220 Conn. 54 | Conn. | 1991
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether General Statutes § 22a-43 (c)
The court reasonably could have found the following facts. The plaintiff, Ralto Developers, Inc. (Ralto), owned a tract of land in Danbury. Ralto filed an application with the named defendant, the environmental impact commission of the city of Danbury (commission), acting as the inland wetlands agency of the city, for permission to conduct a regulated activity on its land,
While that administrative appeal was pending, Ralto filed a second application with the commission.
Meanwhile, in September, 1989, Ralto had brought an action against the individual members of the commission pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 claiming damages for an unconstitutional taking of its property resulting from the denial of the first applica
Later, the court, Karazin, J., granted a motion filed by the association to intervene and become a party to the second administrative appeal and the court, West, J., granted its motion to consolidate the two appeals. Thereafter, Ralto filed a motion to reargue its motion for judgment in accordance with the stipulation and submitted a modified proposed stipulation. After two days of hearings, at which the association objected continually to the terms of the proposed stipulation, the court, Karazin, J., rendered judgment in accordance with the stipulation on August 3, 1990. The effect of the judgment was to withdraw Ralto’s § 1983 action and its first administrative appeal, and to settle the second appeal as provided in the stipulation. The association has appealed from the judgment, raising three issues: (1) whether a trial court may approve the withdrawal and settlement of an appeal from a decision of an inland wetlands agency pursuant to § 22a-43 (c) when an intervening party refuses to consent to the agreement reached between the agency and the applicant devel
The association concedes that it did not raise the claim that § 22a-43 (c) does not authorize the stipulated judgment rendered by the court without its consent to the settlement until September 27,1990, when it filed a motion for articulation in the course of appealing from the judgment. The issue was not raised in its memorandum opposing Ralto’s motion for a stipulated judgment that was presented to the court after the hearing that preceded the rendition of judgment on August 3, 1990. The motion for articulation contained one paragraph requesting clarification of “how the [cjourt could have approved the settlement of one administrative appeal and withdrawal of a second administrative appeal, when one of the parties to both administrative appeals did not agree to said settlement and withdrawal.” The court denied that paragraph of the motion explicitly.
“The supreme court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial.” Practice Book § 4185. The association’s motion for articulation, pointing to
The rule provides further, however, that “[t]he supreme court may in the interests of justice notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court.” Practice Book § 4185. It is only in rare cases that this exception to the requirement for seasonable assertion of claims in the trial court may be invoked. “Such review is reserved for truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.” State v. Hinckley, 198 Conn. 77, 87-88, 502 A.2d 388 (1985). “We have noticed plain error in the failure of a trial court to apply a clearly relevant statute to the case before it.” Id., 88; State v. Burke, 182 Conn. 330, 331-32, 438 A.2d 93 (1980); Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 607, 609, 436 A.2d 1259, reh. denied, 449 U.S. 956, 101 S. Ct. 363, 66 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1980).
In the present case the court did not entirely overlook § 22a-43 (c), because, in rendering its decision from the bench, it specifically referred to the hearing requirement of the statute. The court thoroughly reviewed the stipulation on its merits and approved it as “fair and equitable to the applicant and the public interest.” The association had contested the motion for a stipulated judgment and had presented the testimony of abutting owners opposing Ralto’s proposed development at the hearing on the motion. The court must have been aware of the absence of the association’s consent, but must have overlooked the provision of the statute that refers to a “settlement [agreement] between the parties to any such appeal” as a prerequisite to approval of a settlement involving the withdrawal of such an appeal.
Relying on the failure of the association to raise the issue at trial, Ralto has not argued the merits of the claim that § 22a-43 (c) did not authorize approval of the settlement agreement between Ralto and the commission without the association’s consent thereto. We must, nevertheless, apply standard principles in construing the statute. “To determine the collectively expressed legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute itself. If that language is plain and unambiguous, we go no further.” Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 187, 592 A.2d 912 (1991); University of Connecticut v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 322, 328, 585 A.2d 690 (1991).
Section 22a-43 (c) provides that “[n]o appeal [from an inland wetlands agency decision] shall be withdrawn and no settlement between the parties to any such appeal shall be effective” without court approval of “such proposed withdrawal or settlement” after a hearing. (Emphasis added.) The legislative intent is clear that a settlement agreement “between the parties”
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes § 22a-43 (c) provides as follows: “No appeal taken under subsection (a) of this section shall be withdrawn and no settlement between the parties to any such appeal shall be effective unless and until a hearing has been held before the superior court and such court has approved such proposed withdrawal or settlement.”
This regulated activity consisted of a proposal to construct a road across certain wetland areas and drain water into Tarrywile Lake.
The second application was virtually the same as the first except for changes haade to the proposed configuration of the road.
It is possible to argue that the use of “between” rather than “among” indicates that the legislature intended that the agreement of only two parties, the aggrieved appellant and the agency, would be necessary for a set