78 Miss. 308 | Miss. | 1900
delivered the opinion of the court.
It seems to be settled in this* state that a county is not ordinarily liable to suit except in cases provided for by law. This exemption is placed upon the ground that a county is a governmental agency, created for local purposes, and in this regard it partakes of the immunity of the state itself. The only question before us is whether the declaration states a cause of action against Hinds county. A county, with us, has certain prerogatives and judicial powers, and with respect to the exercise of such powers it may not ordinarily be sued. But a county is also, for many purposes, a corporation. It is a political entity distinct from the several inhabitants that compose it, and a judgment against it is not levied, as at common law, upon the property of a single individual (Russell v. Devon Co., 2 Term R., 667), but is paid by a tax levied upon all the taxable property of the county, in conformity with law. Our laws provide that a county may hold property, may sue and be sued, etc.; and in these respects it is a corporation, or at least is clothed with corporate functions in relation to such subjects. It is expressly provided in the constitution of the state (section 17) that “ private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use except on due compensation being first made to the owner thereof. ” Except on compensation first made, private property shall not be taken by whom ? Manifestly, neither by the state nor any subdivision of it, nor by any corporation or
In Herman v. City of Vicksburg, 72 Miss., 211, s.c. 16 South., 434, it appears that the lots of Herman, when purchased by him, were on a level with the street adjacent to 'them, and that nine years thereafter the city, in making a new grade for the street, made, abutting the property, a deep cut of some fifteen feet, which caused the inconvenience complained of; and it was there held that the making of the cut was a damage not compensated to the plaintiff or to his predecessors in the title to the property when the street was first opened. In respect to the city the right to improve its streets by change of grade was held to be a continuing right, which might be exercised repeatedly according to the needs of the public. In our opinion a county has power, equal to that of a city, to grade and improve its roads to suit the needs of its increasing and advancing population; and, if so, it must exercise the right under like restrictions. That a county has such power seems a reasonable conclusion from the nature and character of the subject-matter, and from the constitutional and statutory provisions of law touching the subject. The full jurisdiction of boards of supervisors over roads is quite a limited power, if, when roads.are once laid out and 'opened, they must forever
Reversed and remanded.