73 F. 389 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Pennsylvania | 1896
On March 15, 1895, W. J. Rainey, a citizen of the state of Ohio, and owner of an undivided one-third of a tract of land containing from six to seven hundred acres, situate in Fayette county, Penn., and known as the “Beeson Farm,’’ filed a bill in equity, for partition, against tbe H. C. Frick Coke Company, a corporation of the state of Pennsylvania, owner of the remaining two-thirds. On May 6, 1895, the company filed its answer, conceding complainant’s right to demand partition. The land is underlaid with Connelsville coking coal. Adjoining the land on the south is a tract owned by'Mr. Rainey, and on which are located his Mt. Braddock mine and coke ovens. Subsequent to the filing of the bill, Mr. Rainey, without asking leave of this court, extended flat heading No. 11 of his Mt. Braddock slope across the division line, and into the Beeson land, and has since mined coal from the same, taking it to the surface through the said slope. On March 11, 1896, the company filed a cross bill praying an injunction to restrain said mining. The bill alleged Mr. Raiuey had in February, 1893, begun a proceeding for partition of the same land in the court of common pleas of Fayette county, and, after much testimony taken on both sides, had discontinued the same, by leave of court; and this is alleged to have been done in bad faith; and the same day he filed the present bill. The cross bill also alleged tbe coal constituted the principal value of the land; that the mining of it was causing irreparable injury to the company, in its part ownership, and tended to reduce tbe value of the balance of the coal iu the tract; that the dip of the vein was such that the water from the Mt. Braddock mine would drain into the Beeson coal; .that, owing to the presence of gas'in the old and abandoned portions of the Mt. Braddock mine, there would be great danger iu subsequently mining tbe Beeson coal from an opening made on that farm, unless protecting pillars of an otherwise needlessly large size, and of an irregular contour, to correspond to the operations of Mr. Rainey, were left as a protection against water and gas. It also alleged Mr. Rainey’s plan of mining was made with' sole reference to taking out the coal through the Mt. Braddock slope, and was inconsistent with a plan for taking it out through an opening made on the Beeson farm. The answer of Mr. Rainey denies bad faith in the former partition; asserts his right as a tenant in common to mine the coal; denies his operations will flood the Beeson coal, or endanger subsequent mining
The issues formed bring us face to face with the question whether a court of equity which has assumed jurisdiction to partition land, the substantial value of which is in unopened coal, has power, pending its partition, to preserve the property by enjoining one tenant 'in common, on complaint of his fellow, from mining the coal through an entry from an adjoining tract owned by the latter. The right of the tenant to so mine, and the consequent lack of power in the court Co prevent it, are broadly asserted in this case, and the question thus presented is of a novel and important character. In the absence of prior adjudications, its solution would seem clear, in the light of certain fundamental legal and equitable principles. When Mr. Rainey invoked the jurisdiction of this court by his bill, he stated:
“That the enjoyment of said tract of land by your orator and his cotenant, the defendant, is subject to great inconveniences and difficulties, and that they have been unable to procure a partition thereof between themselves, according to their respective rights and interests, whereupon your orator needs equitable relief, and prays * * * that your honors decree that partition, be made of the above-described real estate between your orator and the defendants, according to their respective rights and interests.”
To the right of Mr. Rainey to demand partition the company has assented by its answer, with the added averment that, the principal value of the land being its coal, “partition thereof, in proportion to the interests of the plaintiff and defendants, cannot be made without prejudice to or spoiling the whole,” and praying “that said properly be disposed of otherwise, as a whole, according to law.” In addition to the court’s jurisdiction of their persons, all parties have, by their voluntary acts, brought the land itself within the control or jurisdiction of the court, for valuation, partition, allotment, or sale, as the proofs and law may hereafter seem to warrant. The proceeding, then, is in the nature of one in rein, in that the court is asked to make a decree directed against, and acting upon, the land itself. Where a court of equity has rightfully assumed jurisdiction of a principal subject-matter, it has power to dispose of all questions incidental to and arising out. of the principal subject of jurisdiction, and necessary to its proper settlement and disposition. See Winton’s Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 395; Allison’s Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 227; McGowin v. Remington, 12 Pa. St. 63; Souder’s Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 498; Socher's Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 615. And, in proceedings in partition, its scope is not narrowly restricted; “for,” as was said in 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 656b, “in ail cases of partition a court of equity does not act merely in a ministerial chara elm, and in obedience to the call of the parties who have a right to partition, but it founds itself upon its general jurisdiction as a court of equity, and administers its relief ex ;eqno et bono, according to its own notions of general justice and equity between the parties.” Moreover, if is clear that a court of equity has the power, and in a proper case will restrain the exercise of a legal rigid, where it is improperly e>r inequitably used. Rog. Mines, 795; Buckland v. Gibbins (1863) 32 Law