83 U.S. 318 | SCOTUS | 1873
RAILROAD COMPANY
v.
MANUFACTURING COMPANY.
Supreme Court of United States.
*322 Mr. F. Chamberlin, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. A.P. Hyde, contra.
*324 Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
It is not necessary in the state of this record to go into the general subject of the duty of carriers in respect to goods in their custody which have arrived at their final destination. Different views have been entertained by different jurists of what the carrier is required to do when the transit is ended in order to terminate his liability, but there is not this difference of opinion in relation to the rule which is applicable while the property is in process of transportation from the place of its receipt to the place of its destination.
In such cases it is the duty of the carrier, in the absence of any special contract, to carry safely to the end of his line and to deliver to the next carrier in the route beyond. This rule of liability is adopted generally by the courts in this country, although in England, at the present time, and in some of the States of the Union, the disposition is to treat the obligation of the carrier who first receives the goods as continuing throughout the entire route. It is unfortunate for the interests of commerce that there is any diversity of opinion on such a subject, especially in this country, but the rule that holds the carrier only liable to the extent of his own route, and for the safe storage and delivery to the next carrier, is in itself so just and reasonable that we do not hesitate to give it our sanction. Public policy, however, requires that the rule should be enforced, and will not allow *325 the carrier to escape responsibility on storing the goods at the end of his route, without delivery or an attempt to deliver to the connecting carrier. If there be a necessity for storage it will be considered a mere accessory to the transportation, and not as changing the nature of the bailment. It is very clear that the simple deposit of the goods by the carrier in his depot, unaccompanied by any act indicating an intention to renounce the obligation of a carrier, will not change or modify even his liability. It may be that circumstances may arise after the goods have reached the depot which would justify the carrier in warehousing them, but if he had reasonable grounds to anticipate the occurrence of these adverse circumstances when he received the goods, he cannot by storing them change his relation towards them.
Testing the case in hand by these well-settled principles, it is apparent that the plaintiffs in error are not relieved of their proper responsibility, unless through the provisions of their charter, or by the terms of the receipt which was given when they received the wool. They neither delivered nor offered to deliver the wool to the propeller company. Nor did they do any act manifesting an intention to divest themselves of the character of carrier and assume that of forwarder.
It is insisted that the offer to deliver would have been a useless act, because of the inability of the line of propellers, with their means of transportation, to receive and transport the freight which had already accumulated at the Michigan Central depot for shipment by lake. One answer to this proposition is, that the company had no right to assume, in discharge of its obligation to this defendant, that an offer to deliver this particular shipment would have been met by a refusal to receive. Apart from this, how can the company set up, by way of defence, this limited ability of the propeller line when the officers of the road knew of it at the time the contract of carriage was entered into, and the other party to the contract had no information on the subject?
It is said, in reply to this objection, that the company *326 could not have refused to receive the wool, having ample means of carriage, although it knew the line beyond Detroit selected by the shipper was not at the time in a situation to receive and transport it. It is true the company were obliged to carry for all persons, without favor, in the regular course of business, but this obligation did not dispense with a corresponding obligation on its part to inform the shipper of any unavoidable circumstances existing at the termination of its own route in the way of a prompt delivery to the carrier next in line. This is especially so when, as in this case, there were other lines of transportation from Detroit eastward by which the wool, without delay, could have been forwarded to its place of destination. Had the shipper at Jackson been informed, at the time, of the serious hindrances at Detroit, to the speedy transit of goods by the lake, it is fair to infer, as a reasonable man, he would have given a different direction to his property. Common fairness requires that at least he should have been told of the condition of things there, and thus left free to choose, if he saw fit, another mode of conveyance. If this had been done there would be some plausibility in the position that six days was an unreasonable time to require the railroad company to hold the wool as a common carrier for delivery. But under the circumstances of this case the company had no right to expect an earlier period for delivery, and cannot, therefore, complain of the response of the jury to the inquiry on this subject submitted to them by the Circuit Court.
It is earnestly argued that the plaintiffs in error are relieved from liability under a provision contained in one section of their charter,[*] if not by the rules of the common law.
But it is quite clear, on reading the whole section, that it refers to property which has reached its final destination, and is there awaiting delivery to its owner. If so, how can the proviso in question be made to apply to another and distinct class of property? To perform this office it must act independently of the rest of the section, and enlarge, rather *327 than limit, the operation of it. This it cannot do, unless words are used which leave no doubt the legislature intended such an effect to be given to it.
It is argued, however, that there is no difference between goods to be delivered to the owner at their final destination and goods deliverable to the owner, or his agent, for further carriage. That in both cases, as soon as they are "ready to be delivered" over, they are "awaiting delivery." This position, although plausible, is not sound. There is a clear distinction, in our opinion, between property in a situation to be delivered over to the consignee on demand, and property on its way to a distant point to be taken thence by a connecting carrier. In the former case it may be said to be awaiting delivery; in the latter, to be awaiting transportation. And this distinction is recognized by the Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of the present plaintiffs in error against Hale.[*] The court in speaking on this subject say, "that goods are on deposit in the depots of the company, either awaiting transportation or awaiting delivery, and that the section (now under consideration) has reference only to goods which have been transported and placed in the company's depots for delivery to the consignee." To the same effect is a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of New York,[] in a suit brought to recover for the loss of goods by the same fire that consumed the wool in this case, and which were marked for conveyance by the same line of propellers on Lake Erie.
It is insisted, however, by the plaintiffs in error, if they are not relieved from liability as carriers by the provisions of their charter, that the receipt taken by the consignor, without dissent, at the time the wool was received, discharges them The position is, that the unsigned notice printed on the back of the receipt is a part of it, and that, taken together, they amount to a contract binding on the defendants in error.
*328 This notice is general, and not confined, as in the section of the charter we have considered, to goods on deposit in the depots of the company awaiting delivery. It is a distinct announcement that all goods and merchandise are at the risk of the owners thereof while in the company's warehouses, except for such loss or injury as may arise from the negligence of the agents of the company. The notice was, doubtless, intended to secure immunity for all losses not caused by negligence or misconduct during the time the property remained in the depots of the company, whether for transportation on their own line, or beyond, or for delivery to consignees. And such will be its effect if the party taking the receipt for his property is concluded by it. The question is, therefore, presented for decision whether such a notice is effectual to accomplish the purpose for which it was issued.
Whether a carrier when charged upon his common-law responsibility can discharge himself from it by special contract, assented to by the owner, is not an open question in this court since the cases of The New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. The Merchants' Bank,[*] and York Company v. Central Railroad.[] In both these cases the right of the carrier to restrict or diminish his general liability by special contract, which does not cover losses by negligence or misconduct, received the sanction of this court. In the former case the effect of a general notice by the carrier seeking to extinguish his peculiar liability was also considered, and although the remarks of the judge on the point were not necessary to the decision of the case, they furnish a correct exposition of the law on this much-controverted subject.
In speaking of the right of the carrier to restrict his obligation by a special agreement, the judge said: "It by no means follows that this can be done by an act of his own. The carrier is in the exercise of a sort of public office, from which he should not be permitted to exonerate himself without the assent of the parties concerned. And this is not to be implied or inferred from a general notice to the public *329 limiting his obligation, which may, or may not, be assented to. He is bound to receive and carry all the goods offered for transportation, subject to all the responsibilities incident to his employment, and is liable to an action in case of refusal. If any implication is to be indulged from the delivery of the goods under the general notice, it is as strong that the owner intended to insist upon his rights and the duties of the carrier, as it is that he assented to their qualification. The burden of proof lies on the carrier, and nothing short of an express stipulation by parol or in writing should be permitted to discharge him from duties which the law has annexed to his employment."
These considerations against the relaxation of the common-law responsibility by public advertisements, apply with equal force to notices having the same object, attached to receipts given by carriers on taking the property of those who employ them into their possession for transportation. Both are attempts to obtain, by indirection, exemption from burdens imposed in the interests of trade upon this particular business. It is not only against the policy of the law, but a serious injury to commerce to allow the carrier to say that the shipper of merchandise assents to the terms proposed in a notice, whether it be general to the public or special to a particular person, merely because he does not expressly dissent from them. If the parties were on an equality in their dealings with each other there might be some show of reason for assuming acquiescence from silence, but in the nature of the case this equality does not exist, and, therefore, every intendment should be made in favor of the shipper when he takes a receipt for his property, with restrictive conditions annexed, and says nothing, that he intends to rely upon the law for the security of his rights.
It can readily be seen, if the carrier can reduce his liability in the way proposed, he can transact business on any terms he chooses to prescribe. The shipper, as a general thing, is not in a condition to contend with him as to terms, nor to wait the result of an action at law in case of refusal to carry unconditionally. Indeed such an action is seldom *330 resorted to, on account of the inability of the shipper to delay sending his goods forward. The law, in conceding to carriers the ability to obtain any reasonable qualification of their responsibility by express contract, has gone as far in this direction as public policy will allow. To relax still further the strict rules of common law applicable to them, by presuming acquiescence in the conditions on which they propose to carry freight when they have no right to impose them, would, in our opinion, work great harm to the business community.
The weight of authority is against the validity of the kind of notices we have been considering.[*] And many of the courts that have upheld them have done so with reluctance, but felt themselves bound by previous decisions. Still they have been continued, and this persistence has provoked legislation in Michigan, where this contract of carriage was made, and the plaintiffs in error have their existence. By an act of the legislature passed after the loss in this case occurred, it is declared "that no railroad company shall be permitted to change or limit its common-law liability as a common carrier by any contract or in any other manner, except by a written contract, none of which shall be printed, which shall be signed by the owner or shipper of the goods to be carried."[]
It is fair to infer that this kind of legislation will not be confined to Michigan, if carriers continue to claim exemption from common-law liability through the medium of notices like the one presented in defence of this suit.
These views dispose of this case, and it is not necessary to notice particularly the instructions which the court below gave to the jury. If the court erred at all it was in charging more favorably for the plaintiffs in error than the facts of the case warranted.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*] See the section, supra, pp. 320-321. REP.
[*] 6 Michigan, 243.
[] Mills v. Michigan Central Railroad Co., 45 New York, 626
[*] 6 Howard, 344.
[] 3 Wallace, 107.
[*] See 2 Parsons on Contracts, 238, note N, 5th edition; and the American note to Coggs v. Bernard, 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 7th American edition: Redfield Law of Railways, p. 369; McMillan v. M.S. & N.I.R.R. Co., 16 Michigan, p. 109, and following.
[] Statutes of Michigan, Compilation of 1871, p. 783, § 2386.