*1
physician performed
dangerous
to cases
where
dentist
operation
dangerous
or used a
method of
treatment
informing
patient
other,
hazardous,
less
treatment
(See Vigneault
Co.,
was available.
v. Dr. Hewson Dental
185,
For the I would affirm the reasons Respondent’s petition rehearing for a was denied June Carter, J., rehearing. 1951. voted for a May F. No. 18068. In Bank.
[S. 1951.] RAINS, A. Appellant, FLOYD v. COUNTY OF CONTRA al., Respondents.
COSTA et *2 Appellant. for Henry C. Todd & Todd and Todd Attorney, and Charles Hem- District Collins, Francis W. Respondents. Attorney, for Deputy District mings, suing taxpayer, to Plaintiff, as seeks GIBSON, C. J. County paying Costa enjoin officials of Contra certain certifying appointment of, defendant to, or compensation county hospital, and to Degnan as medical director and the medical director ordinance, an which removed have Judgment declared invalid. was service, from civil others plaintiff appealed. has defendants, for and entered supervisors adopted ordinance May, In the hoard of employees pur- establishing a 325 merit Enabling Act, sections County Civil suant to Service now Code. All were 31100-31113 of Government except officials, thereby placed elected under of commis- county institutions, of members casual serving compensation, and certain persons without sions, by employed and district investigators and others the sheriff hy enabling attorney. required act, ordi- Thereafter, by and ratified of nance 325 submitted to electors was it could be amended county. provided The ordinance approval by by supervisors without a four-fifths vote repealing that “no amendment this Ordinance people, but proposition repeal of its be effective unless the shall shall by approved electors and first have been submitted” to the majority vote. supervisors adopted ordi- vote,
In four-fifths by including in the nance 471 which amended ordinance county hospital exempt categories the director of the medical county. surgeons serving the Defend- physicians and all and appointed Degnan, medicine, ant a doctor was thereafter being required a civil medical director without to take payment examination, plaintiff prevent and seeks and claiming ordinance 471 is invalid salary, his ineffective. principal is whether ordinance 471 meaning provision within the
amounts approved no shall effective until This refers the voters. to both amendment and repeal, appears and it that the clear intent of the ordinance supervisors deprive is to or sub stantially impair approval the civil service voters, permit time supervisors but at the same changes amend the ordinance make such and modifica impairment tions as would not constitute substantial general is in accord with the definitions of repeal ordinarily terms, rescission, revocation, since means abrogation destruction, or whereas involves modifi change, addition, taking away alteration or (Webster’s cation. New Dict.; Internat. 3 Words Phrases, 319-321; Phrases, 5-6.) Words
In this case ordinance 471 removed from civil service a employees consisting class of the medical doctors serving county. type work done men, medical the times and hours when such work must be done, possible obtaining difficulties in medical men in that for civil general positions, scarcity *3 service the doctors, many of and may other factors have supervisors influenced the to con clude that the a whole would work as more efficiently, county and this greater that the would derive benefits, if professional group were excluded. opin While differ advisability ions as to the bringing of retaining certain of kinds under experience civil service, adding demonstrate the wisdom of certain classes or eliminating others, and here language both the and general purpose of ordinance are permit consistent with ting degree elasticity. some The record does not part indicate that ordinance 471 was of an attempt system by piecemeal the civil service amendment, and we say any cannot that there impairment. was substantial Accordingly, it must supervisors be held that the power had adopt ordinance 471 and that it was a repeal not within meaning of ordinance 325. by plaintiff
Other contentions made are without substantial merit and need not be discussed. Likewise, in view of our determination that ordinance was a valid amendment of pass ordinance we need not on the further supervisors whether could limit their to take future by ordinance 325 the manner specifying in action legislative might modified or in it be judgment is affirmed.
The Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Edmonds, J., Shenk, J., J., Spence, concurred. Code, (Gov. statute I dissent. Pursuant
CARTER, J. Costa supervisors of Contra seq.) board of 31100 et § County passed and detailed outlining complete a an ordinance It was submitted county employees. plan civil service by required by voters approved to and that a 31105). It contains (Gov. Code, the statute § supervisors (1) by four-fifths vote it be a amended (2) “but people, submitting the same to vote without approved unless repealing” effective no amendment it shall be supervisors amended people. Nevertheless the removing group ordinance placing them provisions its civil who were within submitting category exempt in- it whether was question is, therefore, to the voters. substantially that could tended the civil service impaired approval people. without the subject clear with is provision expressly dealing this says, seen, (1) It the ordinance enough. as above repealing it board, no amendment (2) be amended but reasonable approved by people. is valid not unless say part repeal the second amendment —refers — entirety by meas- only in its one repeal distinguished part for the first it, ure from a authority men- part supervisors to amend—also —the tions an amendment of the ordinance rather than super- supposed of or a not to be thereof. could not amend amended visors the ordinance unless was (1) toto. Therefore read: The board should (2) re- any part amend it or thereof but no amendment pealing it or a approved thereof is valid unless people. reading interpretation, Under the literal *4 ordinance, adopt alone could no amendment repealing part which had the effect impliedly omission of material or which additions would parts. literally If provision other the involved is read no except by means that amendment could be made the except way voters one which in any part no altered the wording part of the second That follows ordinance. repealing that no amendment the ordinance ‘‘ recognizes amend- may passed be the board. That that an portion of it al- may, effect, ment” of a statute though purport so, not for if the it does to do part portion amended, part such omits of the content of the re- Thus no amendment which has the effect of any may passed hy pealing the ordinance he hoard. only The board could add to the ordinance in fashion such any existing change that the effect would be not to the then necessary go contents of ordinance. It is not that far may parts appear however. be said two to be inconsistent on their face but must be harmonized order give possible. suggests effect to each as far parts should two be construed mean under the part, any first board alone amend the long impair thereof so the amendment does not system- heart of the alter ordinance. —-the procedural many matters and other details of which are there changes make purpose which further main only ordinance. Under the part, second make voters changes impair or tend to main thesis— system county a civil service employees. for many There are eompellingly persuasive factors which are foregoing for the First, construction. the ordinance recites adopted it is “in order equitable to establish an procedure uniform dealing through for personnel with matters a Civil Service Commission, place County employment and to on a merit basis purpose for the obtaining highest effi- ciency assuring qualified that the best persons available brought shall be into the County, service of the ...” It sets up a detailed scheme regular “All system shall be included in hereby adopted. merit added.) ...” only (Italics exceptions are elected offi- cials, commission special employees. members and Thus the principle vital that all with exceptions protected by are civil service tenure.
Second, civil laws liberally, should be construed to the end that preserved shall and a return spoils (Steen avoided. v. Board Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d P.2d Allen McKinley, [160 18 Cal.2d 342]; Almassy P.2d Angeles County v. Los Com., Civil Service 34 Cal.2d P.2d Thus *5 268 majority may though interpretation plausi- of the he
even above should be followed because other- ble, the one set forth system jeopardy. put is in whole wise the exempt group board one Third, if the com- power its it system, has within to from the it it away system by exemption pletely. It whittle at by ordinance, though process, group group, ordinance in- day. Thereby accomplish adopted on the same directly destroy in one directly it cannot do what — Certainly people pass upon right to fell stroke. lightly majority to The is not be so brushed aside. issue least, this could not be holds, implication at that opinion done; this court would strike down such action. say legal could arrive at upon what basis it such does not If power. one of the board has is conclusion. by exempting power group ordinance one to amend the employees from then there is no rule of law exempt proceed all em- limiting group. to reach piecemeal, in ordinance or result ployees one group by group, ordinance ordinance. substantially majority that the board could not holds wholly is position That
impair the civil service premise majority opinion major inconsistent with the power has nothing majority in is Under the view there amendment. places any limitation on the board. ordinance such has in breath that the board It is said one next that such cannot be amendment and majority say if But the does not done too much is conjecture left for future much too much. how speculation. requirement people—
Fourth, viewing
vote
pro
referendum
an initiative or
second
—either
provisions are to
vision,
applied that such
the rule must be
liberally
right
people
preserve
to the
construed to
87,
(Perry
Jordan,
v.
34 Cal.2d
91
on such measures.
vote
47]; Gage
Jordan,
v.
[S. 1951.] al., Respondents, MATEO HOMER A. NORRIS et v. SAN (a Corporation), TITLE Defend COUNTY COMPANY Appellants. EMIL al., ant J. RIBARSKY et