Ramani PILLA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 10-4178.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued: June 1, 2011. Decided and Filed: Feb. 6, 2012.
670 F.3d 368
Before: BOGGS and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges; COLLIER, Chief District Judge.*
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge.
Ramani Pilla, a citizen and native of India, was removed from the United States after pleading guilty to making false, misleading, or fraudulent statements to the FBI, in violation of
I.
While employed as an assistant professor at Case Western University, Pilla told the FBI—and the university—that she had received several pieces of hate mail at her university office. The FBI and the university spent thousands of dollars investigating Pilla‘s report before she admitted to writing and delivering the hate mail herself. After Pilla pled guilty to violating
Steven Bell represented Pilla during her criminal case. He encouraged Pilla to plead guilty after the government provided him with overwhelming evidence of her guilt. The evidence included still frames from a surveillance camera that showed
So Bell researched potential defenses consistent with the confession. In particular, he considered a diminished-capacity defense based upon Pilla‘s alleged mental illness and her addiction to a drug called Klonopin. Although Bell found two psychiatrists to examine Pilla, each of them refused to testify in support of this defense. Bell also interviewed an expert whom Pilla herself proposed—a medical doctor and ex-colleague of Pilla‘s—but he likewise refused to testify. Pilla also suggested another defense altogether—that someone had broken into her house and written the letters on her laptop—but Bell rejected it because “the story didn‘t have any credibility” and a forensic examination of Pilla‘s computer would have been too expensive. Bell ultimately advised Pilla that she would probably receive a shorter prison sentence if she pled guilty rather than proceeding to trial.
Pilla is not a United States citizen, so Bell considered whether a guilty plea might have immigration consequences for her. He consulted a statute discussing deportation of non-citizens convicted of “aggravated felonies,” but decided it was “over [his] head, well beyond [his] expertise.” Thus he contacted Robert Brown, an immigration attorney who had previously served as an acting regional director for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Bell described the case to Brown and later sent him copies of the Bill of Information and the government‘s restitution calculations. Bell, Brown, and Pilla thereafter discussed whether the charged conduct would constitute an aggravated felony for immigration purposes. Brown said that “the charge to which Dr. Pilla was going to in all likelihood enter a guilty plea was not an aggravated felony,” meaning that she would not necessarily be deported upon her conviction.
Brown‘s advice turned out to be incorrect. An immigration judge determined that Pilla‘s offense was, in fact, an aggravated felony and that she was therefore removable under
While in federal prison, Pilla challenged her sentence—but not her plea or conviction—in a motion for habeas corpus relief under
In September 2009, after completing her prison sentence, Pilla filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis in the district court. In the petition, she argued that Bell was ineffective for failing to advise her that a guilty plea would result in automatic deportation. The district court allowed discovery and granted both parties several extensions of time to file supplemental briefing. Following a status conference, the court gave Pilla‘s attorney until August 13, 2010 to file a supplemental brief. He did not file the document in time: instead, he waited until fifteen minutes after the deadline and then requested a two-week extension. The court granted him one week. When her attorney missed that deadline as well, the court issued a thor-
This appeal followed.
II.
We review the district court‘s denial of a writ of coram nobis de novo, but uphold the court‘s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Blanton v. United States, 94 F.3d 227, 230 (6th Cir. 1996).
Coram nobis is an extraordinary writ that may be used to “vacate a federal sentence or conviction when a
A.
Pilla‘s claim in seeking the writ—that Bell provided constitutionally ineffective assistance with respect to her plea—is one that she could have raised in her
We agree with the Seventh Circuit‘s holding in Melton. If, in substance, a claim falls within the scope of
B.
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance, Pilla must show that Bell‘s performance was deficient and that his deficient performance prejudiced her defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). To show prejudice, Pilla must demonstrate a reasonable prob-
So we consider whether Pilla can make these showings. Her argument on the performance prong depends on her contention that, at the time of her criminal case, her criminal lawyer actually had a duty to provide her with accurate advice regarding the effect of her criminal conviction upon her immigration status. The Supreme Court first announced this duty in Padilla, which came years after Bell advised Pilla here. The United States says the duty cannot be imposed retroactively on Bell; Pilla says it can.
But we need not decide that issue here, because in any event Pilla cannot show prejudice. As noted above, Pilla faced overwhelming evidence of her guilt, which included a video that showed her planting the letters, a CD of incriminating phone conversations, and FBI interview notes documenting her confession. Given this evidence, the district court found that Pilla “had no realistic chance of being acquitted at trial” and that, if she had proceeded to trial, she “had no rational defense, would have been convicted and would have faced a longer term of incarceration.” Those findings were not clearly erroneous, or indeed erroneous at all. And had Pilla been convicted after trial, she would have been just as removable as she was after her guilty plea. The only consequence of Bell‘s inaccurate advice—assuming one believes Pilla‘s assertion that she would have gone to trial had she gotten accurate advice—is that she got a shorter prison term than otherwise. But more to the point, no rational defendant in Pilla‘s position would have proceeded to trial in this situation. Pilla therefore has not shown that Bell‘s advice created even a “reasonable probability” of prejudice. And thus she cannot show that Bell‘s advice “probably ... altered the outcome of the challenged proceeding,” as required for a writ of coram nobis. Johnson, 237 F.3d at 755.
Pilla separately argues that her guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. The district court did not address this argument because Pilla presented it for the first time in the late reply brief attached to her motion for relief from judgment. Issues so presented to the district court are not preserved for appeal. See Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008). The argument is forfeited.
Pilla finally argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for relief from judgment.
The district court‘s judgment is affirmed.