December of 1997, with Weihe testifying to his and Plaintiff‘s purported roles in the crime and Maio, Foreman, and Rivera testifying to Plaintiff‘s supposed confession. (Id. ¶¶ 274-75.) In his defense, Plaintiff presented testimony from Hurd and her friend that the party where the confession supposedly took place never occurred. (Id. ¶¶ 310, 313, 315-16.) Plaintiff‘s father, a retired police officer, also testified that he had given Plaintiff permission to stay at the Darnell house on the night of the murder and that Plaintiff had returned the next morning wearing the same clothes he had left in, with no sign of blood. (Id. ¶¶ 317-19.) Following three days of deliberation, the jury acquitted Plaintiff of first-degree murder but
Plaintiff challenged his conviction, and in 2001, during state post-conviction proceedings, he learned that police had concealed the fact that Dennis‘s fingernails had been clipped but never tested for DNA. (Id. ¶¶ 260-62.) When the clippings were ultimately tested, they showed the presence of male DNA, likely deposited during Dennis‘s struggle with her assailant, which was not Plaintiff‘s. (Id. ¶¶ 263-65.) In 2019, several other items from the crime scene were tested for DNA, including the held end of the pipe believed to be the murder weapon, the bloody fleece vest, a wooden broom handle, and a folded scarf. (Id. ¶¶ 266-69, 272, 273.) DNA from a single, unidentified male was found on the pipe and fleece, and none of the recovered DNA was consistent with Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 270, 272-73.)
In 2023, the District Attorney‘s Office acknowledged that Plaintiff‘s rights had been violated and that Plaintiff had been denied a fair trial due to the suppression of evidence undermining the prosecution‘s case and implicating alternative suspects. (Id. ¶¶ 355-57.) This, in combination with the new DNA evidence, led the District Attorney to recommend that the Court of Common Pleas vacate Plaintiff‘s conviction. (Id. ¶¶ 357-58.) On November 2, 2023, the judgment against Plaintiff was vacated, and on November 30, 2023, the charges against Plaintiff were dismissed and Plaintiff was released. (Id. ¶¶ 359-60.)
F. Misconduct in Homicide Investigations
For years both before and after Plaintiff‘s arrest and conviction for the Dennis murder, the City and the Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD“) utilized coercive techniques to obtain confessions, fabricated inculpatory evidence and witness statements, and withheld exculpatory
- A 1988/1989 case in which police conducted a sham photo identification and threatened a witness with separate charges to obtain a false statement. (Id. ¶ 373.) The resulting conviction was ultimately vacated with the agreement of the Commonwealth. (Id.)
- A 1989 case in which police suppressed an exculpatory eyewitness account, coerced vulnerable individuals to provide false identifications, pressured an informant facing significant jail time to endorse a fabricated statement, and threatened a suspect in the crime that he would be charged if he did not make a false identification. (Id. ¶ 375.) The defendant was convicted and served 31 years before exonerating evidence was discovered and the judgment vacated. (Id.)
- A 1990 case in which police coerced a witness with threats and promises of financial support to obtain a false inculpatory statement, ignoring alternative suspects and discrepancies with other witness accounts. (Id. ¶ 376.) The defendant was initially convicted, but after the coerced witness recanted her statement, the conviction was vacated and the defendant acquitted on retrial. (Id.)
- A 1991 case in which police held a witness for days, interrogating him without food, water, or bathroom access and hitting him several times, then held a suspect without food, water,
or bathroom access, handcuffed him to a chair, punched him in the face, and pressed a foot to his crotch until he signed a statement which was later proven to be false. (Id. ¶ 369.) - A 1991 case in which police obtained a conviction based on a fabricated, coerced confession and planted evidence, which was later contradicted by DNA evidence, resulting in the defendant‘s acquittal on retrial. (Id. ¶ 378.)
- A 1991 case in which police coerced a witness by threatening to prosecute her and by falsely claiming that she had been implicated; coerced a statement from a witness with a long history of drug and mental health issues and criminal activity; and suppressed a tip specifically identifying an alternate suspect. (Id. ¶ 379.) Ultimately, both witnesses recanted and the Commonwealth conceded, based on the misconduct, that the defendant had been denied a fair trial. (Id.)
- A 1991 case in which police coerced false identifications and concealed alibi evidence. (Id. ¶ 380.)
- A 1992 case in which police, including Defendant Worrell, isolated a suspect, “smacked him around,” and kicked his testicles until he falsely confessed. (Id. ¶¶ 257, 372.)
- A 1992 case in which a suspect who had been awake for 36 hours was interrogated at length before eventually signing a false confession. (Id. ¶ 374.) Following his conviction, the Commonwealth conceded that he was denied a fair trial based on the suppression of exculpatory evidence. (Id.)
- A 1993 case in which police were given a false name by a witness and coerced an unrelated individual by that name into making a false statement and identification. (Id. ¶ 370.) When the misconduct came to light, the detective responsible refused to testify and the pending charges in the case were dropped. (Id.)
- A 1993 case in which a defendant was convicted despite a documented alibi. (Id. ¶ 377.) The Commonwealth ultimately agreed that police had concealed evidence implicating an alternative suspect. (Id.)
- A 1993 case in which police suppressed multiple contemporaneous eyewitness accounts implicating an alternative suspect, leading the court to order a new trial. (Id. ¶ 381.)
- A 1996 case in which police coerced an informant to falsely testify in exchange for leniency, interrogated a teenage witness without a parent or lawyer present, and suppressed impeachment evidence. (Id. ¶ 382.) The conviction in the case was ultimately overturned and the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the charges. (Id.)
- A 2000 case in which police coerced three witnesses into providing fabricated statements, interrogating one for eight hours and offering another leniency, and suppressed impeachment and alternate suspect evidence. (Id. ¶ 383.) The conviction in the case was ultimately overturned and the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the charges. (Id.)
- A case from an unknown year in which police employed verbal and physical abuse to coerce statements from four young witnesses. (Id. ¶ 371.)
The City and PPD failed to train, supervise, or discipline officers in response to this misconduct. (Id. ¶ 397.) Moreover, the disciplinary system in place was deficient due to arbitrariness, chronic delays, inconsistency, lack of progressive discipline, poor training and supervision of disciplinary personnel, and the inability to track repeat offenders. (Id. ¶ 398.)
Prior to January 1, 2014, the PPD did not have clear internal guidance or rules in place concerning the constitutional rights of those being questioned or interrogated. (Id. ¶ 386.) Specifically, there was no policy governing the length of detention, use of
G. Plaintiff‘s Damages and Claims
As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff was wrongfully incarcerated for 28 years and sustained personal, psychological, social, and economic harm. (Id. ¶¶ 399-403.) The Amended Complaint asserts the following claims pursuant to
In the instant Motion, Defendants McDermott, Vivarina, and Gross seek dismissal of the
When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, [and] matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant‘s claims are based upon these documents.” Alpizar-Fallas v. Favero, 908 F.3d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010)). We “accept[] all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view[] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Talley v. Pillai, 116 F.4th 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011)). However, “we need not accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Host Int‘l, Inc. v. Marketplace PHL, LLC, 32 F.4th 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)) (citation omitted).
A plaintiff‘s pleading obligation is to set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim,” which “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (first quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); then quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible,” thus enabling “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for [the] misconduct alleged.” Warren Gen. Hosp., 643 F.3d at 84 (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In the end, we will grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if the factual allegations in the complaint
III. DISCUSSION
A. Fourteenth Amendment Malicious Prosecution
Count I asserts a
“[Q]ualified immunity shield[s] an officer from personal liability when an officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009). The qualified immunity inquiry is twofold: (1) whether the facts alleged in the complaint “make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and (2) whether that right “was clearly established at the time of a defendant‘s alleged misconduct.” Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). To be clearly established, a right must be recognized by “controlling authority or a robust consensus of . . . persuasive authority” with sufficient clarity “that any reasonable official in the defendant‘s shoes would have understood that [he] was violating it.” Weimer v. Cnty. of Fayette, 972 F.3d 177, 190 (3d Cir. 2020) (first quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018), then quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014)). Courts have discretion to decide which prong of the qualified immunity analysis to consider first “in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Montanez, 603 F.3d at 250 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). A defendant bears the burden of proving his entitlement to qualified immunity. Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808 (1982)).
The moving Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established
B. Failure to Intervene
Count IV of the Amended Complaint asserts a
The Third Circuit has recognized a duty to intervene in the
In Count V of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a municipal liability claim against the City pursuant to
Under
1. Custom
For purposes of a Monell claim, a municipal custom is a “course of conduct [which,] although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)) (citation omitted). To plausibly allege a Monell claim based on
i. The Customs at Issue
The City argues that we should dismiss this aspect of Plaintiff‘s municipal liability claim because the Amended Complaint does not sufficiently identify the customs on which Plaintiff‘s claims are based, instead making only broad references to unconstitutional customs generally.1 However, as Plaintiff stated at Oral Argument, and as is clear from reading the Amended Complaint as a whole, Plaintiff‘s claims are premised on three specific customs. First, the Amended Complaint alleges that the City has a custom of police “withholding and hiding exculpatory and impeachment evidence from the prosecution and defense lawyers,” including exculpatory statements and recantations, evidence undermining the prosecution‘s case, and their own role in coercing or fabricating statements. (Am. Compl. ¶ 363.) Second, it alleges that the City has a custom of police “coerce[ing] inculpatory statements” by holding witnesses for hours, physically abusing them, and making threats of baseless prosecution or promises of leniency. (Id. ¶ 364.) Finally, it alleges that the City has a custom of police taking steps to “make false statements appear true and reliable” by feeding information to witnesses or fabricating the statements outright, while concealing their involvement. (Id. ¶ 365.) The Amended Complaint further fleshes out these alleged customs by alleging numerous examples of misconduct from Plaintiff‘s case and
ii. Causation
The City also argues that we should dismiss this portion of Plaintiff‘s municipal liability claim because the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege that the purported customs were the proximate cause of Plaintiff‘s injuries. To show causation, Plaintiff must allege an affirmative link between the custom and the constitutional violation, which he can do by alleging that the City “had knowledge of ‘similar unlawful conduct in the past, . . . failed to take precautions against future violations, and that [its] failure, at least in part, led to [his] injury.‘” Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (alterations in original) (quoting Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 851).
The Amended Complaint identifies numerous cases from the same time period as Plaintiff‘s and allegedly involving the same kinds of misconduct at issue here, including police coercing interviewees by abuse or threats (see, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 257, 373, 375, 376, 369, 370, 372, 378, 379, 380, 374, 382, 383), concealing exculpatory or impeachment evidence (see, e.g.,
The City argues that the other misconduct alleged is too temporally remote to support Plaintiff‘s claim. However, it relies upon cases involving gaps of five to six years between the prior misconduct and the incidents at issue, decided at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2007); Doe v. Allegheny Cnty., Civ. A. No. 10-1761, 2013 WL 1290686, at *2-3, 12 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2013); see also Freeman v. McGorry, Civ. A. No. 20-3354, 2022 WL 3030789, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2022) (granting summary judgment while noting that “[t]he Court provided Plaintiff with an opportunity to conduct discovery to develop her Monell claim by denying Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings” (citation omitted)). Here, in contrast, the Amended Complaint alleges a consistent pattern of similar misconduct from 1988 through 1993, just two years prior to the beginning of the underlying investigation in early 1995. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 274, 369-83.) Moreover, the earlier procedural posture of this case is significant because “[m]unicipal liability under
2. Failure to Train, Discipline, and Supervise
As we mentioned above, Plaintiff also bases his municipal liability claim on the City‘s alleged deliberate indifference “to the need to train, supervise, and discipline police officers” and use of an inadequate internal disciplinary mechanism. (Am. Compl. ¶ 398.) A failure to train, discipline, or supervise will only lead to municipal liability where it “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)); see also Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105 (citation omitted) (explaining that a municipality may be liable for failures related to supervision and discipline of police officers as well as training). The Amended Complaint alleges that at the time of the underlying investigation, the PPD had no rules or guidance with respect to how long individuals being questioned could be constitutionally detained or prohibiting the use of force or threats against them. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 386-88 & n.7.) It also alleges that the PPD had no rules or guidance regarding disclosure of exculpatory or impeachment evidence and did not mandate the recording of interrogations, precluding supervisory review of officers’ conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 389-90.) Indeed, the Amended Complaint alleges that PPD supervisors were aware of and encouraged the claimed misconduct. (Id. ¶ 367.) Moreover, the internal disciplinary mechanisms the PPD had in place were allegedly ineffective, as they were arbitrary and slow, favored officers, failed to impose progressive discipline or track repeat offenders, and were staffed by personnel who were themselves untrained and incompetent. (Id. ¶ 398.)
Here, the City doubtless “know[s] that [police] will confront” situations involving handling exculpatory evidence, questioning witnesses or suspects, and preparing statements. Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (quotation omitted). Additionally, as discussed above in the context of Plaintiff‘s custom-based claim, the Amended Complaint alleges a “history of [police] mishandling” such situations by concealing exculpatory evidence, coercing individuals during questioning, and fabricating and supplementing statements. (Id. (quotation omitted).) Finally, there is little question that “wrong choices,” such as those alleged in the Amended Complaint, will “frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” (Id. (quotation omitted).) We therefore conclude that the Amended Complaint adequately pleads deliberate indifference and we deny the Motion to Dismiss as to Count V on this ground.
3. Municipal Liability for Rights Not Clearly Established
Finally, the City argues that, even if we deny the Motion as to a portion of Plaintiff‘s Monell claim, we should dismiss Count V to the extent that it seeks to hold the City liable for violations of rights that were not clearly established at the time of Plaintiff‘s investigation and prosecution. As we concluded above, when the events at issue took place, there was: (1) no clearly
While the Third Circuit has not addressed whether a Monell claim can be based on the violation of a constitutional right that was not clearly established, courts of appeals in other circuits have held that a municipality cannot be deliberately indifferent to a right that is not clearly established. See Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 393 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“[A] municipal policymaker cannot exhibit fault rising to the level of deliberate indifference to a constitutional right when that right has not yet been clearly established.” (citations omitted)); Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff‘s Off., 695 F.3d 505, 511 (6th Cir. 2012) (same) (quoting Szabla, 486 F.3d at 393); Bustillos v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 891 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2018) (same) (quoting Hagans, 695 F.3d at 511; Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir. 2017) (“The absence of a clearly established right spells the end of [a] Monell claim.“)); Young v. Cnty. of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that a Monell claim based on “failure to train cannot be sustained unless the employees violated a clearly established federal constitutional right” (citation omitted)). We agree with these analyses.
Plaintiff acknowledges this authority but asks us to instead follow the analysis of this issue in the Crosland case, which rejected the City‘s argument “that a municipality can only be ‘deliberately indifferent’ to a constitutional violation if the underlying right was clearly established at the time.” Crosland, 676 F. Supp. 3d at 381. The Crosland court rejected this argument as an improper “‘conflation’ of qualified immunity and municipal liability standards.” Id. (citation omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is granted with respect to Plaintiff‘s malicious prosecution claim under the
BY THE COURT:
/s/ John R. Padova, J.
John R. Padova, J.