Appellant Ralph Simon (“Simon”), a black male, was employed by appellee Honeywell, Inc. (“Honеywell”) from July 1973 until June 1977 when he voluntarily terminated his employment. On three separate occasions during his tenure with Honeywell, Simon was considered for a promotion but was not selected. In each ease, a white mаle was chosen to fill the position. Simon brought suit in district court alleging racial discrimination, 1 and asking for both declaratory relief and damages. 2 After a non-jury trial, the distriсt court ruled in favor of Honeywell, and Simon brought this appeal.
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, - U.S. -,
In the еase at bar, the district court neither expressly applied the above legal standards, nor made findings of fact which would enable us to review the judgment below in light of these standards. The conclusory statement that “there is no evidence of racially-premised disparate treatment,” Record at 51, is insufficient in that it gives nо clue as to the bases of the trial judge’s decision and fails to indicate whether the proper legаl standards were, in fact, applied. Moreover, a careful reading of the record in the casе at bar reveals that the evidence can be interpreted in a variety of ways, and such interpretation is solely within the province of the trial court. For example, the record is inconclusive as to whеther plaintiff was qualified for the three positions in question, or whether the defendant clearly explainеd legitimate reasons for its actions. Without further findings of fact we are thus unable to review the trial court’s deсision in light of the applicable legal standards. In addition, after the district court rendered its decision in the case at bar, the United States Supreme Court delineated the ebbs and flows of the burdens of production and persuasion in discrimination cases. See Burdine, supra. Because of inadequate findings of fact in the case at bar, and in light of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Burdine, supra, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for furthеr proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. The suit was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
. Plaintiffs complaint also alleged a variety of other discriminatory practices, including harassment and the failure to pay plaintiff “a wаge commensurate with the quantity and quality of his work.” See Record at 3-4. The trial judge found these allegations to be unsuрported by the evidence. Appellant’s only objection to this decision is the bald assertion— without anаlysis or explanation — that the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous. We have carefully examinеd the record and find appellant’s argument to be without merit.
. The fact that appellant may not have formally applied for the promotions in the case at bar is not significant in light of the uncontradicted еvidence that no formal application was necessary and that appellant was, in fact, сonsidered for the promotions. See, e. g., Trial Transcript at 12, 59, 64 -65, 119-25, 139, 147.
. For example, under one appropriate model of a рrima facie case, the plaintiff must show (1) that he belongs to a racial minority, (2) that he was qualified for an available position for which he applied, (3) that he was not selected, and (4) that the position remаined open after his rejection and that the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of plaintiff’s qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra,
. The defendant need not prove by a preponderance of the evidence “that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasоns.” The clear articulation of legitimate reasons for plaintiffs rejection must simply raise “a genuine issuе of fact as to whether [defendant] discriminated against the plaintiff.”
Burdine,
supra, — U.S. at —,