169 Iowa 388 | Iowa | 1915
Prior to the accident in which plaintiff was injured, the defendant city had let a contract for- the construction of a sewer along the course of one of its streets known in the record as West Locust. The sewer had been
The petition charges the defendant with negligence in permitting the street to become and remain in the condition complained of and in failing to erect or maintain guards or barriers or warning lights to prevent injury therefrom to persons lawfully using the street. The allegations of the petition are denied by the answer. The issues' were tried to a jury and verdict returned Tor the defendant..
The jury having determined the fact issues adversely to the plaintiff, we have only to inquire whether the record discloses any error to his prejudice requiring a reversal of the judgment entered on the verdict. Bearing upon this propo
“1st. That he was injured by being thrown from a hack caused from an obstruction in said street, and that from such injuries damages resulted to him.
“2d. That the defendant city was negligent for permitting said obstruction to exist, and that said obstruction was a nuisance and caused plaintiff’s injury.
“3d. That plaintiff himself, at the time of the happening of the accident was guilty of no negligence on his part which contributed to his injury.
“It is incumbent upon plaintiff to establish and prove each of these three propositions by a preponderance of the credible evidence, and if he has failed to so establish and prove any one of these three propositions your verdict should be in favor of the defendant.”
In another paragraph the court said, “It is for you to determine from all of the evidence in this ease whether or not the carriage was overturned because of an obstruction in the street, and- whether or not such obstruction was a nuisance.” And again in the same paragraph, “In this case, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the obstruction in the street overturned the carriage and that such obstruction was a nuisance.”
These instructions cannot be approved. They clearly serve to impress upon and emphasize to the minds of the jury that plaintiff must not only prove that defendant was negligent with respect to the condition of the street, but must go farther and prove that such negligent condition constituted a nuisance — and this too without anywhere defining or ex
It is true the statute charges each city with the duty of keeping its streets free from nuisances, and still another statute makes the obstruction of a public highway an actionable nuisance. But these statutes do not attempt to define or measure the full duty which the law imposes upon every municipality with respect to its streets.- It is too thoroughly settled to require discussion or citation of authorities that the city is charged with the exercise of reasonable care to make and keep its streets free not only from defects or obstructions which are nuisances in the technical or statutory meaning of that word, but from all defects, including those of a less flagrant or perilous character, which expose persons lawfully using such streets to danger of injury. Failure to exercise such care is negligence and. if thereby a traveler on the public way is injured without contributory fault on his part, the city is liable and the jury in such case should neither be asked or permitted to speculate upon the question whether the negligent condition complained of did-or did not constitute a nuisance. The giving of the instructions to which reference is made was a prejudicial error for which there is no remedy except á new trial.