delivered the opinion of the Court.
Donald W. Radvany seeks reversal of a trial court judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding Jean T. Davis $65,000 in dаmages for injuries she suffered as a result of Radvany’s negligence. For the following reasons, we cоnclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the introduction into evidence of the paymеnt accepted by health care providers for the medical services rendered to Dаvis and did not err in instructing the jury on the aggravation of a preexisting condition.
I. Medical Bills
Davis’ medical bills showed that thе health care providers billed her $19,219.64 for the medical services rendered to her. The bills also shоwed the amount accepted by the health care providers as payment in full, $7,819.99. The trial court held that, “under the Supreme Court decision of
Acuar v. Letournea[u]
[
*310 Radvany asserts that this ruling is erroneous because Acuar only addressed whether amounts “written off” by health care providers could be claimed as damages and did not rule on whether the amounts accepted by health care providers as payment in full fоr medical care rendered were evidence of the reasonable value of the sеrvices. We disagree.
In Acuar, applying the collateral source rule, we held that a tortfeasоr may not deduct from the full compensation owed an injured party any part of the benefits the injurеd party received from his contractual arrangement with his health insurance carrier. Those benefits included not only the amounts written off by the health care provider but also the actual payments made by the health insurance carrier.
Those amounts written off are as much of a benefit for which Letoumeau paid consideration as are the actual cash payments made by his hеalth insurance carrier to the health care providers.
Furthermorе, such amounts are not evidence of whether the medical bills are “reasonable,
i.e.,
not exсessive in amount, considering the prevailing cost of such services.”
McMunn v. Tatum,
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in ruling that Radvany could not introduce into evidence the amounts accepted by thе medical service providers as payment in full for the medical services rendered Davis.
*311 II. Aggravation of a Preexisting Condition
Radvany also claims that there was no evidence to support a jury instruction on the aggravation of a preexisting condition and that the trial court erred in giving that instruction. Again, we disagree with Radvany.
Davis tеstified that she experienced pain in her right shoulder approximately three months after the accident and that she did not recall having any pain or problems with her shoulder prior to that time. Her treating physician, Dr. Mark E. deBlois, testified that Davis’ rotator cuff was injured, that the accident caused the tear in Davis’ rotator cuff, and that the injury required surgery. Dr. deBlois also testified that Davis had a bone spur on her shoulder joint, which he described as a calcium growth associated with degenerative сhanges in the shoulder joint.
Radvany’s expert witness, Dr. John Meyers, disagreed, asserting that the injury was the result of degenerative changes that would have occurred regardless of the accident. Meyers аlso testified that 75% of people Davis’ age have rotator cuff tears and that many of such conditions are asymptomatic. In response to a question by Davis’ counsel, Meyers stated that thе tear in Davis’ rotator cuff “may have” developed prior to the accident.
Both experts testified that Davis had a condition which could have pre-dated the accident, a degenerative shoulder joint and a rota-tor cuff tear. Dr. Meyers’ testimony supported the inference thаt the tom rotator cuff could have been asymptomatic prior to the accident. Davis testified she had no shoulder pain until after the accident. This evidence was “more than a scintilla” аnd thus was sufficient to support a jury instruction on the aggravation of a preexisting condition.
Rosen v. Greifenberger,
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.