Raftopol v. RameyRaftopol v. Ramey
Lead Opinion
Opinion
This appeal raises the question of whether Connecticut law permits an intended parent
The defendant department of public health (department) appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff Shawn Hargon, an intended parent under the gestational agreement.
Hargon and the named plaintiff, Anthony Raftopol, the children’s biological father, as the children’s parents. The department also argues that the trial court improperly concluded that
The record reflects the following facts, either as found by the trial court or undisputed. The plaintiffs, who were domestic partners living in Bucharest, Romania,
Prior to the expected delivery date, the plaintiffs brought this action, seeking a declaratory judgment that the gestational agreement was valid, that the plaintiffs were the legal parents of the children and requesting that the court order the department to issue a replacement birth certificate reflecting that they, and not Ramey, were parents of the children. The department responded that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Hargon did not allege that he had conceived the children and because the court lacked jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of the gestational carrier, the egg donor, and any husbands either may have, which the department argued would be a necessary prerequisite to the declaration that
I
We first turn to the issue of whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to declare Hargon a legal parent of the children because Hargon was not biologically related to the children and did not adopt them. Included within this issue is the question of whether the court was required, as a prerequisite to making any determination regarding Hargon’s parental status, to terminate Ramey’s parental rights, and, if so, whether the court had jurisdiction to terminate those rights. We conclude that: (1) because Ramey did not have any parental rights with respect to the children, the termination of those nonexistent rights was not a necessary prerequisite to a determination of Hargon’s parental status with respect to the children; and (2) the court had jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling regarding Hargon’s parental status.
A
Preliminarily, we address the department’s claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to declare Hargon a parent because the termination of Ramey’s parental rights — over which the trial court would have lacked jurisdiction — was a necessary prerequisite to Hargon’s acquiring parental status with respect to the children.
Our statutes and case law establish that a gestational carrier who bears no biological relationship to the child she has carried does not have parental rights with respect to that child. We have long recognized that there are three ways by which a person may become a parent: conception, adoption or pursuant to the artificial insemination statutes.
In 1975, the legislature provided the third means by which a person may gain parental status. Public Acts 1975, No. 75-233, now codified at
In Doe v. Doe, supra,
Under any of the three specified ways of acquiring parental status, as set forth both in our statutes and interpretive case law, Ramey is not a parent of the children in the present case. It is undisputed that she is neither the biological nor the adoptive mother to the children. Nor does she fall within the parameters of the artificial insemination statutes. Accordingly, Ramey did not have parental rights that required termination before Hargon could acquire parental status with respect to the children.
B
The department also claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to declare Hargon a parent. Specifically, the department argues that, because a person may become a parent only by conception, adoption, or by compliance with our statutes governing artificial insemination, and because Hargon does not claim parentage by virtue of any of these three avenues, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Hargon’s request for a declaratory judgment that he is the parent of the children. We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction over the matter.
Pursuant to
II
The jurisdictional questions now resolved, we turn to the merits of the department’s claim that the trial court improperly concluded that
Preliminarily, we must note that because in the present case the department
As directed by § l-2z, we begin with the text of the statute.
Related statutes provide little guidance in resolving the many ambiguities suggested by the text of
We observe that in interpreting the text of
Moreover, the department’s contention that the only reasonable inteipretation of the plain language of
A subsequent exchange could be read more broadly. At one point during the discussion of the amendment, Representative Lenny T. Winkler remarked: “[F]rom what I understand it’s been difficult for some individuals to adopt and they’ve been required to go to [P]robate [Court] and this would avoid that and make it easier, could you explain that all?” Id., p. 4459. Representative Sherer responded: “That’s correct. There’s been the difficult situation where due to the birth being, the parents not being the birth parents the
With respect to whether this substantive change in the law was intended to include nonbiological intended parents, we recognize that the legislative history is inconclusive, but we already have rejected, on the basis of our plain language analysis, the department’s contention that only biological intended parents may acquire legal parentage solely by virtue of a valid gestational agreement. On the basis of our analysis of both the text of the statute, as well as its legislative history, we conclude that the legislature intended
Consistent with our conclusion that
The department relies on Doe v. Doe, supra,
The department also contends that courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that the legislature is the appropriate body to devise new rules for the regulation of gestational agreements. See, e.g., Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center,
We agree that the legislature is the appropriate body to craft specific rules and procedures governing gestational agreements. That precept does not conflict with our decision today, which interprets
Indeed, this appeal highlights the fact that our existing statutes addressing parentage do not address the public policy concerns raised by modem assisted reproductive technology. The legislature itself has recognized that it has postponed confronting these issues. In 2007, the legislature amended
“And I’m gathering, based on this [b]ill before us, that it’s going to be in a piecemeal sort of way that we deal with all of these issues of technological innovation in the area of reproduction and legal issues that crop up that really need to be resolved so that the families are not left in a state of confusion as to what they should do.” Id., pp. 4438-39.
Representative O’Neill could not have phrased this issue more precisely — this area of law needs to be clarified so that families are not left in a state of confusion. Our existing statutory scheme only partially addresses these issues. Parentage, however, is not an issue that should be addressed in a “piecemeal” fashion. As we already have observed in this opinion, our existing statutes provide few answers and raise many questions. It is decidedly not the role of this court to make the public policy determinations necessary to establish the specific rules and procedures governing the validity of gestational agreements or set the standards for valid gestational agreements. The legislature will be required to grapple with numerous questions implicating significant public policy issues — that body, with the ability to hold public hearings and seek out expert assistance, is the appropriate one to make such public policy determinations.
We highlight some of the issues that remain unresolved in our current statutory scheme by looking to the laws of other jurisdictions that have grappled with these public policy issues. In jurisdictions that have addressed the issues raised by the use of assisted reproductive technology,
How a state defines parentage is merely the starting point. Additional issues that some states have addressed, for example, include whether to recognize compensated gestational agreements,
We emphasize that the legislature is the appropriate body to make the public policy determinations implicated by these issues. Because of the uncertainties created by the existing statutory scheme, we respectfully would suggest that the legislature consider doing so. Particularly important will be a determination of which types of gestational agreements are valid, as that determination will decide who may benefit from the streamlined process to parentage created by
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, Js., concurred.
Notes
For purposes of this opinion, we use the term “intended parent” to signify a party to a gestational agreement who enters into the agreement with a gestational carrier with the intention of becoming the legal parent of any resulting children.
Throughout this opinion, we use the terms “biological” and “genetic” intex'changeably. A “biological parent” or “genetic parent” is a parent who shares genetic material with the child; that is, both phrases refer to parents who have contributed gametes.
The first child conceived by means of in vitro fertilization was bom more than thirty years ago, in 1978. M. Garrison, “Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage,” 113 Harv. L. Rev. 835, 848 (2000). The famous “Baby M” case was decided in 1988, twenty-two years ago. In re Baby M.,
See, e.g., D. Hofinan, “ ‘Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:’ A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact,” 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 449, 454 (2009) (noting advances in assisted reproductive technology and, in course of fifty state survey, noting that“[t]he vast majority of states are silent or near silent on the issues of whether, when, and how surrogacy agreements are enforceable, void, or voidable”); C. Spivack, “The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States,” 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 97, 101 (Sup. 2010) (commenting on confused state of law on surrogacy issue and categorizing different approaches taken by various states, including “ ‘inaction,’ ” which describes state legislatures that have failed to ban surrogacy and instead have relied on courts to ban it as matter of public policy); A. Plant, “With a Little Help from My Friends: The Intersection of the Gestational Carrier Surrogacy Agreement, Legislative Inaction, and Medical Advancement,” 54 Ala. L. Rev. 639 (2003) (noting law’s inability to keep pace with advances in assisted reproductive technology and remarking that gestational agreements “seem beyond the boundaries of settled law, reaching into a morass of issues and rights involving morality, ethics, and responsibility”); see also part II of this opinion (discussing statutes and decisions of other states dealing with legal issues arising from use of assisted reproductive technology).
The trial court also rendered judgment for the plaintiff Anthony Raftopol, the children’s biological father, but the department does not challenge the judgment with respect to Raftopol. We refer to Raftopol and Hargon individually by name and collectively as the plaintiffs.
Although Ramey and Manchester Memorial Hospital also were named as defendants in the action, neither is a party to this appeal.
The phrase “[i]f the birth is subject to a gestational agreement” was added to
“We presume that, in enacting a statute, the legislature intended a change in existing law. . . . This presumption, like any other, may be rebutted by contrary evidence of the legislative intent in the particular case. An amendment which in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the original act. . . . Furthermore, an amendment that is intended to clarify the intent of an earlier act necessarily has retroactive effect.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Middlebury v. Dept. of Environmental Protection,
Although the trial court did not expressly state in its memorandum of decision that
Although it has no bearing on the outcome of this appeal, the plaintiffs subsequently were married in Massachusetts on August 15, 2008.
For purposes of this opinion, we use the term “gestational carrier” to refer to an adult woman who gives birth, pursuant to a gestational agreement, to a child to whom she bears no biological relation. In other words, “gestational carrier” signifies a woman who supplies only a womb and not the egg. In this opinion, the term “gestational carrier” does not include a woman who requests the use of artificial insemination with donor eggs pursuant to
The children were bom three months prematurely.
Ramey previously had given birth to another child for the plaintiffs, under the same conditions. That is, Ramey had entered into a gestational agreement with the plaintiffs, who utilized the same third party egg donor and Raftopol’s sperm to create an embryo, which subsequently was implanted in Ramey’s uterus. Hargon, along with Raftopol, had been named as the parent on the replacement birth certificate, with no objection from the department.
The department does not renew on appeal the argument it had raised to the trial court that the termination of the parental rights of the egg donor and any husband of the egg donor would be necessary in order for Hargon to acquire parental status with respect to the children. In any case, such an argument would fail in light of
The department does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s conclusion that the gestational agreement was valid.
The department appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to
It is well established that there exist only two procedural vehicles by which parental rights may be terminated: “[B]y decree of the [PJrobate [C]ourt pursuant to
We have never stated, and do not hold today, that being named on a birth certificate as the parent to the child confers parental status on the named person. A person who is named on a birth certificate as a parent to the child is so named on the certificate as a function of the department’s responsibility to keep accurate records of vital records. The birth certificate must accurately reflect the legal relationship between parent and child, but it does not create that relationship. See footnote 27 of this opinion.
Chapter 803a,
Finally,
“(b) If a child is conceived by A.I.D. in another jurisdiction but is bom in Connecticut to a husband and wife who, at the time of conception, were not domiciliaries of Connecticut, but are domiciliaries at the time of the birth of the child, the child shall have the same status as is provided in
Because the wife had been receiving state assistance for herself and her child, the attorney general became a party to the action and moved for support pursuant to
The trial court had denied the motion for an order of support on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, supra,
By contrast with the present case, therefore, the facts in Doe involved a traditional surrogacy. See footnote 10 of this opinion. Because the surrogate was impregnated without the use of a donated egg, she was the biological mother of the child. Her parental rights and the parental rights of her former husband had been terminated by decree of the Probate Court. Doe v. Doe, supra,
The parties were married when the surrogate was four months pregnant with the child. Doe v. Doe, supra,
“(b) The judges of the Superior Court may make such orders and rules as they may deem necessary or advisable to carry into effect the provisions of this section.”
Because the initial requirement — that each birth certificate shall be filed with the name of the birth mother recorded — applies to every birth, not just births governed by gestational agreements, it appears that the term “birth mother” refers to any woman who gestates and gives birth to a child, regardless of whether she is also the genetic mother to the child. Considering that a gestational carrier — that is, a birth mother who is not also the genetic mother — has no parental rights; see part IA of this opinion; and considering also the requirement that all information on birth certificates must be accurate;
“[GJestational agreement” may encompass a variety of different arrangements. The possibilities include, but are not limited to the following: a traditional surrogacy arrangement in which the surrogate, whose own eggs are used, is impregnated via artificial insemination with the sperm of the intended father or a donor; a purely gestational agreement, whereby the sperm of the intended father and the egg of the intended mother are used to create an embryo which is implanted in the gestational carrier’s uterus; a third party egg donor gestational agreement, such as the one in the present case, in which the sperm of the intended father and the egg of a third party, identified or unidentified, egg donor are used to create an embryo, which is implanted in the gestational carrier’s uterus; or a third party sperm and egg donor gestational agreement, in which neither the sperm nor the egg come from the intended parents, and the resulting embryo is implanted in the gestational carrier’s uterus.
Moreover, because there is no statutory provision specifically addressing the elements of a valid gestational agreement, and because the reference to gestational agreements in
Specifically,
Section 7-51a, which governs access to vital records by genealogical societies, provides in relevant part: “(a) . . . During all normal business horns, members of genealogical societies incorporated or authorized by the Secretary of the State to do business or conduct affairs in this state shall (1) have full access to all vital records in the custody of any registrar of vital statistics, including certificates, ledgers, record books, card files, indexes and database printouts, except for those records containing Social Security numbers protected pursuant to 42 USC 405 (c) (2) (C), and confidential files on adoptions, gender change, gestational agreements and paternity . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Not only does this interpretation of
Section 28 of No. 04-255 of the 2004 Public Acts provides in relevant part: “
“On and after January 1, 2002, each birth certificate shall contain the name of the birth mother, except by the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, and be filed with the name of the birth mother recorded. Not later than forty-five days after receipt of an order from a court of competent jurisdiction, the Department of Public Health shall create a replacement certificate in accordance with the court’s order. . . (Emphasis in original.)
Connecticut is not alone in failing to enact laws addressing the issues implicated by assisted reproductive technology. An astonishing twenty states have not weighed in at all on the validity of gestational agreements, including Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming.
Some states have barred gestational agreements altogether, including Arizona, Indiana, Michigan, New York, North Dakota and the District of Columbia. See
Ten states prohibit compensated gestational agreements, including Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Virginia and Washington. See
Some states require that intended parents be married. See, e.g.,
Although Arkansas, which appears to recognize only traditional surroga-cies, does not require that intended parents be married, its statutes establish a presumption that a child bom by means of artificial insemination to a surrogate mother who is married is the child of the biological father and the “woman intended to be the mother if the biological father is married . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Some states require that one or both of the intended parents must have a “medical need” for the use of a gestational carrier. See, e.g.,
For example, Florida requires that both the gestational carrier and the intended parents be eighteen years or older.
See, e.g.,
See, e.g., 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 47/25 (b) (2) (i) (West 2009);
Illinois, New Hampshire and Virginia, each of which has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme addressing issues that arise from the use of assisted reproductive technology, each incorporate numerous provisions safeguarding the legal rights of the parties to gestational agreements. For example, among the many legal protections incorporated into Illinois’ statutory scheme are the requirements that gestational agreements be in writing, and that the gestational carrier and intended parents must be represented by separate counsel. 750 HI. Comp. Stat. Ann. 47/25 (b) (1) and (3) (West 2009). AdditionaUy, the parties must sign acknowledgments that they have received information regarding the “legal, financial, and contractual rights, expectations, penalties and obligations of the surrogacy agreement . . . .” 750 HI. Comp. Stat. Ann. 47/25 (b) (3.5) (West 2009). The gestational agreement also must be witnessed by two competent adults. 750 HI. Comp. Stat. Ann. 47/25 (b) (5) (West 2009). A gestational carrier and the intended parents each must have consulted with counsel regarding the potential legal consequences of the gestational agreement. 750 HI. Comp. Stat. Ann. 47/20 (a) (5) and (b) (4) (West 2009).
New Hampshire requires judicial preauthorization of a gestational agreement, prior to the medical procedure to impregnate the gestational carrier.
Sindlar to New Hampshire, Virginia requires that a petition for court approval of a surrogacy contract be filed prior to the performance of assisted conception. One of the required findings by the court is that the parties have voluntarily entered into the gestational agreement and understand its terms.
Illinois requires that the gestational carrier be covered by health insurance and provides that either the gestational carrier or the intended parents may obtain coverage. 750 DI. Comp. Stat. 47/20 (a) (6) (West 2009).
See, e.g., 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 47/20 (b) (1) (West 2009);
In addition to requiring that at least one intended parent must contribute a gamete, New Hampshire bars the use of a third party egg donor — the egg must either come from the intended mother or the gestational carrier.
Texas does not appear to require that one of the intended parents contribute genetic material, and allows a donor egg to be used, but prohibits the use of the gestational carrier’s eggs in the assisted reproduction procedure.
Nevada requires that both intended parents must contribute the gametes used in the assisted reproduction procedure.
See, e.g., 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 47/20 (a) (3) and (4), and (b) (3) (West 2009) (gestational carrier must have mental and physical health evaluation; intended parents must have mental health evaluation);
Concurrence Opinion
joins, concurring. I agree with part I of the majority opinion addressing the jurisdictional claim of the defendant department of public health (department). I also agree with the conclusion in part II affirming the trial court’s order directing the department to issue a replacement birth certificate, pursuant to
I
The majority concludes that the meaning of
“The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning ... § l-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual
The language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. The term “subject to” in
This conclusion is confirmed by a reading of
“(c) . . . The original certificate in the case of parentage or gender change shall be physically or electronically sealed and kept in a confidential file by the department and the registrar of any town in which the birth was recorded, and may be unsealed for viewing or issuance only upon a written order of a court of competent jurisdiction. The amended certificate shall become the public record. ...”
Reading these statutes together, they clearly provide that an amendment to a birth certificate for a birth governed by a gestational agreement shall result in a replacement birth certificate that supersedes the original. There is no qualifying language in
The majority’s conclusion that
Because the term gestational agreement is a technical term that describes a certain type of contract, we turn to Black’s Law Dictionary for guidance. Black’s Law Dictionary contains no definition of gestational agreement but defines a “surrogate-parenting agreement” as, inter alia, “[a] contract between a woman and typically an infertile couple under which the woman provides her uterus to carry an embryo throughout pregnancy; [especially], an agreement between a person (the intentional parent) and a woman (the surrogate mother) providing that the surrogate mother will (1) bear a child for the intentional parent, and (2) relinquish any and all rights to the child . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009). “Gestational surrogacy” is further defined as “[a] pregnancy in which one woman (the genetic mother) provides the egg, which is fertilized, and another woman (the surrogate mother) carries the fetus and gives birth to the child.” Id. Black’s Law Dictionary distinguishes “gestational surrogacy” from “traditional surrogacy,” by defining the latter as “[a] pregnancy in which a woman provides her own egg, which is fertilized by artificial insemination, and carries
The agreement in the present case, which is variously described therein as the “agreement,” “carrier agreement,” “gestational surrogacy arrangement” and “gestational carrier agreement,” fits precisely within this framework. The agreement identifies the plaintiff, Anthony Raftopol, as the natural father and Hargon, who is not biologically related to the children, as the “adopting parent,”
II
To the extent that the majority finds
A
The legislative history of
This explanation was instead contained in an amendment to
Thus, the exception in
B
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the legislative history of Public Acts 2004, No. 04-255, in which the legislature amended
This new language evidently was intended to correct whatever ambiguity had been created by the absence of language in the original statute regarding when to apply the exception to the rule that each birth certificate shall contain the name of the birth mother. By referring to the fact that such an exception would result in the creation of a replacement birth certificate and by expressly referring to
Representative Donald B. Sherer, who introduced the amendment to his fellow House members, indicated his understanding of the substantive connection that the legislature had established in 2001 between
“And over the course of the years there’s been some confusion as to how to effectuate the birth certificate. So the language in this amendment pretty much clarifies what to do. It says that after the court [orders] parentage, that within [forty-five] days after the presentation of the court order the [department] will issue a replacement birth certificate and the original birth certificate with all the required statistical information would remain confidential.” 47 H.R. Proc., Pt. 14, 2004 Sess., pp. 4456-57. In response to a subsequent question as to whether the new provision would make it easier for some individuals to adopt without going to Probate Court, Representative Sherer added: “There’s been a difficult situation where due to the . . . parents not being the birth parents the only way to obtain a new birth certificate would be to go to [P]robate [C]ourt and basically adopt their own child, which no one really thinks is the right thing to do.” Id., p. 4459.
Representative Sherer’s comments, when read in the proper context, are not ambiguous. In his first comment, in which he referred to previous changes in the law on vital records to permit a finding of parentage on the basis of the biological relationship of a mother who was not the birth mother, he clearly was referring to the enactment of
C
In addition, the majority inexplicably fails to examine the most important part of the legislative history, namely, the 2008 amendment in which the legislature added the language on gestational agreements to the statute. As previously discussed, prior to 2008,
The office of fiscal analysis and the office of legislative research provided the legislature with reports on the proposed revision consistent with the commissioner’s testimony. In its report, the office of fiscal analysis stated that the amendment “clarifies law regarding the issuance of replacement birth certificates for births subject to a gestational agreement. This results in no fiscal impact.” Office of Fiscal Analysis, Connecticut General Assembly, HB-5701 An Act Concerning Revisions to Statutes Pertaining to the Department of Public Health (2008) § 1. The office of legislative research bill analysis similarly explained in relevant part that “[t]he bill appears to limit the replacement certificate requirement to births that are subject to a gestational agreement.” Office of Legislative Research, Connecticut General Assembly, Bill Analysis HB 5701 An Act Concerning Revisions to Statutes Pertaining to the Department of Public Health (2008) § 1. Even more specific was the summary of 2008 Public Acts published by the office of legislative research and made available to the public
Accordingly, the only conclusion that can be drawn from an examination of this legislative history is that a person named as an intended parent in a valid gestational agreement may also be named as a parent in a replacement birth certificate, regardless of whether that person has biological ties to the child. Trial courts that have considered the legislative history of the 2008 amendment have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Griffiths v. Taylor, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. FA 08-4015629 (June 13,2008) (concluding that “the legislature contemplated that a [judge of the] Superior Court would have the authority, under
When the 2008 amendment is examined in the context of the entire legislative history of
Ill
The majority attempts to resolve the perceived ambiguity in
From this it is evident that the principle that a statute should not be construed in a manner that would lead to an absurd or bizarre result leaves no room for an examination of the legislative history when the court concludes that there is only one reasonable or plausible interpretation of the statute, namely, the one that the court is adopting. In other words, it is necessary and permissible to examine the legislative history for the purpose of discerning the legislative intent only when there is more than one plausible interpretation of the statute or when the only seemingly plausible interpretation would lead to an absurd result. See Ziotas v. Reardon Law Firm, P.C., supra,
The majority justifies its approach, which it fails to bolster with any precedential support, by stating that “[t]he mere fact . . . that the department’s proposed interpretation of
IV
My final comment pertains to the last pari of the majority opinion, which provides the legislature with a detailed road map indicating how the law on gestational agreements should be clarified. The majority makes much of the fact that “the legislature is the appropriate body to craft specific rules and procedures governing gestational agreements,” and that it is not the role of the courts to advise the legislature. The majority nonetheless states that “this appeal highlights the fact that our existing statutes addressing parentage do not address the public policy concerns raised by modem assisted reproductive technology.” After observing that “[i]t is decidedly not the role of this court to make the public policy determinations necessary to establish the specific rules and procedures governing the validity of gestational agreements or set the standards for valid gestational agreements,” the majority proceeds to take this opportunity to “highlight some of the issues [involving key public policy determinations] that remain unresolved in our current statutoiy scheme . . . .” The majority then provides approximately four pages of citations to statutes enacted by our sister states and to various provisions in the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000; see Unif. Parentage Act §§801 through 809, 9B U.L.A. 299-376 (2001); concerning issues relating to gestational agreements for the purpose of instmcting the legislature as to matters that require clarification. Although I believe it is appropriate for this court to convey to the legislature that additional guidance in this area of the law would be helpful, I am unaware of another opinion of this court that goes so far in attempting to constmct a legislative agenda. Accordingly, I view this extraordinary step as excessive.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur only in the result reached by the majority in part II of its opinion.
I presume, as does the majority, that the gestational agreement is valid.
I note that traditional surrogacy agreements also incorporate the principle that one of the intended parents is not biologically related to the child because the surrogate mother under such arrangements donates her own egg due to the infertility of the intended parent. The only exception to the rule that at least one of the intended parents named in a gestational or a traditional surrogacy agreement is not biologically related to the unborn child would seem to be when a woman is unable to carry and give birth to a child for medical reasons and the egg of the intended mother and the sperm of the intended father are used to create an embryo that is then implanted in the gestational carrier’s uterus.
Although the agreement describes Hargon as the “adopting parent,” its language indicates an understanding by the parties that Hargon’s adoption of the children would occur by operation of the gestational agreement itself, and that he would adopt the children by more traditional means only “if necessary . . . .” See following text citing agreement’s language.
Although Ramey was named in the action as a defendant, she no longer is a party to this appeal.
The gestational surrogacy agreement, entitled “Carrier Agreement,” provides in relevant part: “The adopting parent [Hargon] and natural father [Raftopol] are living together, as lifetime partners, both are over the age of eighteen . . . years, and both are desirous of entering into the following agreement. The adopting parent and natural father desire to take into their home the child or children ... as their own whom is/are carried by the carrier and is/are biologically related to the natural father. The carrier wishes to facilitate the child’s placement with the adopting parent and natural father and will fully cooperate to achieve this goal.”
The complete version of the proposed bill provided as follows: “Sec. 27. (NEW) (a) On receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction approving a gestational agreement, the department shall prepare a new birth certificate for the child bom of the agreement. The new birth certificate shall include all the information required to be set forth in a certificate of birth of this state as of the date of birth, except that the intended parent or parents under this agreement shall be named as the parent or parents.
“(b) Immediately after a new certificate of birth has been prepared, an exact copy of the certificate, together with a copy of the order of the court approving a gestational agreement, shall be electronically or manually transmitted by the department to the registrar of vital statistics of each town in this state in which the birth of the person is recorded. The new birth certificate, the original certificate of birth on file and the copy of the order of the court shall be filed and indexed pursuant to such regulations as the commissioner shall adopt, in accordance with chapter 54 of the general statutes, to cany out the provisions of this section and to prevent access to such records of birth and court order, except as provided in this section. Any person, except the intended parent or child bom of the agreement, who discloses any information contained in such records, except as provided in this section, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
“(c) When a certified copy of the birth certificate of a child bom of a gestational agreement is requested by a person authorized to receive such copy pursuant to
The language in Substitute House Bill No. 6569 was changed as follows: “Sec. 28. (NEW) On and after January 1, 2002, each birth certificate shall contain the name of the birth mother, except by the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.” Substitute House Bill No. 6569, January 2001 Sess., § 28, as amended by House Amendment Schedules A and B.
In 2005, the department adopted § 19a-41-8 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies clarifying, inter alia, that “[o]nly the commissioner shall malee amendments pertaining to adoption, gestational agreements, or maternity upon receipt of a court order . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
As previously discussed, these circumstances were described in
A “Notice to Users” at the beginning of the summary states that the office of legislative research encourages dissemination of the summaries by photocopying, reprinting in newspapers or other means and that they are intended to be “handy reference tools . . . .” Office of Legislative Research, Connecticut General Assembly, Summary of 2008 Public Acts (2008) p. i.
As we previously have recognized, the “fiscal impact statement and bill analysis are prepared for the benefit of members of the General Assembly, solely for purposes of information, summarization and explanation and do not represent the intent of the General Assembly or either house thereof for any purpose. . . . Although the comments of the office of legislative research are not, in and of themselves, evidence of legislative intent, they properly may bear on the legislature’s knowledge of interpretive problems that could arise from a bill.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298 Conn. 665, 688 n.22,