Radu v. Rawley
1:24-cv-01981
| N.D. Ga. | Nov 17, 2025|
Check Treatment|
Docket
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
MARIAN RADU,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:24-CV-1981-TWT
ADAM RAWLEY,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a personal injury action. It is before the Court on the Defendant
Adam Rawley’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 24] and Motion to Strike
[Doc. 39] and the Plaintiff Marian Radu’s Motion to Supplement [Doc. 38]. For
the following reasons, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
24] is GRANTED, the Defendant’s Motion to Strike [Doc. 39] is DENIED, and
the Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement [Doc. 38] is DENIED. As a result, the
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [Doc. 23] and the Defendant’s Motion in Limine
[Doc. 26] are DENIED as moot.
I. Background1
This action arises out of a car accident between the two parties that took
place on April 3, 2022 in Gwinnett County, Georgia. (Def.’s Statement of
1 The operative facts on the Motion for Summary Judgment are taken
from the Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and the
Plaintiff’s response thereto. The Court will deem the Defendant’s factual
assertions, where supported by evidentiary citations, admitted unless the
Plaintiff makes a proper objection under Local Rule 56.1(B).
Material Facts ¶ 1). The Plaintiff Marian Radu was a passenger in a vehicle
driven by non-party Ionut Creta. ( ¶ 2). In the Complaint, the Plaintiff
alleges that as the vehicle he was a passenger in “lawfully entered the
intersection on a green traffic signal, Defendant [Adam Rawley] suddenly and
without warning disregarded the red traffic signal for his vehicle and drove his
vehicle directly into the intersection, colliding with the passenger side of Mr.
Creta’s vehicle containing Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¶ 5). A police officer responded to
the traffic accident and did not issue a traffic citation to the Defendant. (Def.’s
Statement of Material Facts ¶ 4). During depositions, the Defendant testified
that he had a green light when he entered the intersection, while the Plaintiff
testified that he does not remember whether Creta had a red, yellow, or green
light at the time of the accident—he was asleep when the accident occurred.
( ¶¶ 5, 7); (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B (“Rawley Dep.”) at 11:22-23; Ex.
D (“Radu Dep.”) at 15:17-18). As a result of the accident, the Plaintiff contends,
he sustained fractures in his cervical spine, a concussion, and other injuries.
(Def.’s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 8).
The Plaintiff filed this action in the State Court of Gwinnett County on
March 28, 2024, asserting one count each of negligence and negligence per se.
(Compl. ¶¶ 7-16). The Defendant removed the action to this Court on May 6,
2024, and now moves for summary judgment. [Doc. 24].
2
II. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings,
depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue
of material fact exists, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). The court should view the evidence and draw
any inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
, 398 U.S. 144, 158-59(1970). The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. ,477 U.S. 317
, 323–24 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. ,477 U.S. 242, 257
(1986).
III. Discussion
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
The Defendant argues that there is no genuine dispute that he had a
green light at the time of the accident, and there is no admissible evidence that
the accident caused the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at
7-12). In response, the Plaintiff contends that Creta told the responding officer
that he had a green light. (Pl.’s Resp. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J., at 4-5). He
asserts on that basis that summary judgment is improper because there is a
genuine dispute of material fact as to who was at fault for the accident. ( at
3
5-6).2
The Court need not wade into the Defendant’s causation arguments
because the Plaintiff has failed to rebut the Defendant’s evidence that he had
a green light at the time the accident occurred. First, the Plaintiff’s reliance on
the purported body camera footage from the accident scene is misplaced
because that evidence is not properly before the Court. The Plaintiff has not
filed this evidence in the record and failed to file a statement of additional
material facts with citations to supporting evidence, as required under Local
Rule 56.1(B)(1), (B)(2)(b). Specifically, Local Rule 56.1(B)(1) provides that
“[e]ach material fact must be numbered separately and supported by a citation
to evidence proving such fact” and that the Court “will not consider any fact . .
. set out only in the brief and not in the movant’s statement of undisputed
facts.” Moreover, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) prohibits a party from using
information as evidence on a motion when that information was not provided
during discovery as required under Rule 26. The fact that the Defendant could
have requested the video from the police department himself, as the Plaintiff
asserts, is irrelevant to the Plaintiff’s disclosure obligations under Rule 26.
Thus, the Court has not and cannot consider the body camera footage cited
2 The Court has also considered the Defendant’s reply [Doc. 32] and the
Plaintiff’s surreply [Doc. 33]. The Court notes that the Plaintiff’s surreply was
not properly styled as a motion permitting leave to file a surreply, but as the
Defendant has not opposed it, the Court will nonetheless consider it.
4
only via a Dropbox link in a footnote of the Plaintiff’s response brief.
Second, the Plaintiff cannot rely on the police officer’s description of the
accident in the police report—including Creta’s statement to him at the
scene—as evidence that Creta had a green light, because it is hearsay. Fed. R.
Evid. 801(c), 802; , 683 F.3d 1283, 1293(11th Cir. 2012) (noting that a district court generally cannot consider inadmissible hearsay on a motion for summary judgment). The Plaintiff’s argument that the police officer’s statement is admissible because he could be called to testify at trial misses the mark. Even if the officer testified at trial, his testimony as to what Creta said, if admitted as evidence that Creta in fact had a green light, would still be inadmissible hearsay. While the Plaintiff is correct that the officer could testify about what he observed at the accident scene without running afoul of the hearsay rules, the Plaintiff is not attempting to rely merely on the officer’s observations. Instead, he clearly seeks to have the Court consider Creta’s statement to the officer about the color of the traffic light as evidence of the truth of that matter. There is no exception to Rule 802 that allows that here. ,556 F.3d 1260, 1278
(11th
Cir. 2009) (“It is well established that entries in a police report which result
from the officer’s own observations and knowledge may be admitted but that
statements made by third persons under no business duty to report may not.”
(citation omitted)).
5
That leaves the Defendant’s deposition testimony that his light was
green when he entered the intersection as the only admissible evidence
touching on the fault issue. Even viewing this statement in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, summary judgment for the Defendant is warranted.
Assuming the Defendant’s light was green, he could not have negligently failed
to obey a traffic device or “failed to operate his vehicle in a safe and lawful
manner,” as the Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint. This dooms both of the
Plaintiff’s negligence claims. , 398 U.S. at 158-59. While the Plaintiff argues that that his deposition testimony that he is not sure what color Creta’s traffic light was when he entered the intersection necessarily implies a dispute of fact on this issue, the Plaintiff misconstrues the burden shifting framework applicable on summary judgment. Once the Defendant pointed to his deposition testimony regarding the traffic light issue, the burden shifted to the Plaintiff to “present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” , 477 U.S. at 257. The Plaintiff’s testimony does nothing to rebut the Defendant’s testimony here. Moreover, the Plaintiff cannot satisfy his burden by pointing to the lack of admissible evidence in support of his position to manufacture a dispute of fact about the color of Creta’s traffic light. Finally, the Plaintiff cites ,130 Ga. App. 396, 399
(1973) for the proposition that the Defendant’s testimony, since it is
6
self-serving, must be construed against him. ( Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Mot.
for Summ. J., at 5-6). This rule is no more than a narrow restatement of general
summary judgment law requiring the movant’s evidence to be construed in the
non-movant’s favor. , 398 U.S. at 158-59 (noting that the court is
required to view the evidence and draw any inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-movant). Moreover, to the extent the Plaintiff attempts to
reference Georgia’s rule, which requires a party’s testimony to be
“construed most strongly against him” on summary judgment, that rule applies
only when that testimony is “self-contradictory, vague, or equivocal.”
, 2025 WL 2715888, at *3 (Ga. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2025). The Defendant’s
testimony that he had a green light does not fit that description—in fact, his
testimony is more aptly described as unequivocal.
For all of these reasons, based on the admissible evidence before the
Court, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the Defendant had a
green light when he entered the intersection, so the Plaintiff’s negligence
claims against him necessarily fail. Accordingly, the Court will grant the
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 24].
B. Motion to Supplement and Motion to Strike the Motion to Supplement
The Plaintiff moves to supplement his surreply to “advise the Court”
that he has scheduled a deposition of the officer that responded to the accident
and intends to present that testimony at trial. (Pl.’s Mot. to Supplement, [Doc.
7
38], at 2-3). The Defendant moves to strike the Plaintiff’s Motion. (Def.’s Mot.
to Strike, [Doc. 39], at 1-2). Neither Motion is well taken.
Notwithstanding the fact that discovery in this matter ended in early
June, there is no valid reason to permit the Plaintiff’s additional briefing here.
, 2024 WL 3833853, at *2 (N.D. Ga. July 8,
2024) (noting that district courts have discretion to permit sur-replies “but will
do so only when a valid reason for additional briefing exists, such as when a
movant raises new arguments in its reply brief.”). No such valid reason exists
here, with the Plaintiff filing his motion nearly three months after this matter
was submitted to the Court. Nor does the deposition the Plaintiff seeks to take
have any bearing on the motions presently before the Court. Accordingly, the
Court will deny the Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement [Doc. 38].
As a result, the Defendant’s Motion to Strike is moot. Nonetheless, the
Motion is also procedurally improper. Under Rule 12(f), a party may move to
strike all or a portion of a “pleading” that contains “an insufficient defense or
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(f). A motion to supplement a response or surreply to a motion for
summary judgment is not a pleading listed under Rule 7(a). Fed. R. Civ.
P. 7(a). Therefore, the Court will deny the Defendant’s Motion to Strike. [Doc.
39].
8
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant Adam Rawley’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 24] is GRANTED, the Defendant’s Motion to Strike
[Doc. 39] is DENIED, and the Plaintiff Marian Radu’s Motion to Supplement
[Doc. 38] is DENIED. As a result, the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike [Doc. 23] and
the Defendant’s Motion in Limine [Doc. 26] are DENIED as moot. The Clerk is
directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendant, and to close the case.
SO ORDERED, this 17th day of November, 2025.
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge