Rajappa v. StateRajappa v. State
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- Before:
- Andrews
Lead Opinion
Padmini Rajappa was convicted in a bench trial of the misdemeanor offense of giving a false name to a police officer in violation of
1. We first address appellant’s enumeration concerning the general grounds. At trial, police officer Dodson testified that on June 18, 1990, she responded to a 911 call from a man who had mailed a $1,300 check to a DeKalb County address in payment for an airline ticket he ordered from the “Padmini International” travel agency, but had not received the ticket. Officer Dodson went to the address given by the caller, which proved to be an apartment on Buford Highway. When a teenage girl answered the door, Officer Dodson asked to see Padmini Rajappa. Officer Dodson testified that the girl, Shnan Balakri, responded that Rajappa, her mother, was in Florida and would return the next day.
Officer Scott Biumi arrived to assist Officer Dodson, and they asked for, and obtained, Balakri’s consent to enter the apartment to make certain that the mother was not present. The officers observed six or eight adults sitting in the living room аnd found Rajappa in the apartment bathroom. Officer Dodson testified that in response to her query, Rajappa stated her name was “Mini Vankat.” Dodson testified that she wrote the name in the palm of her hаnd after Rajappa spelled it for her. Balakri asserted that Rajappa was her aunt.
When first asked for identification, Rajappa told the police that she had just arrived from out of town and had nonе. Upon continued questioning she acknowledged that her name was Padmini Rajappa, produced a Georgia driver’s license under that name, and admitted that Balakri was her daughter. Officer Biumi testified that he understood Rajappa to say that her name was “Nini Vankat,” although he acknowledged that she could have said “Mini,” and that she appeared nervous and was a little difficult to understand.
At the trial, Rajappa testifiеd that her given name is “Padmini,” and explained that in India women are given only first names and use the first names of either their fathers or their husbands as their last names. She testified that since she is divorced, she uses her father’s first name, “Venkateswara Rajappa,” as a last name, and that she uses “Mini” as a nickname. Rajappa stated that she and her daughter understood the officers to be asking for “the Padmini Travel owner” rather than for “Pаdmini Rajappa,” and that was why Balakri answered that the owner was in Florida because appellant’s mother, who lives in Florida, owns the business. Rajappa testified that she told the officers that her name was “Padmini Venkateswara,” but that when they had difficulty understanding her she explained that people often *373called her “Mini,” which is the name she observed Officer Dodson write in her hand. Rajappa stated that she also spelled for the officers the second name of “Venkat,” a shortened version of the name she uses as her last name, and which she testified had the same meaning as the full name of “Venkateswara.” Rajappа stated that she had returned from India the prior day, and that she delayed giving her identification to the officers only because she had to search for her handbag. She also testified that after she learned of thе travel customer’s complaint, he was issued a ticket the next day.
2. There was sufficient evidence here for the Court to find Rajappa guilty of giving a false name to a police officer under
Additionally, Rajappa’s behavior when the police arrived at her home supported the finding of guilt. The investigating officers testified that when they arrived at her house, Rajappa was hiding in the bathroom. When the police found her, she represented herself as her daughter’s aunt and identified herself as “Mini Venkateswara.” When asked to produce identification, Rajappa denied that she had identification, which later proved to be untrue. She later showed the police a driver’s license bearing the name “Padmini Rajappa” and аdmitted that was her name.
Although Rajappa had an explanation for giving a different name to the police, the explanation was problematic. When the Court asked her to write out the name “Venkateswara,” she misspelled the name and did not notice that she had misspelled it until this fact was brought to her attention. Furthermore, she stated that the police did not ask specifically for her; she claimed that “[t]hey did not say Padmini Rajappa, my name.” The question of whether Rajappa can be guilty of giving a false name when by Indian custom she has both last names has not been specifically addressed in Georgia, although a similar situаtion arose in Johnson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 273 (253 SE2d 889) (1979). In that case, this court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict of guilty of giving a false name, since the name which the defendant gave the police officers was not the name on his birth certificate, social security card, or driver’s license. The same result is dictated here.
3. In a separate enumeration of error, Padmini contends that the trial court erred in convicting her since the police officers were acting unlawfully in the discharge of their duties in that they had no warrant for the search and the consent of her minor daughter to search thе apartment was invalid.
The law concerning the authority of a third person, who is a minor, to consent to a warrantless search establishes that this determination is made on a case by case basis. Atkins v. State, 173 Ga. App. 9 (325 SE2d 388) (1984), aff’d and remanded, 254 Ga. 641 (331 SE2d 597) (1985). “In cases whеre the person consenting to the search has not attained the age of eighteen, the courts have measured the minor’s control over the area searched by examining whether the minor lived on the рremises, whether the minor had a right of access to the premises and the right to invite others thereto; whether the minor was of an age at which he or she could be expected to exercise at least minimаl discretion; and whether officers acted reasonably in believing that the minor had sufficient control over the premises to give a valid consent to search.” Atkins, supra, 173 Ga. App. 9, 11. Indeed, “an analysis of these factors will indicatе the minor’s relationship to the premises or effect sought to be inspected, which is the fundamental consideration in any third party consent search.” Atkins, supra, 254 Ga. 642.
In this case, we find that Rajappa’s daughter’s consent was sufficient to authorize the entry into the apartment. Balakri lived on the premises and at age 15, was at an age at which she could be expected to exercise at least minimal discretion. Although her mother denied at trial that Balakri exercised equal control over the premises, the fact that Balakri indicated to the police that her mother was out of town and that she was in charge of the apartment indiсated that she exerted the necessary control over the apartment. Balakri’s control over the apartment could also be inferred from the fact that the adults in the apartment, who the police could see from the door, allowed Balakri to conduct the police interview and made no effort to assist her.
The police officers acted reasonably in assuming that Balakri had sufficient control over the premises to give them authority to search. *375Therefore, the police officer’s presence in Rajappa’s apartment was not unlawful and the trial court did not err in so ruling.
Judgment affirmed.
Carley, Pope, Beasley and Cooper, JJ., concur. Sognier, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., and Birdsong, P. J., dissent.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with appellant that the evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to establish a violation of
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Presiding Judge Banke, and Presiding Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.