67 Tenn. 300 | Tenn. | 1874
delivered the opinion of the court.
If we were allowed to look to the parol proof, it is abundantly shown that the trust was intended for all the children of the marriage, but under the rules of law the deed must be its own interpreter. It was an observation of Lord Coke, that matters in writing, made by advice and on consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the parties, should not be proven by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory: Countess of Rutland’s Case, 5 Rep., 26. And it is a fixed rule of law that in the construction of deeds, as of wills, the court must limit itself to the inquiry, what intention do the words of the instrument express; 2 Phill. Ev., 540. It is rather remarkable that no precisely similar col
Affirm the decree.