93 Neb. 198 | Neb. | 1913
This is an action by plaintiff, August G. Rakow, against defendants Robert J. Tate and the First National Bank of Fremont, Nebraska, the object and purpose of which is to quiet the title to the southwest quarter of section 14 and the southeast quarter of section 15, all in township 26, range 5, in Antelope county. It is alleged in the amended petition that on the 14th day of September, 1907, plaintiff, as party of the first part, and Robert J. Tate, as party of the second part, entered into a certain written agreement, in two parts, by which plaintiff agreed to sell defendant the land above described upon condition that defendant should approve the purchase and sale, and, if so approved, the deed was to be made to him October 14 of the same year and left in escrow with the First
The other part of said agreement was embodied in a somewhat similar writing binding defendant to convey to plaintiff the east half of section 26 and the east half of section 35, all in township 15, range 47, in Cheyenne coimty, the deed or deeds to be made and deposited in the First National Bank of Fremont on the same date that required the deposit by plaintiff — October 14, 1907 — together with an abstract of defendant’s title thereto, showing perfect title. If, upon examination of plaintiff’s land by defendant, he approved the sale or exchange, the $1,600 note executed by plaintiff to defendant was to be retained by defendant, and the deeds delivered, otherwise the note was to be returned to plaintiff; but, in case plaintiff failed to comply Avith the agreement, the $1,600 should be forfeited to defendant. These two writings were evidently intended to embody one agreement and should be so
It is alleged that it was expressly agreed and understood between the parties that the promissory note signed by plaintiff should not become effective and binding until plaintiff’s real estate had been inspected by defendant, and the contract approved by him, after his examination, and the contract and note signed by the wife of plaintiff; that neither the written contract nor note was ever in fact delivered; that they were never assented to and signed by plaintiff’s wife, nor was the agreement ratified by defendant, and the transaction was rescinded and revoked by plaintiff; that plaintiff is a married man, the head of a family, and that his exempt homestead is included in the land owned by him and described in said agreement; that' in violation of the termsi and conditions of the agreement defendant had unlawfully, wrongfully and fraudulently caused the written agreement to be filed and recorded in the records of the register of deeds of Antelope county on the 18th day of October, 1907, and entered on the numerical index of said county, by which a cloud had been cast upon plaintiff’s title, and had as wrongfully and fraudulently sold and transferred the $1,600 note to the Farmers State Bank of Plainview, Nebraska, which claimed to.be an innocent purchaser thereof, and that the First National Bank of Fremont claimed to have some interest in said note, but it is alleged that such banks had knowledge of the invalidity of the note before they obtained it; that on the 14th day of October the defendant was not the owner of the land which he had contracted to convey to plaintiff, and did not leave in escrow with the First National Bank of Fremont a warranty deed conveying the land to plaintiff, nor did he furnish an abstract of the title thereto, or to any part thereof. The prayer of the petition is for the cancelation of the written agreement and promissory note; that defendant be adjudged to have no interest in plaintiff’s real estate; that plaintiff’s title thereto be quieted';
Defendant Tate answered, objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. He also disclaimed any interest, lien or claim upon the land either at the time of answering or the commencement of the suit. He presented as a plea in abatement the pendency of a suit instituted in Cheyenne county by him against plaintiff, which, he alleged, involved the same subject matter, but which, upon a special appearance by plaintiff herein, who was defendant in said action, was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and from which judgment defendant had appealed to the supreme court, where the action was still pending. Defendant further answered, without waiving the objection to jurisdiction or plea in abatement, admitting the execution of the agreement and note, alleging their unconditional delivery, denying that any of the papers were to be signed by the wife of plaintiff, alleging that the contract was approved by him, and denying that the agreement was revoked by plaintiff. The averments that plaintiff is a married man, and that a portion of his land, described in.the contract, was his homestead, are admitted, as also the recording of the agreement for the sale of the land, that the $1,600 note was sold to the Farmers State Bank of Plainview, and that the defendant the First National Bank of Fremont owns said note. It is alleged that on the 14th day of October, 1907, defendant was the actual owner of the land in Cheyenne county described in the contract, and that a deed thereto was executed by defendant and wife and deposited in the First National Bank of Fremont.
The First National Bank of Fremont filed its answer and cross-petition, which, in part, is practically a repetition of the contents of the answer of defendant Tate, which is followed by what we may term an action on the $1,600 note held by the bank, which is alleged to have been purchased in good faith, for value before maturity, and without notice or knowledge that any defense thereto was claimed by plaintiff; and the prayer is for judgment against plaintiff for the amount thereof, including interest.
On the 3d day of May, 1930, the findings and decree were entered in favor of plaintiff De Ette Rakow, as administratrix, in which the facts as found by the court were set out, including the homestead character of plaintiff’s land; that no part of the agreement was signed by the wife, nor was any part thereof acknowledged by either husband or wife; that on September 20, 1909, defendant examined plaintiff’s land, when he declared that unless plaintiff reduced the price of his land $2.50 an acre there was no deal, whereupon plaintiff informed defendant that he “would call the deal off,” and requested the return of his note; that defendant Tate did not on said day approve of the land, nor agree to take the land upon the terms prescribed in the agreement; that on that day, without the knowledge or consent of Rakow, defendant sold and indorsed the note for value to the Farmers State Bank of Plainview, which purchased the same in the ordinary course of business and without notice of any defense thereto; that on October 14, 1907, Tate and wife executed a deed to Rakow of the Ohevenne county land, and deposited it in the First National Bank of Fremont, but that at that time he was not the owner in fee of said land, and no conveyance thereof was made to him until Ocober 23, 1907, which was delivered to Tate and recorded in the deed records of Cheyenne county April 3, 1908; that on November 21, 1907, the Union Pacific Railroad Company executed
The conclusions of law are quite elaborate, and will not be here set out. They are, in substance and effect, that the completion of the agreement of September 14, 1907, was made to depend upon the examination of the Antelope county land and approval of the deal by Tate before October 14, 1907, and if he refused to accept the proposition the note referred to was to be void; that on September 20, 1907, Tate examined the land and rejected the proposition contained in the agreement; that at that time Rakow declared the contract at an end and demanded the return of the note which he had signed; that by the action of the parties the contract was then annulled and. terminated, and could not be enforced by either party, and Tate had no power or right to forfeit the $1,600 note; that the written agreement, so far as it affected the homestead of Rakow1 — the southwest quarter of section 14 — was null
The defenses pleaded will be noticed in the order in which they are presented. The contention that the court Avas without jurisdiction contains no merit. The contract on the part of Rakow was recorded by Tate in Antelope county and constituted a cloud upon the title to Rakow’s land, and no cautious purchaser would have bought it with that record against it uncanceled. Had Tate caused the cancelation of the record thereof at any time before the beginning of this suit, there would be reason for the contention of no jurisdiction, but he failed to do this. The public records are for the purpose of giving notice of the interests in or ownership of the land to be affected thereby. This recorded contract gave notice to the world of defendant’s claimed interest in the land, and to that extent apparently affected Rakow’s title, and he was entitled to have it canceled, either by Tate, or by his authority, or by a court of equity.
The contention that the agreement was of no force does not apply, as the proof of the invalidity of the record Avould have to be made dehors the record, and, until attacked by an equitable proceeding and canceled by a decree, it implied just what it said. Corey v. Schuster, Hingston & Co., 44 Neb. 269; Smith v. Neufeld, 57 Neb. 660; Sanxay v. Hunger, 42 Ind. 44.
The action to quiet title must be brought in the county where the land to be affected is situated. Code, sec. 51,
It is insisted, however, that, the court erred in rendering judgment against Tate for the amount of the note, which he had sold, and for which the judgment in favor of the Fremont National Bank was rendered against Rakow’s estate. The giving of the note, whether delivered or not, inhered in and was a part of the main transaction. By the action of Tate in terminating the contract on the 20th of September the note became the property of Rakow, and he was entitled to its surrender. Instead of so doing, the defendant sold it, and thereby created a liability against Rakow where none would have existed had not the note been transferred to innocent purchasers. It is a well-settled rule that, where a court of equity obtains jurisdiction of a cause, it will retain it until all questions involved in the case are adjudicated, doing complete justice between the parties. This rule applied fully justified the settlement of all controversies growing out of the main case between the parties, and there was no error in this action of the court. By the sale and transfer of the note to innocent purchasers, thereby creating a liability against Rakow, where none existed before, defendant created a liability against himself in favor of Rakow, and it was entirely proper to adjudicate all questions growing out of the contract.
A plea in abatement was presented and overruled, and of which ruling complaint is made. This subject will be briefly noticed. The final decision of the case mentioned in the plea was rendered by this court on the 21st of May, 1909 (Tate v. Rakow, 84 Neb. 459), where it was held that the district court for Cheyenne county never obtained jurisdiction over Rakow, and affirming the judgment of that court. Aside from the question of the
It is claimed that the findings and decree are not sustained by the evidence and contrary thereto. We do not so view it. The evidence is conflicting on the material parts in the case. The written agreement provides that, if defendant did not approve the purchase of the Rakow land after inspecting it, the note was to be returned to Rakow, and the contract abandoned. He inspected the land September 20, 1907 — one week after signing the agreement. The evidence is clear that, upon the examination, he sought to have the agreed price reduced. Rakow testified that, defendant insisted upon it, and declined to proceed with the trade unless upon the reduction, and declined to perfect the deal, and that after defendant’s ‘declination Rakow notified defendant of his refusal to consider it further, and demanded the posession of the note. He also testified that the note was never delivered to defendant, but that it was agreed he might hold it, as custodian, until it was finally decided as to whether they would carry out the agreement or not, and if that were done defendant should retain the note; if not, it was to be returned to Rakow. True, defendant and another testified to the contrary; but viewing all the circumstances, as shown, we incline to the conclusion adopted by the district court. The note was sold to the Plainview bank on the same day that the defendant inspected the land, and, as alleged and testified to by Rakow, refused to proceed with the contract unless Rakow would reduce the contract price $2.50 an acre. Defendant failed to furnish an abstract of the title to the Cheyenne county
We have examined the transcript and bill of exceptions with care, and can see no sufficient reason Avhy the decision of the district court should be reversed. It is therefore
Affirmed.