This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court holding respondent George B. Raines was not a “statutory employee” of appellant Gould, Inc. pursuant to the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act so as to bar his right to sue for damages arising out of a personal injury. We affirm.
Raines was injured while employed by a subcontractor to install an electrical system at a plant being constructed for Gould by a general contractor. Raines received workers’ comрensation benefits for his injury from the subcontractor and then brought this action seeking to recover damages. Gould objected to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and moved for an order of dismissal on the ground that, under certain provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, Raines was its statutory employee at the time of his injury, and for this reason, his exclusive remedy is for workers’ compensation benefits before the South Carolina Industrial Commission.
2
Raines moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that he was not a statutory employee of Gould
The resolution of the issue presented depends upon whether the work being performed by Raines was a part of the trade or business of Gould.
See Bighorn v. Nassau Recycle Corp.,
285 S. C. 200,
Ordinarily construction work, such as building a factory structure or making electrical installations, is considered outside the trade or business of a manufacturer. 1C A. Larson,
The Law of Workmen’s Compensation
§ 49.12, at 9-25 (1982);
see Penton v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
699 F. (2d) 737, 744 (5th Cir. 1983) (notwithstanding the fact that employees of a paper company had performed 177 projects of repair and modification during a previous four-year period, court held a modernization project was not a part of the company’s trade or business “with any degree of certitude”);
Murphy v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
628 F. (2d) 862 (5th Cir. 1980) (notwithstanding the fact that employees of a wood products company had previously constructed a project involving 100 workers, court held a much larger construction project involving 1500 workers which was too large for the capabilities of the company was not a part of its trade or business);
4
Wilson v. Duke Power Co.,
273 S. C.
If however a business by its size and nature is accustomed to carrying on a more or less ongoing program of construction, perhaps having a construction division, or has handled its own construction in the past, construction work delegated to a contractor may be considered a part of its trade or business. 1C A. Larson,
supra,
§ 49.12, at 9-29;
see Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co.,
190 S. C. 336,
Moreover, we have recently held that even work which a business might never perform with its own employees may be considered a part of its trade or business if the work is an integral part of its operation without which it cannot function.
Hairston v. Re: Leasing, Inc.,
286 S. C. 493,
Under the facts of the instant case, we hold the work being performed by Raines was not a part of the trade or business of Gould. The nature of its business, according to its application to transact business in South Carolina, is the “[mjanufacturing and selling [of] batteries of all kinds and related products.”
Although Gould has been involved with the construction of numerous facilities on property which it owns or leases and manages, the record does not indicate that it had a construction division or that any construction work was performed by its regular employees. Rather, the record indicаtes Gould merely “prepares the specific designs for certain parts of the facilities, or oversees such designs, approves engineering plans and, in some instances, provides supervisory personnel to provide generаl assistance in the contracting of the contractors and subcontractors and coordinating their activities.”
Furthermore, the record does not indicate the work being performed by Raines in constructing the plant for Gould was an integral part of its operations without which it cannot function. Every manufacturer must have a plant, but this fact alone does not make the work of constructing a plant a part of the trade or business of every manufacturer who engages a contractor to construct a plant. Otherwise, the employees of every contractor so engaged would be the statutory employees of every such manufacturer. We are aware of no case in any jurisdiction holding this and do nоt believe this is what the legislature intended when it enacted the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act.
For these reasons, the order of the Circuit Court is
Affirmed.
Notes
The provisions of the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act relied upon by Gould are codified as Section 42-1-130, 42-1-400, 42-1-420, and 42-1-540, Code of Laws оf South Carolina, 1976.
In oral argument before us, the parties also agreed that no further development of the facts was necessary to determine the issue presented. The record on appeal consists of the pleadings and nоtices of motion filed by the parties as well as documents and affidavits filed by them in support of their motions.
The United States Court of Appeals began its opinion by saying, “We journey today into the mysterious realm of Merlin, as we are faced with a valiant attempt at legal sleight of hand. Attorneys for defendants have used all the magic and abracadabras they could muster in order to change a paper manufacturing company into a construction company.” Murphy v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 628 F. (2d) 862, 863 (5th Cir. 1980). The court concluded by holding, “However, because we realize that the sleight of hand is ultimately mere illusion, we are not persuaded by the hocus pocus.” Id at 864. We find the real magic to be that performed by the Court of Appeals in publishing an interesting oрinion addressing this issue.
The Supreme Court of Vermont reasoned that to hold “a farmer who lets a contract to build a barn or corncrib on his premises is engaged in the business of contractor or builder” would be the same as holding “the business of the contractor while thus engaged is that of farming.”
See Packett v. Moretown Creamery Co.,
See Boseman v. Pacific Mills,
193 S. C. 479,
See Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co.,
190 S. C. 336, 361,
