Ralph Harrison Benning v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of CorrectionsRalph Harrison Benning v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections
Case Information
*2 Bеfore J ORDAN and R OSENBAUM , Circuit Judges, and S CHLESINGER ,* District Judge.
JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
An email, as the term itself implies, is a message, note, or letter sent by electronic means over a computer system. See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 582 (4th ed. 2009). The questions presented in this appeal largely re- volve around how emails generated by inmates in the custody of the Georgia Department of Corrections are to be treated for pur- poses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
* The Honorable Harvey Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Mid- dle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
I An inmate in a Georgia Department of Corrections facility is “allowed to send emails through JPay kiosks . . . or through Geor- gia Offender Alternative Learning (‘GOAL’) devices which are pro- vided to [inmates].” D.E. 64-4, Exh. B at 3. JPay Kiosks and GOAL devices are electronic devices used for, among other things, “send- ing and receiving email messages.” D.E. 64-4, Attachment B-1 at 10. Each email costs 37 cents to send, with the GDC receiving 15% of the fees. See D.E. 64-3, Exh. A at 38.
One of the GDC’s Standard Operating Procedures, SOP 204.10, governs the use of JPay Kiosks and GOAL devices. SOP 204.10, which became effective on August 15, 2017, “explains the rules and sanctions that can be imposed if a [GOAL] device or [JPay] Kiosk is misused.” D.E. 64-4, Attachment B-1 at 10. It sets out, among other things, 16 policies governing video visitations and emails. Two of those policies are relevant here: (1) “[o]ffenders shall not request emails to be forwarded, sent, or mailed to others;” and (2) “[c]ustomers and offenders shall not request or send infor- mation on behalf of or about another offender.” Id. at 14–15.
Under SOP 204.10, “[a]ll communications sent or received via the GOAL device or the [JPay] Kiosk are subject to inspection and review for security reasons, and neither the sender, nor re- ceiver, has an expectation of privacy in any of these communica- tions.” Id. аt 13. Any communications that violate SOP 204.10 “will be intercepted without explanation and no refund will be pro- vided to the sender.” Id. at 15. The screening and review of inmate emails is conducted by analysts at the GDC’s Central Intelligence Unit through an intranet system. See D.E. 64-4, Exh. B at ¶¶ 16– 19.
A Ralph Harrison Benning is serving a life sentence in Georgia and is in the custody of the GDC. As an inmate, his communica- tions with those on the outside are governed by GDC policies and regulations.
In September and October of 2017, Mr. Benning attempted to send three emails to his sister, Elizabeth Knott—one on Septem- ber 24, 2017, and two on October 9, 2017. Those emails were in- tercepted by the GDC and never delivered to Ms. Knott due to vi- olations of SOP 204.10. All three emails were about gang problems and fraud and corruption in the GDC.
Margaret Patterson, a GDC analyst, intercepted the Septem- ber 24 email because Mr. Benning had asked Ms. Knott to forward it to third parties. See D.E. 64-6, Exh. D at ¶¶ 11–13. Jennifer Ed- gar, another GDC analyst, intercepted the October 9 emails for the same reason. See D.E. 64-5, Exh. C at ¶¶ 10–12. Neither Ms. Pat- terson nor Ms. Edgar notified Mr. Benning that his emails had been intercepted and withheld. Nor did they give him an opportunity to appeal their decisions to a different GDC official. See, e.g., D.E. 80-5 at ¶ 14.
Another email Mr. Benning tried to send, this time to the Aleph Institute on February 6, 2018, was similarly intercepted and never sent. See D.E. 64-4, Exh. B at ¶ 27. In this email, Mr. Ben- ning discussed receiving a declaration and a “Kosher Authorities Template,” and expressed gratitude. See D.E. 64-4, Attachment B- 3 at 21. But he also asked that another inmate’s address be “cor- rected to show he is now at Wilcox State Prison.” Id. GDC analyst Romita Keen intercepted this email because it “contained infor- mation about another inmate.” D.E. 64-4, Exh. B at ¶ 27. Ms. Keen did not inform Mr. Benning that the email had been intercepted, and did not give him the opportunity to appeal her decision to a different GDC offiсial.
Mr. Benning mailed Ms. Knott handwritten copies of the emails he had tried to send her in September and October of 2017. See D.E. 64-3, Exh. A at 74–75. To Mr. Benning’s knowledge, his sister received those letters. See id. at 76. Mr. Benning did not send a handwritten version of his February 2018 email to the Aleph In- stitute. See D.E. 80-5 at 4.
B In 2018, Mr. Benning filed a pro se civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint named the GDC Commissioner (then Gregory Dozier, now Timothy Ward) and Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar—the GDC analysts who had intercepted his emails in September and October of 2017—as defendants. It did not name Ms. Keen—the GDC analyst who intercepted the email to the Aleph Institute in February of 2018—as a defendant.
Mr. Benning alleged that the GDC, Ms. Patterson, and Ms. Edgar unconstitutionally censored certain emails he tried to send, and failed to provide him notice, thereby violating his rights under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment. He requested specific declaratory and injunc- tive relief, as well as comрensatory, nominal, and punitive dam- ages.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. They argued in part that Mr. Benning did not have a constitutional right to communicate through email and that, even if he did, the interception and withholding of his emails was constitutional. Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar also asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity from Mr. Benning’s claims for damages.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Mr. Benning appealed, and counsel thereafter ap- peared on his behalf.
II
We review questions of constitutional law de novo. See
Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901
F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2018). The same plenary standard gov-
erns our review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
See Marbury v. Warden,
We first address Mr. Benning’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, and then turn to the First Amendment claims.
III As noted, in September and October of 2017 Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar censored (i.e., intercepted) three emails which Mr. Benning sought to send to his sister. They did so because the emails violated SOP 204.10’s prohibition against requesting for- warding to third parties. Mr. Benning alleged that Ms. Edgar and Ms. Patterson did not provide him with any notice that his emails had been intercepted and were not going to be sent, and did not provide him with an opportunity to appeal their decisions to a dif- ferent GDC official. He alleged that these failures violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. [1]
The district court entered summary judgment against Mr. Benning and in favor of Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar on the due process claims. The court concluded that Mr. Benning did not have any protected liberty interest in the emails he generated because emails should not be treated the same as outgoing physical mail. And without such a liberty interest, he was not entitled to any due process protections when his emails were censored. See D.E. 108 at 26–27. The court also ruled that Ms. Edgar and Ms. Patterson were, in any event, entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Benning’s due process claims. Even if Mr. Benning had a liberty interest in the emails he generated, the law to that effect was not clearly es- tablished in September and October of 2017, when the three emails to his sister were censored. See id. at 27–28.
We hold that Mr. Benning had a protected liberty interest in his outgoing emails, and as a result he was entitled to notice and other procedural safeguards when the three emails to his sister were intercepted and withheld. But we agree with the district court that Ms. Edgar and Ms. Patterson are entitled to qualified im- munity on Mr. Benning’s due process claims for damages because the law to thаt effect was not clearly established in September and October of 2017. [2]
A The first question is whether Mr. Benning had a liberty in- terest in his emails that triggered due process protections. See Dor- man v. Aronofsky, 36 F.4th 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Before addressing what process is due, we first examine whether Mr. Dor- man has a liberty interest that triggers due process protections.”). We conclude that he did.
The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he interest of prisoners
and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter,
grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a ‘liberty’ inter-
est within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even
though qualified of necessity by the circumstance of imprisonment.
As such, it is protected from arbitrary governmental invasion.”
Procunier v. Martinez,
When an inmate’s outgoing correspondence is censored,
Martinez requires prison officials to provide certain procedural
safeguards to satisfy the Due Process Clause. Here is how we have
described those safeguards: “(1) the inmate must receive notice of
the rejection of a letter written by or addressed to him; (2) the au-
thor of the letter be given ‘reasonable opportunity to protest that
decision,’ and (3) ‘complaints be referred to a prison official other
than the person who originally disapproved the correspondence.’”
Id. at 1368 & n.2 (quoting Martinez,
This case, of course, involves the censoring of emails rather than physical letters. So, like the district court, we must decide whether emails are the equivalent of physical letters for purposes of a liberty interest.
We conclude that under Martinez Mr. Benning had a pro- tected liberty interest, grounded in the First Amendment, in the emails he generated and sought to send to his sister. We do so for a number of reasons.
First, those emails—which contained communications from
Mr. Benning to his sister—undoubtedly constituted speech under
the First Amendment. The First Amendment “protects material
disseminated over the [I]nternet as well as by the means of com-
munication devices used prior to the high-tech era.” Clement v.
Cal. Dep’t of Corr.,
Second, it seems to us that the rationale of Martinez is con-
cerned with correspondence from inmates, regardless of the form
(or medium) the correspondence takes. See Bonner v. Outlaw, 552
F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Although [Martinez ] discusses let-
ters, that is because letters were simply the form of correspondence
at issue in that specific case. Nothing about the reasoning of [Mar-
tinez ] justifies treating packages differently than lеtters for pur-
poses of the notice that should be given an inmate when corre-
spondence addressed to that inmate is rejected.”). As the Eighth
Circuit persuasively explained in rejecting an argument that Mar-
tinez applies only to letters and does not govern packages, the “rea-
soning of [Martinez] applies to all forms of correspondence ad-
dressed to an inmate. It is the inmate’s interest in ‘uncensored
communication’ that is the liberty interest protected by the due
process clause, regardless of whether that communication occurs
in the form of a letter, package, newspaper, magazine, etc.” Id. We
have applied Martinez to magazines, see Prison Legal News v.
Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
In the 1970s, when Martinez was decided, correspondence consisted only of physical letters (or similar notes or messages) handwritten or typed on paper and sent by regular mail. Today, almost 50 years later, correspondence is not so limited and emails serve as the electronic equivalent of physical letters (i.e., corre- spondence). See Johnson, Jail (E)Mail, 11 Wash. J.L., Tech. & Arts at 288 (explaining that by 2017 the number of email accounts was expected to rise to 4.9 billion). Thanks to computers and the Inter- net, we can now correspond with others digitally through email, and for due process purposes it makes both doctrinal and practical sense to treat outgoing email the same as physical letters. See, e.g., Tory v. Davis, 2020 WL 2840163, at *4 (W.D. Va. June 1, 2020) (“[A]n inmate has a due process right to receive notice when his email communication has been censored.”). Just as the Fourth Amendment protects against searches by technology unknown in the 18 th century, see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–38 (2001), the First Amendment protects correspondence transmitted by means developed in the 20 th or 21 st centuries.
Third, GDC officials themselves treat outgoing emails from inmates like physical letters for screening and review. Inmate emails are not immediately transmitted to their intended recipi- ents, but instead go to the Central Intelligence Unit for screening and inspection by way of an intranet system. Emails are sent on their way only when GDC analysts at the Unit are satisfied that they comply with SOP 204.10.
In other words, just as a physical letter is not immediately delivered when an inmate places it in the prison’s mail system, an email is not immediately transmitted as soon as an inmate hits “send.” SOP 204.10 makes clear that “[b]ecause of the need” for inspection, email “communications may not be received by the in- tended recipient on the same day as sent by the sender.” D.E. 64- 4, Attachment B-1 at 13. From the perspective of the GDC, emails are the functional equivalent of letters written or typed on paper. And we can think of no persuasive reason why prison officials should not be required to provide notice and other procedural safe- guards when they intercept or otherwise censor emails sent by in- mates. [4]
B
The defendants argue that Mr. Benning did not have a pro-
tected liberty interest because using the email system is a privilege,
and not a right, for inmates in the custody of the GDC. See Br. for
Appellees at 39–40. This argument misses the mark, and does so
by the proverbial country mile. For over 50 years the Supreme
Court has “fully . . . rejected the wooden distinction between
‘rights’ and ‘privileges’ that once seemed to govern the applicability
of procedural due process rights.” Bd. of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth,
government, but whether the government acted lawfully in depriv-
ing him of it.” Thompson v. Gallagher,
As a result, whether Mr. Benning had a free-standing consti-
tutional or statutory right to use the GDC email system does not
affect or resolve the procedural due process question under Mar-
tinez. In any event, it is the First Amendment—and not state law—
which creates a liberty interest here. See Martinez,
C We next take up whether Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar de- nied Mr. Benning his due process rights under Martinez. On this summary judgment record, a jury could reasonably find that they did.
When outgoing physical letters are intercepted or censored
by prison officials, Martinez requires that the inmate be “notified
of the rejection of [the] letter written by . . . him,” and that he be
“given a reasonable opportunity to protest that decision,” with his
complaint being “referred to a prison official other than the person
who originally disapproved the correspondence.”
Mr. Benning submitted an affidavit stating that, when the
emails to his sister were intercepted in September and October of
2017, he was denied (a) “any process” and (b) an “administrativе
remedy” to challenge the decisions because of SOP 204.10. See
D.E. 80-5 at ¶ 14. That affidavit, based as it was on Mr. Benning’s
personal knowledge, sufficed to create an issue of fact. See United
States v. Stein,
The evidence in the summary judgment record also sup- ports the lack-of-notice and lack-of-remedy assertions. SOP 204.10 expressly states that “communications which violate [the] policy will be intercepted without explanation.” D.E. 64-4, Attachment B-1 at 15 (emphasis added). Richard Wallace, a GDC supervisor, confirmed in his declaration that SOP 204.10 provides for no expla- nation when emails are intercepted for a violation. See D.E. 64-4, Exh. B at ¶ 13. Moreover, Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar stated in their declarations that they acted pursuant to SOP 204.10, and they did not claim that they notified Mr. Benning of their decisions or provided him with an administrative remedy. See D.E. 64-5, Exh. C at ¶¶ 10–12; D.E. 64-6, Exh. D at ¶¶ 11–13. It is therefore reason- able to infer that, in accordancе with SOP 204.10, they did not tell Mr. Benning that his emails were intercepted and did not provide him with an appeal to a different GDC official.
Given this evidence, the district court should not have
granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Patterson and Ms. Ed-
gar on whether they violated Mr. Benning’s due process rights. Mr.
Benning had a protected First Amendment liberty interest in his
outgoing emails, and a reasonable jury could find that he was not
provided any notice of the interceptions or of his right to challenge
the decisions. See Martinez,
But that does not end the matter, for Ms. Edgar and Ms. Pat- terson asserted qualified immunity as to Mr. Benning’s claims for damages for the alleged procedural due process violations. We therefore turn to qualified immunity.
D
Government officials sued in their individual capacities for
money damages “are entitled to qualified immunity with respect
to ‘discretionary functions’ [they have] performed[.]” Ziglar v. Ab-
basi,
In this case qualified immunity “turns on the ‘objective legal
reasonableness’” of the actions of Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar. See
Ziglar,
Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s con- duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. A right is clearly established when it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable offi- cial would have understood that what he is doing vi- olates that right. Although this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question be- yond debate. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specifiс context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna,
It is true, as Mr. Benning says, that by September and Octo-
ber of 2017—when his emails were withheld—some courts had ap-
plied Martinez to correspondence other than letters. See, e.g., Bon-
ner,
Email is created and trаnsmitted in a different medium than
physical mail. Although we have concluded that the Martinez due
process requirements apply to email correspondence in the prison
setting, before today there were no Supreme Court, Eleventh Cir-
cuit, or Georgia Supreme Court decisions on point. As far as we
can tell, only two district courts have specifically ruled that the
Martinez due process framework governs emails generated by in-
mates, and those courts issued their decisions in June of 2020 and
November of 2018, well after Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar inter-
cepted Mr. Benning’s emails. See, e.g., Tory,
In sum, at the time Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar acted there
was no governing and materially similar precedent concerning the
due process implications of confiscating, intercepting, or censoring
outgoing emails generated by inmates. We recognize that a prior
case on all fours (or nearly all fours) is not always necessary to give
an official fair notice that his conduct is wrongful. See, e.g., Taylor
v. Rojas,
E In addition to seeking damages against Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar, Mr. Benning requested declaratory relief with respect to his due process claims. He asked that the district court issue a judgment which declared (a) that he “has a right to be notified when email correspondence is censored,” (b) that he “has a right to [the] written reasons for any decision to censor” his email corre- spondence, and (c) that he “has a right to respond to any decision to censor [his] email correspondence before the decision is final- ized.” See D.E. 28 at 6. [7]
As we have explained, qualified immunity “is only a defense
to personal liability for monetary awards resulting from govern-
ment officials performing discretionary functions,” and “may not
be effectively asserted as a defense to a claim for declaratory or in-
junctive relief.” Ratliff v. DeKalb County,
The district court, having rejected Mr. Benning’s due pro- cess claims on the merits, did not have to confront the issue of declaratory relief. But we have held that a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar violated Mr. Benning’s due process rights by intercepting his emails and by failing to provide him notice and an opportunity to appeal to a different GDC official. Those due process claims will have to be put to a jury so that the district court can address the propriety (and scope) of declaratory relief should Mr. Benning prevail. Cf. Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 483 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the grant of qualified immunity to individual prison officials did not preclude an inmate “from going forward with his as-applied challenge to the Ohio prison grooming regulation insofar as he seeks declaratory and in- junctive relief” to “prevent the defendants from forcibly cutting his beard and sidelocks in the future”); 1 Sheldon H. Nahmood, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation § 5:3 (2021-22 edition) (by “the terms of” the Declaratory Judgment Act, “neither injunctive relief nor damages need be sought as a condition precedent to obtaining a declaratory judgment”).
We note that Mr. Benning asserted his due process claims
against all of the defendants, including the Commissioner of the
GDC. See D.E. 28 at 11–12. Insofar as he is being sued in his official
capacity for declaratory relief, and due to his implementation of
SOP 204.10, the Commissioner may not assert qualified immunity
as a defense. See Kentucky v. Graham,
Although a prayer for declaratory relief generally seeks a
declaration of both past and future conduct, the Supreme Court
has explained that such relief is permitted in an official-capacity suit
against a state official for prospective relief under Ex parte Young,
IV We now pivot to Mr. Benning’s First Amendment claims. Mr. Benning alleged that two of the policies set out in SOP 204.10— the prohibition on requesting forwarding to third parties and the prohibition on sending information about other inmates—violated his First Amendment rights. The parties, as they did below, debate which of two Supreme Court cases provides the proper standard for addressing the censorship of inmates’ outgoing emails.
Martinez, which has been limited to outgoing correspond-
ence, see Thornburg,
A Mr. Benning alleged that two policies set out in SOP 204.10 violated his First Amendment rights under Martinez. As stated, these were the policy рrohibiting inmates from asking recipients to forward their outgoing emails (the forwarding policy) and the pol- icy prohibiting inmates from discussing other inmates in their out- going emails (the inmate-information policy). Mr. Benning did not argue that he had an “independent, stand alone, right to electronic correspondence if . . . no email service of any sort was offered by the defendants.” D.E. 80 at 6. Instead, he asserted that “[t]he stand- ard to be applied for review of the censorship of outgoing elec- tronic correspondence is the same as that for outgoing physical cor- respondence set out in [Martinez].” Id. at 16. His position before the district court was that the policies did not pass muster under Martinez, and that summary judgment in favor of the defendants was not appropriate because the record did not establish that the restrictions were “no greater than necessary or essential to protect important or substantial interests.” Id. at 17.
The defendants responded that Mr. Benning did not have a constitutional right to communicate through email. And they as- serted that even if he had such a right, the challenged policies would survive constitutional scrutiny under Turner. That is, they argued that the two policies are “rationally related to [the] GDC’s security interest”—“[b]oth policies exist to curb criminal activity and ensure security and are therefore ‘rationally connected to [GDC’s] security and safety interests.’” D.E. 64-1 at 11–12. See also D.E. 64-4, Exh. B at 7. Specifically, the forwarding policy “prevents [inmates] from communicating with those who have not been cleared by GDC’s security personnel and who may have a record of criminal activity,” and the inmate-information policy “prevents [inmates] from including information that could endanger the safety and security of anyone related or connected to the inmate named in [the] email.” Id. at 11. Thе defendants further asserted that Mr. Benning had other means of communicating besides email (i.e., physical letters), that accommodating Mr. Benning’s forward- ing request would require the GDC to invest more resources “to do background checks on the limitless number of possible recipi- ents that [inmates’] emails could be forwarded to,” and that the prohibitions set forth by the policies “are not exaggerated re- sponses to GDC’s security concerns.” Id. at 12–13.
Ms. Edgar and Ms. Patterson additionally argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity. In their view, “there [was] no clearly established law that would have put them on notice that performing their job responsibilities of withholding emails that did not comply with the email [policies] was clearly unlawful.” Id. at 15.
The district court decided to apply the standard set out in Turner and ruled that the challenged policies were constitutional under that standard. The district court alternatively concluded that Ms. Pаtterson and Ms. Edgar were entitled to qualified immunity such that Mr. Benning would not be entitled to damages from them. See D.E. 108 at 10–29.
On appeal, the parties essentially restate the positions they took in the district court.
Mr. Benning makes three principal arguments. First, he maintains that Martinez—rather than Turner—provides the appro- priate standard for reviewing restrictions on outgoing emails and that under Martinez issues of material fact preclude summary judg- ment. See Br. for Appellant at 28–42. Second, he contends that even if Turner applies material issues of fact exist as to whether the forwarding policy and the inmate-information policy are constitu- tional. See id. at 43–51. Third, he asserts that Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar are not entitled to qualified immunity. See id. at 59–60.
The defendants argue that “straightforward application of the Turner standard confirms that [the] GDC’s modest email regu- lations are reasonably related to security and safety fоr inmates, se- curity guards, and members of the public.” Br. for Appellees at 13– 14. They also contend that the district court correctly found that Ms. Edgar and Ms. Patterson were entitled to qualified immunity. See id. at 41–45.
B As set out earlier, the Supreme Court’s cases provide that qualified immunity “attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” and explain that for a right to be clearly established “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Rivas-Villegas, 142 S. Ct. at 7–8 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
We conclude that qualified immunity applies with respect to Mr. Benning’s claims for damages against Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgard. In September and October оf 2017, when Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar intercepted Mr. Benning’s emails, there was no clearly established law (in the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Cir- cuit, or the Georgia Supreme Court) holding or indicating that the forwarding policy or the inmate-information policy (or similar pol- icies) violated the First Amendment when applied to outgoing emails from inmates. There was also no clearly established law ad- dressing which First Amendment standard—the one in Martinez or the one in Turner—governs prison regulations like the ones at is- sue here.
Mr. Benning cannot point to any materially similar cases—
and we have not found any ourselves—but he argues that a reason-
able prison official would have understood that emails are a form
of outgoing correspondence under Martinez. See Br. for Appellant
at 56. But we have already rejected Mr. Benning’s similar argu-
ment against qualified immunity with respect to the due process
claims. And the recognitiоn that emails constitute correspondence
for due process purposes says little about the constitutionality of
the forwarding and inmate-information policies under the First
Amendment. Under the circumstances, the unconstitutionality of
those policies was not “beyond debate.” Wesby,
Thus, because the law was not clearly established, we affirm the district court’s ruling that Ms. Edgar and Ms. Patterson are en- titled to qualified immunity on Mr. Benning’s First Amendment claims for damages. In light of our decision, we need not and do not address the constitutionality of the forwarding and inmate-in- formation policies.
C
That leaves the First Amendment claims against the Com-
missioner in his official capacity. Mr. Benning did not seek declar-
atory relief on those claims, but he did seek certain injunctive relief.
See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson,
As relevant here, Mr. Benning requested that the district court (1) “order the defendants to not limit the length of outgoing emails,” (2) “order the defendants to allow [him] to email anyone except for persons who have specifically requested to be restricted to [him],” and (3) “order the defendants to not impose restrictions on the use of [his] electronic communications by non-incarcerated persons.” D.E. 28 at 13.
The district court denied Mr. Benning’s claims for injunctive relief because they were moot or because they did not comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (requiring, among other things, that injunctive relief as to prison conditions “extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff” and be “narrowly drawn”). See D.E. 108 at 7–8. Mr. Benning contends that the district court erred, but we disagree.
While the case was pending in the district court, the GDC rescinded the policy in SOP 204.10 preventing inmates from email- ing anyone not cleared to physically visit them at their facility. See D.E. 80-5 at 1. The district court concluded that, as to this aspect of SOP 204.10, Mr. Benning’s request for injunctive relief was moot. See D.E. 108 at 7. Mr. Benning does not challenge that con- clusion on appeal, so we address only his other two requests, unre- lated to monetary damages, for injunctive relief—ordering the GDC not to limit the length of outgoing emails and not to impose restrictions on the use of his communications by non-incarcerated persons.
Mr. Benning argues that the district cоurt acted prematurely in rejecting his claims for injunctive relief, and asserts that it should have waited to see if he prevailed on any of his First Amendment claims. See Br. for Appellant at 58–60. If a preliminary injunction is not sought, it generally makes sense for a district court to leave the matter of equitable remedies until the end of the case. At that point the court will know what claims, if any, the plaintiff has prevailed on and will be able to determine the propriety and scope of injunctive relief. See United States v. Baxter, Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 909 (11th Cir. 2003).
Under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
“demand for relief in the pleadings does not limit, except in cases
of default, the relief a court may grant when entering judgment.”
Sapp v. Renfroe,
“[T]he scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of
the violation established.” Califano v. Yamasaki,
Although we review pro se filings liberally, we cannot “re-
write [a] . . . pleading” to request a different form of relief. See
Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir.
2014). Given the complete lack of connection between the claims
pled and the injunctive relief requested, the district court did not
err in ruling that such relief was overbroad and inappropriate. See
§ 3626(a)(1)(A); Thomas,
V On Mr. Benning’s due process claims, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Mr. Benning had a First Amendment liberty inter- est in his outgoing emails. As a result, he was entitled to procedural safeguards when his emails in September and October of 2017 were intercepted. Although Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Benning’s requests for damages on the due process claims, those claims must be tried to a jury. The re- quests for declaratory relief on the due process claims are not barred by qualified or sovereign immunity, and a reasonable jury could find that the defendants—in promulgating and following SOP 204.10—violated Mr. Benning’s due process rights.
With respect to Mr. Benning’s First Amendment claims re- lating to the forwarding and inmate-information policies, we af- firm. Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar are entitled to qualified immun- ity, and the requested injunctive relief against the Commissioner was not connected to the policiеs that Mr. Benning challenged.
A FFIRMED I N P ART , R EVERSED IN P ART , A ND R EMANDED . Schlesinger, J., Concurring S CHLESINGER , District Judge, Concurring:
I concur in the result and agree with much in the majority
opinion. But I write separately because I would affirm the district
court’s determination that Turner rather than Martinez controls.
Turner v. Safley,
This case presents an opportunity to address how prison of-
ficials should treat First Amendment issues. The majority con-
cludes, “under Martinez Mr. Benning had a protected liberty inter-
est grounded in the First Amendment, in the emails he generated
and sought to send to his sister.” Maj. Op. at 10. But the issue is
not so plain. Other Circuits have recently addressed similar in-
stances and have followed Turner. See Murdock v. Thompson,
No. 20-6278,
It is for this reason, and to provide sharper guidance to dis- trict courts, I suggest we should have more fully developed whether Turner applies to Mr. Benning’s claim. In my view the challenged email policies survive constitutional scrutiny under Turner.
Notes
[1] Mr. Benning also alleged that a fourth email, the one he sent in February of 2018 to the Aleph Institute, was intercepted and withheld because it violated SOP 204.10’s prohibition against discussing another inmate’s information. The summary judgment record indicates (and Mr. Benning does not dispute) that this email was withheld by Ms. Keen, another GDC analyst. See D.E. 64- 4, Exh. B at ¶ 27; Br. for Appellant at 19. Mr. Benning, however, did not name Ms. Keen as a defendant.
[2] We address the merits of the due process claims because, as explained later, Mr. Benning’s requests for declaratory relief as to those claims are not barred by qualified immunity.
[3] In a later case, the Supreme Court limited Martinez “to regulations concern- ing outgoing correspondence.” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989). Because Mr. Benning’s intercepted emails were outgoing communi- cations, Martinez governs the Fourteenth Amendment due process claims.
[4] In his concurring opinion, our colleague suggests that other circuits have ap-
plied Turner v. Safley,
[5] Thompson constitutes binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit under Bon-
ner v. City of Prichard,
[6] Our sister circuits read Martinez the same way. See Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th
182, 187 (3d Cir. 2021); Hopkins v. Collins,
[7] Mr. Benning also requested that the district court issue a judgment which declared “inmate email correspondence” to be the same as “written/paper correspondence.” See D.E. 28 at 6. Because Mr. Benning has not claimed that any particular policy within SOP 204.10 is unconstitutional in its differential treatment of email correspondence and written/paper correspondence, we do not consider this claim.