having stated the case, delivered the
opinion of the court as follows:
The jurisdiction of the action by the Federal court is denied on three grounds: the character of the parties as supposed citizens of the same State; the limitation to the State court of the remedy given by the statute of Wisconsin; and the alleged invalidity of the act of Congress of March 2d, 1867, under which the removal from the State court was made.
First, as to the character of the parties.
The plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Illinois and the defendant is a corporation created under the law's of Wisconsin. Although a corporation, being an artificial body created by legislative power is not a citizen within several provisions of the Constitution ; yet it has been held, and that must now be regarded as settled law, that, where rights of action are to be еnforced, it will be considered as a citizen of the State where it was created, within the clause extending the judicial power of the United States to controversies between citizens of different States.
*
The defendant, therefore, must be regarded for the purposes of this action as a citizen of Wisconsin. But it is said, and here the objection to the jurisdiсtion ai'ises, that the defendant is also a corporation under the laws of Illinois, and, therefore, is also a citizen of the same State with the plaintiff. The answer to this position is obvious. In Wisconsin the laws of Illinois have no operation. The defendant is a corporation, and as such a citizen of Wisconsin by the laws of that State. It is not
there
a corporаtion or a citizen of any-other State. Being there sued it can only be brought into court as a citizen of that State, whatever its status or citizenship may be elsewhere. Nor is there anything against this view, but, on the contrary, much to support it, in the case of
The Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company
v.
Wheeler.
†
In that case the declaration averred that the plaintiffs were a corporation creatеd by the law’s of the States of Indiana and Ohio, and that the defend
The correctness of this view is also confirmed by the recent decision of this court in the case of
The Railroad Company
v.
Harris.
*
In that case a Maryland railroad corporation was empowered by the legislature of Virginia to construct its road through that State, and by an act of Congress to extend a lateral road into the District of Columbia. By the act of Virginia the company was granted the same rights and privileges in that State which it possessed in Maryland, and it was made subject to similar pains, penalties, and obligations. By the act of Congress the company was authorized to exercise in the District of Columbia the same powers,
Second; as to the limitation to the State court of the remedy given by the statute of Wisconsin. That statute, after declaring a liability by a person or a corporation to an action for damages when death ensues from a wrongful act, neglect, or default of such person or corporation, contains a proviso “ that such action shall be brought for a death caused in this State, and, in some court established by the constitution and hnvs of the same.” This proviso is considered by the counsel of the defendant as in the nature of a condition, upon a compliance with which the remedy given by the statute can only be enforced.
It is undoubtedly true that the right of action exists only in virtue of the statute, and only in cases where the death was caused within the State, The liability of the party, whether a natural or an artificial person, extends only to cases where, from certain causes, death ensues within the
This doctrine has been asserted in several cases by this court. In
Suydam
v.
Broadnax,
*
an act of the legislature of Alabama provided that the estate of a deceased person, declared to be insolvent, should be distributed by the executors or administrators according to the рrovisions of the act, and that no suit or action should be commenced or sustained against any executor or administrator after the estate had been declared to be insolvent, except in certain cases; but this court held, in a case not thus excepted, that the insolvency of the estate, judicially declared under the. act, was not suffiсient in law to abate a suit instituted in the Circuit
In The Union Bank of Tennessee v. Jolly’s Administrators * this court declared that the law of a State “limiting the remedies of its citizens in its own courts cannot be applied to prevent the citizens of other States from suing in the courts of the United States in that State for the recovery of any property’ or money there to which they may be legally or equitably entitled.” The same doctrine was affirmed in Hyde v. Stone, † and in Payne v. Hook. ‡
Third; as to the alleged invalidity of the act of March 2d,
1867,
under which the removal from the Slate court was made.
The counsel of the defendant, whilst confining his special objection to this act, questions the soundness of the reasoning of Mr. Justice Story, by which any legislation for the removal of causes from a State court to a Fеderal court is maintained. We may doubt, with counsel, whether such removal before issue or trial can properly be called an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. It may, we think, more properly be regarded as an indirect mode by which the Federal court acquires original jurisdiction of the causes.
§
But it is not material whether the reasoning оf the distinguished jurist in this par
The judicial power of the United States extends by the Constitution to controversies between citizens of different States as well as to cases arising under the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States, and the manner and conditions upon which that power shall be exercised, except as the original or appellate character of the jurisdiction is specially designated in the Constitution, are mere matters of legislative discretion. In some cases, from their character, the judicial power is necessarily exclusive of all State authority; in other cases it may be made so at the option of Congress, or it may be exercised concurrently with that of the States. Such was the opinion of Mr. Justice Story, as expressed in
Martin
v.
Hunter's Lessee,
*
and this conclusion was adopted and approved by this court in the recent case of
The Moses Taylor.
†
The legislation of Congress has proceeded upon the cоrrectness of this position in the distribution of jurisdiction to the Federal courts. The Judiciary Act of 1789, as observed in the case of
The Moses Taylor,
declares, “ that in some cases from their commencement such jurisdiction shall be exclusive; in other cases it determines at what stage of procedure such jurisdiction shall attach, and how long and how far concurrent jurisdiction оf the State courts shall be permitted. Thus, eases in which the United States are parties, civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and cases against consuls and vice-consuls, except for certain offences, are placed from their commencement exclusively under the cognizance of the Federal courts. On the other hand, somе cases in which an alien or a citizen of another State is made a party may be brought either in a Federal or a State court, at the option of the plaintiff, and if brought in the State court may be prosecuted until the appearance of the defendant, and then
When the jurisdiction of the Federal court depended upon the citizenship of the parties, the case could not be withdrawn from the State courts after suit commenced until the passage of the act of 1867, except upon the application of the defendant. The provision of the Constitution extending the judicial power of the United States to controversies between citizens of different States had its existence in the impression, that State attachments and State prejudices might affect injuriously the regular administration of justice in the State courts. The protection intended against these influences to non-residents of a State was originally suрposed to have been sufficiently secured by giving to the plaintiff in the first instance an election of courts before suit brought; and where the suit was commenced in a State court a like election to the defendant afterwards. The time at which the non-resident party should be allowed thus to make his election was evidently a mere matter of legislative disсretion, a simple question of expediency. If Congress has subsequently become satisfied, that where a plaintiff" discovers, after suit brought in a State court, that the prejudice and local influence, against which the Constitution intended to guard, are such as are likely to prevent him from obtaining justice, he ought to be permitted to remove his case into a
It follows, from the views we have expressed, that the objection to the jurisdiction of this action by the Circuit Court, upon the grounds advanced by the defendant, cannоt be maintained.
It only remains to say a few words upon the refusal of the court to give the instructions prayed by the defendant, and upon its ruling in the admission of certain evidence, and its charge to the jury.
The facts of the case are very few, and with respect to most of them there was little conflict of evidence. [The learned justice here stated thе facts of the case, aud continued :]
Upon these facts the court gave to the jury a clear and full charge upon the duties and responsibilities of the railroad company in crossing the street of the city, with its engines and trains, aud upon the care, prudence, and caution which it was incumbent upon the deceased to exercise in crossing thе tracks; and as to the damages which the jury were authorized to find, in case they were satisfied that the employees of the company had been guilty of negligence, and that such negligence had caused the death of the deceased.
The counsel of the plaintiff had requested three special instructions to the jury, and the counsel of the dеfendant had requested nineteen special instructions. The court, however, declined to give any of them except as they were embraced in its general charge. Some of the instructions prayed by the defendant presented the law respecting the liability of the company correctly, and some of them were based upon an assumed condition of things which the evidence did not warrant. But it is not error for a court to refuse to give an extended series of instructions, even though some of them may be correct in the propositions of law
The evidence of the condition of the deceased—that she was enceinte at the time оf the accident—could not materially have affected the jury in the estimation of the damages, after the clear and explicit charge of the court, as to the character of the damages which only they were authorized to consider.
The other evidence in the case, to the admission of which objection was taken, was not material, and could not have influenced the result.
Judgment affirmed.