221 S.W.2d 357 | Tex. | 1949
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The trial judge filed findings of fact, Nos. 1 through 13. Omitting the numbers, we copy those findings as a statement of the case. “This is a suit in trespass to try title for title and possession of Lot 11, Black 42, Townsite of Port Isabel, Cameron County, Texas. The common source of title is Bess Chenoweth Lasswell Kelner, sometimes known as Bess Lasswell or Bess Kelner. On March 22, 1940, Bess Lasswell, a feme sole, executed a deed, naming her brother, W. A. Chenoweth, as grantee. Bess Lasswell retained the said deed in her possession and made no delivery of the deed at that time. Bess Lasswell married Eugene A. (Bob) Kelner in April, 1940, and never divorced him during
Based upon those findings, the court filed three conclusions of law, namely, (1) that the deed was “an instrument testamentary in character”; (2) that when Mrs. Kelner undertook to dispose of this property in question by a will, she revoked the deed; and (3) that the petitioner, holding under a deed from Chenoweth, should be denied recovery of the premises, because the instrument under which Chenoweth claimed title was revoked by the will executed subsequent to its delivery to Mrs. John Mahurin. Accordingly judgment was rendered that plaintiff, petitioner here, take nothing. The court of civil appeals affirmed that judgment, holding that the trial court was justified in concluding that the instrument, although in the form of a deed, was testamentary in character. 221 S. W. (2d) 355.
While the question of whether there has in fact been a delivery of a deed is one for the trier of facts; the question of what constitutes a delivery is one of law. In this case the facts regarding the delivery of the deed are undisputed, and only the question of what legal effect is to be given those facts is
Much has been written upon this question, but we need cite only a few selected cases from our own jurisdiction. Our view is that, as a matter of law, Mrs. Kelner delivered the deed to this property to W. A. Chenoweth, to become effective upon her death, when she manually delivered it to Mrs. Mahurin. This conclusion, we think, is required by the decisions in Henry v. Phillips, 105 Texas 459, 151 S. W. 533; Davis v. Bond, 138 Texas 206, 158 S. W. (2d) 297; and Earl v. Mundy, 227 S. W. 970, writ refused. The conclusion is strengthened by a consideration of Eckert v. Stewart, 207 S. W. 317, writ refused, a case in which the grantor retained the right to recall the deed at any time. The test established by those cases is whether or not the grantor parted with all dominion and control over the instrument at the time he delivered it to the third person, with intent at the very time of its delivery that it take effect as a conveyance. Let us examine the facts of this case in the light of that test.
On March 22, 1940, when Mrs. Kelner, then Mrs. Lasswell, executed the deed she told the notary who prepared it that she was deeding the lot to her brother so that Lasswell, her husband or former husband, could not get it. The next month she married Kelner. No attempt was made to deliver the deed until August, 1943. In the spring of that year she made known to a friend, Mrs. John Mahurin, that her husband had assaulted her, and that she was afraid of him; that she had executed a deed to her property which she wanted Mrs. Mahurin to keep and deliver to her brother in the event anything happened to her. In that connection she declared her purpose to be that she did not want her husband to have the property if anything happened to her. The deed was not handed to Mrs. Mahurin at that time, but in August thereafter Mrs. Kelner delivered it to Mrs. Mahurin with these instructions: “If anything happens to me, I want you to send this deed to my brother, W. A. Chenoweth, who lives in the state of California.” It is evident that by this expression, “If anything happens to me,” she referred to her death. The evidence concerning the delivery of this deed was
Respondent regards the fact that Mrs. Kelner retained this deed in her possession so long after its execution before its delivery to Mrs. Mahurin as a circumstance showing that she had no intention to pass title at the time of its delivery. To our minds it is a circumstance in support of the opposite conclusion. It appears that she realized that so long as she kept the deed in her possession it was not effective as a conveyance, and when she made up her mind to deliver it to Mrs. Mahurin she must have intended that such delivery would have the effect of placing the title to the property beyond the reach of her husband. Her purpose in delivering it to Mrs. Mahurin was to prevent her husband’s getting her property. The only way to accomplish that purpose was to place the property beyond his reach, which she must have intended to do by making delivery of the deed; otherwise, she might as well have retained it in her possession. It is our conclusion that when Mrs. Kelner delivered the manual possession of this deed into the hands of Mrs. Mahurin she did so with an intention to pass present title to the land to her brother, W. A. Chenoweth, with the right of possession, use and enjoyment of the property remaining in her during her lifetime.
On oral submission of this case a question was raised from the bench as to the effectiveness of a deed to pass title to a wife’s real estate if it was executed by her alone before marriage and delivered by her after marriage without her husband’s knowledge or consent. The effect of sustaining the point would have been to affirm the case. The duty, then, rested upon respondent to present it, if he desired a decision thereof. The point was not briefed, but because of its importance we requested the parties to brief it. Petitioner responded to our request, but respondent failed to do so. The point is, therefore, not before us for decision and we do not express an opinion thereon.
From what is written above it follows that the judgments below must be reversed. There remains for decision the question of whether we should remand the case to the trial court or render judgment here on the merits. The trial court found that when the deed was executed Mrs. Kelner, then Mrs. Lass-well, was a feme sole. This opinion has been written on the assumption of the correctness of that finding. Respondent claims that the record does not support the finding, but that, to the contrary,- it reveals that she had not been divorced from Lass-well. The record is not at all clear on that important point. The case has, therefore, not been fully developed and justice seems to demand another trial. Rule 505.
Judgments of both courts below are reversed and the case is remanded generally to the trial court.
Opinion delivered May 25, 1949.
Rehearing overruled June 22, 1949.