*1 A91A0266.RAJAPPA
Andrews, Rajappa the misde- a bench was convicted to a officer violation a false name meanor offense appeals. 16-10-25, which she gen- first We address grounds. trial, that on June At Dodson testified eral responded $1,300 had mailed a 911 call from a man who she to a County payment an airline ticket he check to a DeKalb address agency, travel but had not from the “Padmini International” ordered received the ticket. caller, given by the Officer Dodson went to the address Highway. apartment on Buford When a to be an teenage girl Dodson asked to see Padmini answered girl, Balakri, Rajappa. Shnan re- Officer Dodson testified sponded Rajappa, mother, in Florida would return her that Dodson, and Biumi arrived to assist Officer
Officer Scott for, obtained, to enter the Balakri’s consent asked present. The officers observed that the mother was not make certain living Rajappa eight sitting room and found six or adults response bathroom. Officer query, Rajappa her name was “Mini Vankat.” Dodson testified stated palm Rajappa of her hand after that she wrote the name Rajappa spelled her thаt aunt. Balakri asserted Rajappa told the When first asked Upon just had none. continued from out of town and she had questioning arrived Rajappa, acknowledged that her name was Padmini produced Georgia name, аnd admitted license under that driver’s daughter. he under- was her Officer Biumi testified although Rajappa he stood acknowledged that her name was appeared “Mini,” and that she that she could have said to understand. nervous and wаs a little difficult given Rajappa trial, “Padmini,” her name is At the testified given only explained first names and use India women are husbands as their last the first names of either their fathers divorced, her she uses father’s names. She testified that since she is Rajappa,” name, name, and that she as a last first uses understood the officers to be rather than for “Padmini “Venkateswara Rajappa as nickname. stated that “Mini” asking for Padmini Travel owner” “the why Rajappа,” an- and that was appellant’s mother, who swered that the owner was Florida because Rajappa Florida, that she told the testified lives owns the business. Venkateswara,” but that when officers that her name was “Padmini people explained difficulty understanding often “Mini,” which called her observed Officer Dodson Rajappa in her spelled write hand. stated that for the officers “Venkat,” the second name of a shortened version of the namе she uses as and which she testified had the same meaning as the full name of “Venkateswara.” stated that she had re- prior day, delayed turned India the and that she her iden- *2 only tification the officers because she had to for her hand- search bag. She testified that after she learned of the travel customer’s complaint, he was issued a ticket
2. There was sufficient here evidence Court to find Rajappa guilty giving police of a name to a OCGA false under a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. § (99 (1979). First, Rajappa’s testimony working revealed she was on a doctorate thesis at Vanderbilt English, had degree received an E.D.S. from Tennessee Middle State University, undergraduate degrеes two colleges. held from Indian background Her educational indicated she was familiar with the customs of the United States.
Additionally, Rajappa’s behavior police when the arrived at her home of supported finding guilt. Thе investigating officers testi- house, fied that when hiding arrived at was her, bathroom. When the represented found as herself daughter’s aunt and herself identified as “Mini Venkateswara.” When produce asked to Rajappa denied that shе had identifi- cation, which later to be untrue. She later showed the a bearing driver’s license the name “Padmini Rajappa” and admitted that was her name.
Although Rajappa explanation had an a different name pоlice, problematic. When the Court asked “Venkateswara,” her to write misspelled out the name the name misspelled and did not notice that until fact Furthermore, brought attention. stated that the did her; not ask specifically “[t]hey she claimed did not Rajappa, my name.” The question of whether Rajappa can of guilty false name when Indian has custom she both specifically last has been Georgia, although names addressed in similar situation Johnson v. Ga. arose In that this court held that was suffi- there jury’s cient guilty evidence sustain the verdict of of giving a false name, since the name which the defendant officers was certificate, security card, not the name on his birth social оr driver’s license. same result is dictated here. “person gives 16-10-25 states that a who a false name or
address to a law discharge enforcement officer the lawful his offi- of identify cial duties with misleading the intent of the officer as to his “intent requirement statute’s guilty . of the offense. The . (See Doug- Rajappa’s guilt the element critical here. to deceive” 98) (1990), las v. which the his name he lied to the officer about that the defendant conviction.) Regardless sufficient evidence to sustain recognized Indian custom “Venkateswara” ample there was evidence which the Court Padmini’s police by giving meant to have concluded deceive that name. error, separatе In a Padmini contends acting in convicting
trial court erred her since the officers were unlawfully discharge in that had no war- duties and the of her search for the search rant invalid. mi- authority person, is a The law a third nor, to a warrantless search establishes this determi- to consent case basis. Atkins is made on a case nation 388) (1984), remanded, aff’d and consenting to search person “In has cases where mi- eighteen, have measured the not attained the courts *3 by examining control the area searched whether the minor nor’s over premises, the to lived on access the thereto; premises and to invite others the minor the age he or to expected at which shе could be exercise at least discretion; reasonably believing minimal and whether officers acted premises give that the minor had over sufficient control valid Atkins, 9, Indeed, supra, “an search.” Ga. analysis relationship of these factors will indicate the minor’s premises sought inspected, or effect which the fundamental Atkins, any party supra, third consideration consent search.” Ga. 642. Rajappa’s daughter’s find consent was suffi- we apartment. entry Balakri lived on the
cient to authorize the into 15, expected premises age and at she could be at at an Although at minimal her mother denied at to exercise least discretion. premises, the fact equal exеrcised control over out of town that Balakri indicated to the her mother was ex- charge indicated that she and that of the over apartment. control Balakri’s control erted the over adults in could also be infеrred the fact that the apartment, allowed see made no to assist interview and effort conduct reasonably assuming that Balakri had officers acted authority to search. premises give them sufficient control ovеr Therefore, presence Rajappa’s apartment officer’s ruling. unlawful and the trial court did not err Judgment Beasley Carley, Pope, JJ., con- Cooper, affirmed. J., J., Banke, J., Sognier, Birdsong, P. cur. C. P. J., P. dissent. Judge, Chief dissenting.
Sognier,
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with that thе evidence adduced at trial was not beyond sufficient establish a violation of OCGA 16-10-25 a rea satisfy sonable doubt so the standard set forth in Jackson v. The accu charged appellant violating sation issued this case with OCGA § by giving of “Nini I оfficers name Vankat.” find the State did not establish the falsely essential element of stating appel name of Vankat” Officer because lant said name was “Mini Biumi testified could have said either “Nini” or “Mini” Vankat. Ac (1) Preston v. cord Fur ther, given difficulty appel the officers’ admitted understanding statements; lant’s acknowledged inability speak or read appellant’s language; appellant’s native unchallenged testimony con cerning the difference in customs between “first” and names in “last” India; considering the United States and similarity the obvious between nickname and what she as the shortened (which version of last she testified had the meaning same name) language as the full and the name Offiсer Dodson testified them, cannot conclude that rational trier could have found the essential element of intent to deceive Jackson, supra 319; reasonable doubt. see generally at Teston v. disagree with the majority’s Douglas reliance on
98) (1990) on intent deceive because that case the *4 subsequently defendant arresting false name to the officers, appellant whereas here insisted the name she cor logical explanation rect and support her claim. Johnson v. State, 889) (1979) 149 Ga. similarly distin guishable because unlike in the judice, case sub the defend ant Johnson gave police a name that similar remotely was not on and he no made for discrepancy. reasons,
For these judgment would reverse the trial court. am authorized Presiding Judge to state that Presid- Banke, ing Judge Presiding Birdsong Judge join this dissent. July 9, 1991.
Decided appellant. McDonnell, H. Robert Bergman, Gary Ralph Howard, Solicitor, Bowden, Jr., D. T. Cliff appellee. Solicitors, for Assistant FORD v. A91A0340. 166) Carlеy, selling
Appellant and one two counts of cocaine was indicted for jury marijuana. selling and, called for dur- The case was count question: attempted following ing dire, to ask the his counsel voir drug you or close friend who’s ever “[D]o have a relative ques- sponte, problem?” court, ruled that this The trial sua alcohol except Appellant’s counsel did not tion could not be asked. ruling jury returned and moved on. The the trial court but thanked appeals judgments guilt convic- verdicts of tion and by the trial court. sentences entered thereon relates to the trial court’s refusal enumeration of error The sole above-quoted question In be asked on voir dire. to allоw the refusing, judge “Although dire, on voir the trial trial court erred. impermissible, questions [cit.], are has discretion to determine permit appellant’s court the instant case the failure of the trial [question] its discre- was an abuse of ask thе above stated counsel to (1) (299 Craig v. 165 Ga. tion.” Accordingly, ultimately depen- appeal disposition of the instant sponte upon rul- trial court’s sua to assert the dent ing appellate preserved for review. as error was question objected and the trial court had If to the the State had required objection, not would have been sustained that pre- ruling any subsequent exception court’s so as to the trial make appeal. ruling is, on “Therе enumerate that as error serve the except Georgia longer any requirement course, that counsel no preserve by ruling the trial court order to an adverse (4) (341 appeal. [Cits.]” Stone v. App. 362, See also Richards ruling (4) (206 the adverse In the instant prompted by objection. effect, court, in inter- The trial the State’s not posed question. objection However, there and sustained its own exception subsequent logic holding that a is no reason law or prompted ruling necessary the adverse when would ruling objection, when the adverse would be State’s but sponte. event, issue has either the trial court sua made